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The . . . English worker . . . cherishes religious, 
social and national prejudices against the Irish worker.
His attitude toward him is much the same as that of the 
"poor whites" to the "niggers" in the former slave states 
of the U.S.A.
— Karl Marx
[The English working classes looked upon] Irish labor 
as "black," and therefore stayed resolutely unsympathetic 
to catalogues of the wrongs of Ireland.
— A . P . Thornton
The Irish played a role in British history from 1800- 
1922 similar to that of the Negro in American history.
— Lawrence J. McCaffrey
In Northern Ireland Catholics are Blacks who happen 
to have white skins. . . .
— Liam de Paor
[The Ulster Protestant] despised his Catholic neigh­
bours, they were no countrymen of his: they were a lower
order of human being.
— George Dangerfield
PREFACE
From 1870 until 1918 the Irish sought a degree of 
self-government in domestic, as distinct from foreign or 
imperial, matters. Their aim was to achieve a modest 
degree of autonomy within the United Kingdom, a move which 
would have organized the United Kingdom on a federal basis, 
leaving England's ultimate authority and sovereignty in Ire­
land untouched. Since the Nationalist Party had failed by 
1918 to achieve these goals the Irish people turned over­
whelmingly to a new party, Sinn Fein, which d nded the 
complete severence of all political ties with England and 
the establishment of a sovereign Irish republic. The re­
fusal of British statesmen to accede to the wishes of the 
Nationalist Party drove Ireland into the arms of the republi­
cans and led directly to the destruction of the political 
union between Ireland and England and to the division of 
Ireland into two separate states.
The purpose of this study is to describe the images
that prevailed among England's two major political parties
during the Home Rule struggle, to determine what factors
influenced the composition of those images, and to discover
how those images were affected by the nature and course of
British policy toward Ireland. Since that policy, during
this period, has been described in numerous works, this is
iii
not simply another account of British policy. It is an 
attempt to discover what the fundamental underlying party 
images of the Irish were, and to explain how those images 
conditioned party policy and in part justified it. It is an 
effort to set forth in systematic form the party images of 
the Irish and to explain the relationship between these and 
the various social, political, and imperial objectives of 
the two parties.
It is not the purpose of this study to describe or 
cite in detail every act performed or statement made by 
leading English political figures during this half century 
in order to reveal the party images of Ireland. The method 
has been to cull from the many acts and many statements of 
British politicians and political commentators a select 
number sufficient to indicate the essential nature of these 
images and the factors underlying their formation.
The sources used are the statements and ideas of the 
various leading politicians and political theorists and 
writers as revealed in their diaries, memoirs, speeches, 
published correspondence and memoranda, magazine articles, 
pamphlets, autobiographies, biographies, and government 
documents, such as the Parliamentary Debates. In addition 
monographs and articles dealing with importantly related 
subjects have also been used.
It will perhaps be useful to add a note on termi­
nology. The term "British" is used to refer to the people 
of Great Britain, even though in a strictly legal sense the
iv
Irish were also British. But a convenient term was required 
to refer to the people of England, Scotland, and Wales, as 
distinct from the Irish, and this was really the only ap­
propriate one. There is also a question as to whether the 
term "Home Rule era" is justified, since Home Rule was never 
achieved. But again a convenient term was needed, and the 
only real alternative, "late Victorian and Edwardian Eng­
land," is not entirely appropriate for the period covered.
It may be also useful, if perhaps superfluous, to say 
a word about footnoting. Titles and facts of publication 
are given in full the first time they are cited. Thereafter, 
most titles are arbitrarily abbreviated to their key words 
and in such a way, hopefully, as to cause no confusion.
In conclusion I would like to express my appreciation 
for the important financial assistance I received from 
Rackham Graduate School of the University of Michigan and 
from Lake Superior State College. I should further like to 
state my gratitude to the latter institution for its pro­
found generosity in granting me a two-year leave of absence. 
Finally, to Professor Gerald S. Brown of the University of 
Michigan I owe a special debt for having introduced me to 
the importance and possibilities of this type of historical 
research.
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PART I 
PROLOGUE
1
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE BRITISH AND THE IRISH
Sir, it is the difficulty, one of the great diffi­
culties, of the problem that Ireland is not a homogeneous 
community— thait it consists of two nations, . . . two races 
and two religions. _
--Joseph Chamberlain
Ireland was— and is— a land of bitter, irreconcil­
able, racial and religious conflicts. ~
— Robert Blake
During the approximate half century which spans the 
period from 1869 to 1921 when Irish affairs played a 
prominant and divisive role in British politics, with Con­
servatives and Liberals waging a long and bitter controversy 
over the Irish demand for Home Rule, race and ethnicity were 
predominant elements in the consciousness of most English­
men. There was an almost irresistible tendency among many 
of them to ascribe the achievements of certain nationalities 
and the seeming lack of commendable accomplishment by others 
to biological and cultural characteristics. With respect to
^Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 
3d ser., Vol. 304 (Mar. 26- Apr. 16, 1886), col. 1200.
2Unrepentent Tory: The Life and Times of Andrew
Bonar Law, 1858-1923, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1956), p. 208.
the British and the Irish therefore most Englishmen looked 
upon the former as a progressive and advanced people while 
they saw in the latter only the sluggish characteristics of 
backwardness. Such a conclusion required the assumption 
that the Irish and the British were biologically and ethni­
cally distinct; and most Englishmen of the Home Rule era 
were convinced that this was a fact. They thought of them­
selves proudly as Anglo-Saxon, while they looked upon the 
Irish rather contemptibly as Celtic. They were willing to 
concede that prior to the Germanic invasions of England in 
the fifth and sixth centuries both Great Britain and Ireland 
had been predominantly populated by various Celtic peoples.^
However, while most of these remained among the Germanic 
4
invaders, many Englishmen of the Home Rule era chose to
believe that they had been driven, by the more able and
masterful Germanic peoples, out of England and lowland Scot-
5land into Wales, Ireland, and the Scottish highlands.
The eagerness of most Englishmen during the Home Rule 
era to believe that they were biologically and ethnically 
distinct from the Irish is revealed by the fact that while 
they were willing to recognize the Danish, Norwegian, and
3
William Dalton Babington, Fallacies of Race Theories 
as Applied to National Characteristics (London: Longman's,
Green, & Co., 1895), p. 233.
4Ibid., p. 233.
^Goldwin Smith, Irish History and Irish Character 
(London: James Parker and Co., 1868), p. 8.
4Norman factors in their biological and cultural makeup they 
generally ignored the existence of a Celtic element. The 
tendency to do so stems in part not only from a strong anti- 
Irish prejudice but from a rather widespread derogatory 
opinion of the Celtic people in general. It also reveals 
the inclination among Englishmen to think of themselves as 
biologically and ethnically homogeneous. They felt that 
even though the Danes, Norwegians, and Normans had invaded 
and settled in England, there had been no major biological 
or cultural dichotomy between them and the Anglo-Saxons, 
and that the absorption and assimilation of these into Anglo- 
Saxon culture had been relatively easy. The term Anglo- 
Saxon therefore tended to obscure the many elements that had 
gone into the making of British ethnicity. It lent credence 
to the assumption that the British were a superior people, 
mentally and culturally, who had developed a unique and 
superior language and institutions, and who had spread that 
language, those institutions, and British dominion round much 
of the world. It increased, and gave plausibility, to the 
widespread tendency to view the Irish as very different from 
them. They thought of the Irish as Celtic and many of them 
repeatedly referred to them as such. With few, though grow­
ing and important exceptions, they used the term "Celtic" 
derogatorily and they were convinced that the Celts were an 
inferior biological and ethnic group.^ The more they
^L. P. Curtis, jr., Anglo-Saxons and Celts; A Study 
of Anti-Irish Prejudice in Victorian England (Conference of 
British Studies at the University of Bridgeport, 1968}, p. 12.
5emphasized this fact, the more they seemed to become ob­
livious to the Celtic strain in their own background. They
thought of the Irish as a weak, submissive, and unadvanced
7
people, who, unable to assimilate and dominate invading 
ethnic groups, had themselves been dominated and ruled by
g
their invaders. In this period many Englishmen believed 
that those who had the power to conquer had the right to 
rule. This right of rule by conquest lies at the very root 
of racist and imperialist theories, and the attempt to apply 
this principle in Ireland was one of the fundamental factors 
in the long history of Anglo-Irish conflict.
Ireland, of course, like England has been subjected 
to a number of invasions, both in medieval and in modern 
times. There were Norwegian, Anglo-Norman, English, and 
Scottish invasions in the Middle Ages. Of these the arrival 
of Strongbow and the Anglo-Normans in the 1160s was the 
most momentous event, for it marks the beginning of an in­
trusion by England into Irish affairs from which it has 
never been able to extricate itself. It also marks the 
beginning of Irish resistance to English dominion, which has 
been one of the characteristics of Anglo-Irish relations
7
G. Smith, Irish History and Irish Character, p. 220.
g
This concept of course lies at the root of Kipling's 
imperialism where "the British are God's chosen people," 
and where conquest, power, and the importance of the army 
are repeatedly highlighted. See D. C. Somervell, English 
Thought in the Nineteenth Century (New York: David Me Kay
Company, 1964), pp. 187-88.
ever since. While the arrival of the Anglo-Normans in the 
twelfth century was the first step in the long, slow military 
conquest of Ireland, it was the influx of English and 
Scottish colonists in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
which had the most harmful and enduring consequences for the 
Irish and which led to the bitter and prolonged hostility be­
tween them and the British. There were three important 
aspects to these sixteenth- and seventeenth-century in­
vasions: (1) The number of people who came was very large;
(2) they came principally as colonists to occupy and settle 
the land, though many would remain in England as absentee 
landlords; and (3) they came determined not only to resist 
assimilation, but to impose their institutions and their 
rule on the Irish. From these settlements stems the conflict 
between the British and the Irish that rageJ between Ireland 
and England until 1922 and continues to rage within the 
boundaries of Northern Ireland today.
Why did these invasions trigger such ill consequences, 
consequences which have had such long-term durability? In 
this respect it is interesting to compare briefly the 
colonization of Ireland, and the consequences that ensued, 
with similar colonizations in what became the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The colonization of 
the two North American countries took place contemporaneously 
with the colonization of Ireland. The colonists in North 
America were confronted with a native population which they 
steadily pushed westward, appropriating their lands by
various means, and gradually exercising dominion over them. 
For nearly three centuries the native people resisted this 
process but were eventually overcome and forced to submit.
In Australia and New Zealand a similar process of coloniza­
tion and appropriation occurred. In these countries too 
the indigenous peoples offered opposition but were gradually 
overcome and forced to submit to the political dominion of 
the colonists. In all of these areas the colonists and 
their descendents eventually became more numerous than the 
native populations, a fact which may explain in part why the 
latter have never been able to regain political control of 
the territories over which they once held sway.
Similar efforts were undertaken to conquer and 
dominate the Irish. In the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­
turies English rulers gradually confiscated, under various 
pretexts, almost all the land of Ireland and granted it to 
their English supporters. These in turn rented much of the 
land of northern Ireland to Scottish and English tenants 
who settled there in large numbers, and in so doing radically 
"ltered the ethnic makeup of the country. These English 
and Scottish colonists came eventually to form a majority 
of the people in the province of Ulster where they settled 
mostly as small tenant-farmers. In the remaining three 
provinces, however, the new estate owners were less success­
ful in finding Englishmen and Scots to migrate to Ireland 
to assume the role of tenant-farmers, so that in those 
regions most of the Irish remained on the land as tenants
and laborers dominated by a small, powerful, and largely 
English, property-holding minority. From this time until 
1922 Ireland, though still overwhelmingly Irish in terms of 
population, was dominated and ruled by these great English 
landlords and their descendents, or Anglo-Irish as they later 
came to be called.
By the end of the seventeenth century therefore the 
British and Irish had been lodged side by side in Ireland 
under conditions which laid the basis for the economic 
struggle, ethnic conflict, and religious animosity that 
would color Anglo-Irish relations during the succeeding 
centuries. The question arises as to how the British, Anglo- 
Irish, and Ulster Scots could have developed such intense 
and enduring prejudices toward a people who were in many ways 
not very different from themselves. But when one studies 
the manner by which the English and Scots were settled in 
Ireland and the nature of the relationship that was thereby 
created between them and the native population the causes 
become reasonably clear.
It is unquestionable that this prejudice grew to a 
very large extent out of the methods which surrounded the 
settlement of the British in Ireland. The Irish, having had 
most of their land confiscated and granted to the invader, 
not unnaturally viewed this as an outrageous crime that must 
eventually be rectified. The new settlers of course were 
fully aware of the hostility that had been engendered in 
the Irish and prepared to resist the reprisals and the
retaliation that would come from. them. They banded together 
therefore much more tightly than might otherwise have been 
the case to protect themselves and their property from the 
superior numbers of their enemy. This welded them into a 
close community with common interests against a vengeful 
outsider; and, perhaps much more importantly it also helped 
increase their tendency to view themselves as distinctly 
different from the native people.
This is not to say that an extreme ethnic conscious­
ness would not have existed had it not been for the material 
conditions of the plantations. There were other important 
differences between the British invaders and the native 
Irish. Most conspicuous among these were religious and 
linguistic factors. The two centuries during which the plan­
tation of Ireland took place coincided with an intense and 
widespread religious revivalism. This was the period of the 
Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter Reformation 
when men, with unbending religious fervor and self- 
righteous less, slew each other on a massive and prolonged 
scale for the sake of a particular religious creed. It was 
an era when those who held the reins of power tended to 
legislate on behalf of their own particular version of 
Christianity and to discriminate against those religious 
denominations of which they disapproved. It was an age not 
only generally devoid of religious toleration, but seized by 
the belief that alien religious creeds often contained 
something Satanic or disabolical about them. Thus the
10
immense gulf between Protestantism and Catholicism which 
existed at the time of the plantations further intensified 
the hostility between the two peoples and accentuated another 
aspect of their distinctiveness.
This religious difference was supplemented by a 
linguistic one. The sixteenth- and seventeenth-century 
Irish spoke Gaelic, a language which was utterly foreign and 
incomprehensible to the British colonists. Conversely, the 
English spoken by the new settlers was equally incompre­
hensible to the Irish, so that this linguistic difference 
created a formidable and conspicuous barrier to intercommunal 
communication. Apart perhaps from skin color nothing can 
more effectively reveal the distinction between two people. 
The absence of easy and familiar linguistic communication 
between the British and the Irish created an additional 
obstacle to the development of a harmonious relationship 
between them, and fed the feelings of fear, suspicion, and 
hatred that developed on both sides.
This antagonism was greatest in Ulster where the 
British colonists formed a large proportion of the popula­
tion. The majority of them were small tenant-farmers and 
would generally have been indistinguishable from their
Irish counterparts had it not been for linguistic and re-
g
ligious differences. In most parts of the remaining
g
Edmund Curtis, A History of Ireland (3d ed.; London: 
Methuen & Co., 1937), pp. 230-32.
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provinces, the colonists stood out clearly because of their 
ownership of large landed estates. In these areas the 
Irish were tenant-farmers who worked the land which now 
belonged largely to British landlords.^"® Had the intense 
colonization and extensive conquest of Ireland that took 
place in the seventeenth century occurred prior to the 
Protestant Reformation in England, the differences between 
the two peoples would not have been so marked. In par­
ticular the highly important religious distinction would 
have been absent. But coming as they did in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, when England and Scotland had 
become Protestant, the differences between the two peoples 
were further accentuated. Religious identity between the 
British and the Irish would probably not, in any case, have 
prevented the confiscation of the land but it may have 
tempered British treatment of the Irish and prevented some 
of the Draconian measures that were enacted against them.
The assumption that the Irish would probably have 
been dispossessed of their land in any event is based on 
the fact that the policy of confiscation had been initiated, 
not as one would expect by a Protestant monarch, but by the 
Catholic and proselytizing Mary Tudor. At her command the 
population of the counties of Leix and Offaly were to be 
removed and replaced by English colonists who, it was pre­
sumed, would be more loyal and trustworthy, and who were to
10Ibid., p. 253.
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hire only English l a b o r . T h i s  f^Pt is revealing, for it
indicates that, though there were strong religious overtones
surrounding the colonization of Ireland, especially in the
seventeenth century, economic and political factors played an
essential part. Nor did the British make a serious and con-
12centrated effort to convert the Irish to Protestantism.
The laws they enacted against the practice of Catholicism
were intended primarily to degrade, not convert, the 
13Irish. If the British had seriously wished to convert the 
Irish to Protestantism, they might well have succeeded had 
they made a genuine effort to do so and had the methods they 
employed been less oppressive. But a combination of economic 
and political motives forced them to enact a series of 
severely discriminatory anti-Catholic laws which, rather 
than convert the Irish, served only to degrade and differ­
entiate them socially and economically from the British 
community and to increase their denominational fervor and 
intensify their hostility toward the British. This had un­
fortunate and undesirable consequences, for the more the 
Irish resented the new settlers, the more the latter drew
^Giovanni Costigan, A History of Modern Ireland, 
with a Sketch of Earlier Times (New York: Pegasus, 1969),
p. 53.
12J. C. Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603- 
1923 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), p. 159.
13Ibid., p. 159. See also Beckett's A Short History 
of Ireland (Harper Colophon Books. New York: Harper &
Row, 1952), p. 98.
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together to defend themselves and their property, emphasiz­
ing more keenly their common interests and their identity 
as a community, while at the same time accentuating the 
divergence of interests and characteristics between them and 
their Irish enemies.
In addition to the religious and linguistic distinc­
tions between the British and the Irish there was a third 
factor which was perhaps of equal importance in aggravating 
the clash between them. This was the political structure 
of Ireland. There is a well known Marxist theory that at 
any given time in history those who possess the major 
portion of the wealth of a country will also control the 
political power. Whether this theory is applicable at all 
times and in all places need not concern us here. What does 
concern us is the fact that, at least until 1829, it was 
very true in the case of Ireland. Until the Act of Union 
in 1800 Ireland had its own Parliament in Dublin. Despite 
this, the members of this Parliament did not represent the 
Irish community. They were nominated and elected by the 
Protestant Anglo-Irish colonists and they represented their 
interests and objectives. Irish Catholics— and practically 
all of the native Irish remained Catholic— were denied any 
part in either the legislature or the executive. The former 
was the preserve of the Anglo-Irish and the latter was in 
the hands of the British. It was not until 1795 that 
Catholics were permitted to participate in Irish politics. 
Even then, however, the degree of participation was
14
extremely small, since it merely involved the permission of 
those Catholics who met certain property qualifications to 
vote in Parliamentary elections. They were still legally 
barred from holding political office. The abolition of the 
Irish Parliament in 1800, bringing about the legislative 
union of Britain and Ireland and the transference of Ire­
land's M.P.s from Dublin to Westminster, did not alter the 
situation as far as Catholics were concerned. It was not 
until 1829, under the influence of Daniel O'Connell, that 
Catholics were permitted to sit in Parliament. But while 
the British conceded this reform they simultaneously dis­
franchised many of those Irish Catholics who had been elig­
ible to vote since 1795. This was achieved by raising the 
property qualifications. The Irish were thus excluded from 
any role in the making of Irish law until 18 29. Even then, 
and in fact as long as the union existed, the power of Irish 
M.P.s to influence legislation was extremely minimal. They 
could never hope to form a majority in the British Parlia­
ment, and their ability to influence legislation depended on 
their capacity either to persuade English M.P.s or conversely 
to coerce Parliament by obstruction. But if their legisla­
tive power was restricted, their executive power was 
negligible. Until 1922 the British maintained a separate 
executive for Ireland, an executive from which the native 
Irish were perennially excluded from all positions of power.
It is only to be expected that these legislative and 
governmental conditions would give rise to increasing
15
friction in Ireland. This was produced not only by the fact 
that the British and the Anglo-Irish monopolized the law­
making and governmental machinery but also because this was 
used against the Irish in an extremely discriminatory way. 
Beginning in the seventeenth century the Anglo-Irish aristo­
cracy proceeded to enact a series of laws that not only 
discriminated against the Irish in the area of political 
rights but in civil and religious rights as well. Most of 
these were designed to protect the colonists and their 
property from Irish revenge, but they also ground the Irish 
down to a very low level of subsistence, barring them from
educational, professional, and business opportunities, and
14thus from social mobility. They were designed to keep
15the Irish in a subordinate and subservient position, and 
bore all the marks of what today would be called racist 
legislation.
Racism is a set of attitudes, a way of behaving, both
in thought and in action, that is not necessarily confined
to a certain pattern of relations between two distinct races
as scientifically defined by the anthropologist. It is not
restricted exclusively to a certain attitude of people of
16one color toward those of a different color. When one
■^Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland, pp. 151-52,
157-59.
15Ibid., pp. 151-52, 157-59.
^Jacques Barzun, Race; A Study in Superstition 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 14.
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ethnic or national group considers itself generally superior 
to other such groups, when it believes itself to be more 
capable in most areas of endeavor, when it assumes its cul­
ture or its institutions to be superior, and when it derives 
a certain satisfaction— often rather arrogant and self- 
righteous— from these assumptions, it is behaving in a 
typically racist way. Racism, like ethnocentrism, is a form 
of extreme group egotism; and as such it clashes vigorously 
with the widely held concept that modesty and humility in 
the individual are virtuous. Denied thus the satisfaction 
of self-praise, the individual achieves a degree of compen­
sation by merging himself in the group, and applying to the 
latter the commendations he would otherwise have bestowed 
upon himself.
The racist, or ethnocentrist, does not always reveal 
his prejudice in explicit and unambiguous ways. He is at 
times culturally or intellectually inhibited from making 
an open and straightforward profession of his views. In 
fact he may not himself be aware that he is behaving in a 
racist way. In the period of the Home Rule struggle, how­
ever, many Englishmen believed firmly in a hierarchy of 
races, with themselves at the top, and they did not consider 
it out of place to state publicly that Englishmen were 
superior to most other peoples. While some of them would 
have protested against similar public statements with 
regard to the Irish, there were nevertheless many English­
men who repeatedly expounded publicly on their inordinate
17
17shortcomings. A. P. Thornton is not entirely correct
therefore when he states that "Englishmen of the best kind
talked little of their superiority to others, they were
18content to assert that superiority in action." English­
men have in fact spoken at times with extremely undiplomatic 
candor about the nature of the Irish. This was especially 
so during the Home Rule era and particularly when the union 
was seriously threatened. Lord Salisbury's description of
them as Hottentots does not say much for the Irish or for
19the Hottentots. English imperialists could remain silent 
about their superiority only so long as it was not serious­
ly challenged. As soon as a serious threat was mounted 
they would assert their superiority both in verbal and in 
stronger terms. Throughout the history of British dominion 
in Ireland English imperialists have shown their disdain 
for the Irish and their culture in numerous ways. They 
have repeatedly enacted laws to prevent the acceptance and
17The best evidence on both sides of this question 
is furnished by the debate that occurred when Lord Salisbury 
explicitly and publicly asserted that the Irish were 
inferior to the Anglo-Saxons. See Lady Gwendolen Cecil,
Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury (4 vols.; London:
Hodder & Stoughton, 1931-1933), II, 303.
18A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies;
A Study in British Power {Anchor Books- Garden City, New 
York: Doubleday & Company, 1959), p. 240. Of course much
depends on Thornton’s definition of the term "the best 
kind," and it would be interesting to probe the underlying 
assumptions and ramifications of this phrase.
^Cecil, Life of Salisbury, III, 302-04.
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adoption of that culture by English settlers, and they have 
at times attempted to destroy it. From their earliest con­
tact with the Irish they have shown their disdain for them, 
as The Topography of Ireland, written by the historian 
Giraldus Cambrensis after visiting Ireland in the first 
years of England's conquest, reveals. As early as the 
fourteenth century efforts were made to segregate the 
British and Irish communities in Ireland. The Statutes of 
Kilkenny, enacted in 1366, prohibited the British colonists 
from recognizing Irish law, from speaking the Irish
language, from dressing in the Irish vogue, or from taking
. , 20 an Irish spouse.
With the military and political triumph of the
British in the seventeenth century the laws of Ireland were
reconstructed to reflect the aims and objectives of the new
settlers. They ceased entirely to represent the will or
21aspirations of the Irish. In fact they became utterly
20See Edmund Curtis and R. B. McDowell, eds., Irish 
Historical Documents, 117 2-1922 (London: Methuen & Co.,
193), pp. 52-59. Terence de Vere White states that the 
Statutes of Kilkenny "bore a striking resemblance to the 
modern apartheid law of South Africa." See The Anglo-Irish 
(Victor Gollancz, 1972), p. 270.
21In his book Why England Maintains the Union: A
Popular Rendering of England's Case Against Home Rule 
(London: John Murray, 1887), pp. 18-19, the famous English
professor of constitutional law A. V. Dicey agrees with this 
point. And yet Dicey not only remained a fervent unionist 
but was one of those who in the period 1911-1914 supported 
the view that the Ulster Scots would be justified in armed 
rebellion in order to prevent the application of Home Rule to 
Ulster. For this point see Ronald Me Neill, Ulster's Stand 
for Union (London: John Murray, 1922) , p. 170^ and David
James, Lord Roberts (London: Hollis & Carter, 1954), p. 473.
19
22adverse to Irish needs. They became largely the laws of 
an imperialistic and aristocratic class, expressing the 
will, outlook, and objectives of that class. Insofar as 
these corresponded to the needs of the Irish they were of 
course beneficial, but such correspondence was minor. Even 
the British tenant class, which resided mainly in Ulster, 
was permitted to develop distinct and more advantageous 
land tenure customs than the Irish tenants of the other 
three provinces, so that even in the economic sphere, where 
one would have expected the English and Scottish tenants 
to develop common interests with their Irish counterparts, 
they were largely prevented from doing so. This is not to 
say that the law in other countries, including England, was 
not principally the product of a particular class. The 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century enclosure acts in 
Britain certainly represented the aims of the large land­
owners and thrust many of the peasants into the burgeoning 
cities. It was an Anglo-Irish poet in fact, Oliver Gold­
smith, who in "The Deserted Village," criticized the 
inequity of class law and the destruction of British 
peasants:
111 fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
Where wealth accumulates, and men decay;
Princes and lords may flourish, or may fade;
A breath can make them, as a breath has made.
But a bold peasantry, their country's pride,
When once destroyed, can never be supplied.
22Dicey, Why England Maintains the Union, pp. 18-19.
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But if law was largely class law in England, in Ire­
land it was not only the law of a dominant class but also of 
a particular and alien ethnic group, and as such it was much 
more inclusive and much more discriminatory, aiming to break
the spirit of the native population and to keep them ignor-
23ant, uneducated, poor, passive, and deferential. Michael 
Davitt, who in the late nineteenth century devoted himself 
entirely to the elimination of this class and colonial sys­
tem, was fully aware of its social consequences. "There 
was," he wrote,
a greater evil than economic ignorance to beat down 
among the tenantry of Ireland, and that was their 
slavish social attitude towards not alone the landlord 
but his agent and whole entourage. It was a hateful 
and heartbreaking sight to see manly looking men, 
young and old, doffing their hats and caps and cring­
ing in abject manner to any person connected with an 
estate, and before magistrates and others associated 
with the administration of pro-landlord l a w s . 24
This slavishness of attitude was born of the fact that the
colonial and landed class had wealth, government, and the
law on their side, and seldom hesitated to use them fully.
As Davitt wrote:
It was a moral malady, . . . the demoralizing results 
of the poor possessed by those who owned the land and 
who had the legal authority to carry out the dreaded 
penalty of eviction. Generations of suffering and 
tyranny had inflicted this slavishness of manner upon 
a Celtic peasantry.25
23J. C. Beckett, A Short History of Ireland, pp. 98- 
100, and Michael Davitt, The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland 
(London and New York: Harper & Brothers, 1904), pp. 164-65.
? A
Davitt, ibid., pp. 164-65. My italics.
25Ibid., pp. 164-65.
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This "power of landlordism to demoralize" was perhaps
26its "most hateful feature." It was harmful not only to 
those on the bottom of the ladder but to those on the top as 
well. It not only bred hatred and hostility in the peasan­
try but also in the landlord class. These people arrogated 
to themselves "a status of social superiority which taught"
them "to despise the very people by whom and upon whom they 
27lived." This contempt may have been psychologically ne­
cessitated by the exploitative and parasitic nature of the 
landlord's existence. He may have found in his image of the 
Irish as ignorant, lazy, and inefficient, a degree of justi­
fication for his exploitation of them. Such an explanation 
would be consistent with the economic theories of the 
Classical Economists. These men argued that societies would 
unavoidably, because of the nature of man and the laws of 
economics, be divided into rich and poor; and they justified, 
on the basis of these theories, the existence of the Irish 
peasantry, or the poor of any country, on the verge of star­
vation. Thomas Malthus even justified death through starva-
26Ibid., pp. 164-65.
27Ibid., p. 188.
28T. R. Malthus. An Essay on the Principle of Popula­
tion: or a View of Its Past and Present Effects on Human
Happiness (7th ed.; London; Reeves and Turner, 1872), pp. 
531-35.
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But the expropriation of the land of Ireland, coming 
as it did in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, before 
the promulgation of these views, was of such vast propor­
tions that it was bound to raise a certain moral restlessness 
among those who questioned its ethical basis. These con­
fiscations, which may have left perhaps as little as five
2 9per cent of the land, often the most infertile, in the
hands of the Irish, required strong legal and ethical grounds
for their justification. The general argument used was that
the Irish had been disloyal to the Crown and hence the land
was legally forfeited. This was the argument used by James
3 0I to justify the confiscation of much of Ulster. It was 
also used as the basis of the Adventurer's Act of 1642. The 
adventurers were English speculators who advanced funds for 
the reconquest of Ireland after the rebellions of the pre­
vious year. The Act explicitly stated that there would be
31no clemency for the rebels, thereby insuring that the 
speculators would gain possession of the land; and subse­
quently Cromwell's victories were followed by the payment of
29The figures differ as to the exact amount of land 
held by the Irish. These are discussed at length in 
William F. T. Butler, Confiscation in Irish History (Port 
Washington, New York; Kennikat Press, 1970).
"^Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland, pp. 44-45. 
Irish historians usually refer to these colonizations as 
"plantations."
31See Curtis and McDowell, eds., Irish Historical 
Documents, 1172-1922, pp. 177-7 9.
this debt.^
The final conquest of Ireland and the final confisca­
tions were followed in the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries by the enactment of the Penal Laws, a
series of measures designed to insure that all opportunity
33for learning and advancement was denied to the Irish.
Their degradation to the lowest level of society, therefore, 
34soon followed. The extreme severity, vindictiveness, and 
injustice of these laws were vigorously condemned by the 
conservative, Edmund Burke. They were, he wrote, a "machine" 
of "elaborate contrivance, and as well fitted for the op­
pression, impoverishment, and degradation of a people, and
the debasement in them of human nature itself, as ever pro-
35ceeded from the perverted ingenuity of man." As the 
population increased, and the economy, especially its com­
mercial and industrial sectors, failed to expand proportion­
ately, the social and economic condition of the Irish
32Curtis, A History of Ireland, pp. 252-54.
33Beckett, The Making of Modern Ireland, pp. 151-52,
157-59.
^ Ibid., pp. 151-52.
35Edmund Burke, "A Letter to Sir H. Langrishe, Bart., 
M.P., on the Subject of the Roman Catholics of Ireland, and 
the Propriety of Admitting Them to the Elective Franchise, 
Consistently with the Principles of the Constitution as 
Established at the Revolution, 1792," in Letters and 
Speeches and Tracts on Irish Affairs, ed. by Matthew 
Arnold (London: Macmillan and Co., 1881), p. 277.
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deteriorated still further. Excluded by law from most edu­
cational opportunities, and from most of the professions, 
they were restricted largely to the role of agricultural 
laborers; and because of the land tenure system, which barred 
the tenant in the three provinces outside Ulster from com­
pensation for any improvements he might make, there existed 
little incentive to improve his holding.
It was the conscious policy of the colonists to depict 
the Irish as lacking the qualities of diligence and ef­
ficiency. They were contrasted unfavorably with their 
British counterparts, and this derogatory image soon became 
widespread and predominant. It was doubly welcomed by the 
Anglo-Irish, for in their view it was further justification 
for both their ownership of the land and their control of 
the legislature. It could justify class and colonial rule, 
and it was an easy scapegoat for the consequences of 
absentee landlordism. It precluded the necessity of ques­
tioning the justice and efficacy of the economic and polit­
ical systems. It disproved the suggestion that the land­
lords themselves pursued exclusively their own self-interest. 
It saved the politician and government official from the 
charge that the laws were inequitable or that they them­
selves were administratively inept. All deficiencies could 
be charged to Irish character. The British were struggling 
valiantly to uphold justice and to uplift and civilize the 
Irish. Any criticism from the latter merely revealed their 
ingrained ingratitude and obstructionism, and served as
25
evidence that the only way to rule such people was through
3 6strong, resolute, and authoritarian government.
By the 1870s the Irish had become completely dis­
satisfied with conditions under the existing political sys­
tem. If little benefit had accrued to them under the Anglo- 
Irish parliaments that sat in Dublin until 1800, conditions 
under the union were even worse. The "great hunger" of the 
1840s, resulting in widespread disease, death, and emigra­
tion, surpassed in terms of human suffering anything that 
Ireland had previously experienced. Irish tenants existed 
at a primitive subsistence level so that the largest possible 
profits could be extracted, profits which were then often spent
in England, depriving Ireland of needed opportunities for
37capital investment and economic development. Ireland and 
the Irish were in fact being exploited for the benefit of 
England and absentee Anglo-Irish landlords. "In so far as 
any flow of capital was stimulated by the union," writes
38Professor J. C. Beckett, "it was a flow away from Ireland."
Such conditions could hardly fail to demoralize the 
Irish people and cause grave social and psychological con­
sequences. Frederick Engels, travelling in Ireland in 1856, 
noted some of these evils in his correspondence with Karl
38Cecil, Life of Salisbury, III, 302-04.
"^Beckett, A Short History of Ireland, pp. 132-33. 
38Ibid., p. 133.
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Marx:
Despite all their Irish nationalist fanaticism the 
fellows [the Irish] feel that they are no longer at 
home in their own country. Ireland for the Saxon!
That is now being realized. . . . Emigration will go 
on until the predominantly, indeed almost exclusively, 
Celtic character of the population is all to hell. . . . 
By consistent oppression they [the Irish] have been 
artificially converted into an utterly demoralised 
nation and now fulfil the notorious function of 
supplying England, America, Australia, etc., with 
prostitutes, casual labourers, pimps, thieves, swind­
lers, beggars and other rabble.-*9
The laissez-faire economic philosophy that dominated 
most of the nineteenth century largely precluded any deter­
mined positive action by the government to alleviate eco­
nomic conditions. Ironically the first important break 
with this philosophy, at least with regard to Ireland, was 
made by Gladstone when he enacted the Land Act of 1870.
Even then, however, while this act and additional such acts 
enacted between 1881 and 1909 marked a break with strict 
laissez-faire economics and eliminated some of the grievances 
which existed, they did not erase all sources of Irish dis­
satisfaction. It was necessary throughout most of the
period to maintain large numbers of troops and police in 
40Ireland. If m  the 1850s Engels could write that he had
39Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Corre­
spondence, 1846-1895, trans. by Dona Torr (New York: Inter­
national Publishers, 1942), p. 94.
40In 1886 Sir William Harcourt stated that the English 
were maintaining ”an army of occupation of 30,000 men" in 
Ireland. "In order to maintain the union in Ireland," he 
stated, "we are obliged to keep there in arms more British 
troops than fought at Waterloo, more than we sent against
27
41"never seen so many gendarmes in any country," the situa­
tion had changed little by the 188 0s when Sir William 
Harcourt warned Gladstone that the passage of the 1884 Reform 
Bill, extending the political franchise in Ireland, would 
reveal to the world the moral weakness of England's position 
there. "When full expression is given to Irish opinion, 
he wrote, "there will be declared to the world in larger 
print what we all know to be the case that we hold Ireland
by force and by force alone as much today as in the days of
42Cromwell. . . . "  This situation continued throughout the 
entire Home Rule period and was revealed vividly both in 
1916 and again during the Anglo-Irish conflict of 1919-1921 
when thousands of troops were poured into Ireland in a last 
desperate effort to maintain English dominion.
In the late nineteenth century a new sentiment 
emerged in Ireland,a sentiment which many English states­
men would fail to understand. "A new age was struggling 
to be born," wrote the British historians Ronald Robinson 
and John Gallagher of this period, an age of intense
the Russians in the Crimea. . . ." A. G. Gardiner, The Life 
of Sir William Harcourt (2 vols.; London: Constable &
Company, 1923), I, 593. Walter Long writes that the Royal 
Irish Constabulary alone constituted 12,000 men during 
George Wyndham's administration, but he adds that this was 
reduced during his, that is, Long's own administration. 
Viscount Long of Wraxall, Memories {London: Hutchinson &
Co., 1923), p. 155. The number of armed forces necessary 
to hold Ireland greatly increased of course after World War I.
41Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, 1846- 
1895, p. 93.
^Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt, I, 497.
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43nationalism. This force lay at the bottom of the bitter­
ness and conflict that marked the relations between Britain 
and Ireland during the Home Rule era and made impossible 
the pacification and conciliation of Ireland on any terms 
which did not concede a large degree of national self- 
government. Those statesmen who urged the unimpaired main­
tenance of the existing political status quo failed to 
understand the nature of this new force. Those who felt 
that land reform, government assistance toward minor indus­
trial development, and a measure of democratic local self- 
government would satisfy the Irish, failed equally to com­
prehend the uncompromising nature of nationalism. The Irish 
were caught in the grip of this new force, which British and 
Anglo-Irish policies and attitudes in Ireland had helped 
create, and with it came an unappeaseable demand for some 
degree of national self-government.
Even in ordinary circumstances these aspirations 
would have met with strong resistance from England, but 
coming as they did in this highly charged imperialist age, 
they met with inflexible opposition. For England too was 
in the grip of an intense nationalism, a nationalism which 
had been transformed into an aggressive imperialism, and
A ^
Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice 
Denny, Africa and the Victorians; The Climax of Imperial­
ism (Anchor Books. Garden City, New York: Doubleday &
Company, 1968), p. 287. It is interesting that while Robin­
son and Gallagher admit the existence and impact of nation­
alism in the colonial world they deny the existence of an 
influential nationalism in Great Britain. See pp. 465-72.
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which had engendered widespread aspirations for Anglo-Saxon
44world domination. Moreover, an additional factor inter­
vened to confound the situation still further. The Anglo- 
Irish and Ulster Protestants, who continued to think of 
themselves as British rather than Irish, and who identified 
with British imperialism rather than Irish nationalism, ex­
pressed their categorical opposition to national self-
government for Ireland. To live under the rule of the
45Irish was to them utterly unthinkable. They had nothing 
in common, they maintained. The Irish were mentally, 
morally, and culturally inferior to them. They were eco­
nomically inefficient, religiously unemancipated and in-
46tolerant, and politically despotic. The Anglo-Irish and 
Ulster Protestants, on the other hand, were not only eco­
nomically efficient, but freedom-loving in religion and 
democratic in politics. Furthermore they belonged to a 
different ethnic group. If the Irish claimed the right to 
govern themselves on the basis of ethnicity or nationality, 
what about the Ulster Protestants? Should they be denied 
equal consideration?
The merits of this question were debated passionately
44See Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism, 
1870-1900 (Harper Torchbooks. New York: Harper & Row,
1941), pp. 216-38, and Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1951),
pp. 147-57, 175-84.
4^Costigan, A History of Modern Ireland, pp. 281-83. 
46Ibid., pp. 281-83.
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and repeatedly throughout the period of the Home Rule
47struggle. That the Ulster Protestants were of different 
ethnic origin was partly correct. That this fact justified 
the withholding of national self-government from Ireland 
was another matter. It was the argument of the Ulster Pro­
testants that if ethnic or national differentiation justi­
fied the right of self-government to Irish Catholics, the 
same principle applied to them. The Irish replied that 
since the Ulster Protestants were a minority in Ireland, 
they must conform to the wishes of the majority. The Ulster 
Protestants in turn pointed out that the Irish held a ma­
jority in the three southern provinces only, that they did 
not have a majority in the province of Ulster.
It was this demand by the Irish for a modicum of 
national self-government that dominated Anglo-Irish rela­
tions from the 1870s to the early 1920s. And it is within 
this framework that one must analyze the British attitude 
toward Ireland. One of the consequences of the Reform Bill 
of 1867 and the Ballot Act of 1872 was that a large number 
of Irish M.P.s were returned to Westminster dedicated 
primarily to the achievement of Home Rule. The period began
47At various times the Ulster Protestants have been 
distinguished in Irish history by the term "Presbyterians." 
During the Home Rule era they, with the assistance of their 
unionist allies in Great Britain, attempted to distinguish 
themselves by the term "Ulstermen." This was an effort to 
proclaim their ethnic differentiation from the Irish, but 
it was really an unsuitable term since it tended to obscure 
the fact that almost half the population of Ulster were 
Irish.
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with the inflexible opposition of both major political 
parties to any such concept. Such opposition stemmed from 
the historical relations between the two islands. The 
British and the Anglo-Irish had long dominated Ireland.
They had made the laws and administered them. In so doing, 
they had developed an image of themselves that was highly 
eulogistic. At the same time they had formed an equally 
dyslogistic image of the Irish. They thought of themselves 
as uniquely qualified to rule. They viewed the Irish as 
uniquely unqualified to rule. Behind the long and impas­
sioned opposition to Home Rule lay this image of the Irish, 
an image so abhorrent, especially to Conservatives and to 
the Whigs and Radical Unionists who joined them in the 
1880s essentially on the Irish issue, that it forced them 
to adopt the position that the Ulster Protestants would be
justified in armed rebellion rather than be governed by an
48Irish-dominated government. The Conservative image of
the Irish was in fact so repulsive that most Conservatives
were irretrievably convinced that no Anglo-Saxon could in
49justice be asked to live under their rule. The Liberal 
image, which largely lost its anti-Irish aspects early in 
the period, became very different from the Conservative.
Most Liberals, under the leadership of Gladstone, abandoned
^®Mc Neill, Ulster's Stand for Union, pp. 170, 108-09, 
and James, Lord Roberts, p. 473.
49Costigan, A History of Modern Ireland, pp. 277-86.
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their anti-Irish prejudices and came to look upon them as 
a people not very different from themselves. Partly because 
of this they came to sympathize with most Irish objectives. 
It was the polarity between these two images which caused 
so much Anglo-Irish and inter-party bitterness during the 
Home Rule era. And it is the nature of these images, and 
the forces which helped shape them, that is the subject of 
the following chapters.
PART II 
THE CONSERVATIVE POSTURE
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CHAPTER II
THE CONSERVATIVE RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE 
OF SOCIAL CHANGE
The Tory, however much he may sympathize with 
democracy, is at bottom a patriarch. ^
— Crane Brinton
No old dominant class ever really relinquishes 
power until its nerve has failed— until, losing confidence 
in its own virtue and its own justness, that powerful 
order allows the sceptre or the sword to slip from its 
grasp, mesmerized rather than vanquished. 2
— Russell Kirk
The half century which lies between the disestablish­
ment of the Anglican Church in Ireland and the creation of 
the Irish Free State is one of the most eventful in English 
and Irish history. It began with the fall of Anglican 
religious privilege in Ireland, and ended with the collapse 
of English political dominance. It opened with the fortunes 
cf imperialism on the rise; it closed with the virtues of 
imperialism widely questioned. It witnessed the rise of 
democracy, and with it a bellicose working-class support
^Crane Brinton, English Political Thought in the 
Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1954) , p. 225.
2
Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to
Santayana (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), p. 288.
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of a jingoistic imperialism. It observed the growth of a 
colonial nationalism which challenged the right and the 
ability of the imperialists to rule the colonial world. It 
saw the rise of trade unionism, of nationwide strikes, and 
of the Labor Party. It witnessed the growth of collectivism 
and the enactment of land laws for Ireland which challenged 
the predominant economic philosophy of the nineteenth century 
and largely transferred the ownership of land in Ireland 
from the small Anglo-Irish aristocratic class to the Irish 
people. It saw the power of the House of Lords reduced to a 
mere shadow of its former self. It experienced the rise of 
German and American economic power which forced England to 
seek a federation of the empire, to abandon her isolation­
ism, and to form alliances with Japan and with various 
European states. All this culminated in the outbreak of 
World War I and the collapse of the four continental em­
pires. And although England, militarily victorious, seem­
ingly strengthened her empire through the mandate system of 
the League of Nations, the successful attack on the very 
core of that empire by the Irish in the period 1919-1921 
paved the way for similar demands by other parts of the 
empire, thereby helping to set in motion a process of im­
perial disintegration which has proceeded ever since to 
reduce and transform the empire, and in the 1960s drove 
England to seek her future prosperity in the European Eco­
nomic Community.
This was a period therefore when the familiar and
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assuring beliefs of the nineteenth century were encounter­
ing multipronged attacks. The widening acceptance of 
Darwin's theory of evolution among scientists caused grave 
concern among theists and theologians, and led to prolonged 
and bitter controversy. The spread of secularism frighten­
ed those who felt that any weakening in the role of the 
church and the practice of religion would lead in the end 
to a transformation of values, to an attack on individual­
istic property rights, and to the adoption of socialism.
It was a period of polarization. On the one hand were 
those who embraced the theory of evolution; on the other 
stood those who rallied even more fervently behind the 
Bible. On one side gathered those who supported the seat­
ing of the atheist Charles Bradlaugh in the House of 
Commons; on the other were arrayed those in opposition.
For a time the attractions of imperialism swept the great 
majority to its banner; later those attractions lost much 
of their gloss. And in the years immediately preceding 
World War I the conflict between the Conservative and 
Liberal Parties became so envenomed over social, economic, 
political, and Irish policy that some men tried to escape 
from these difficulties by forming a coalition. This failed 
in 1910, but succeeded in 1915 and continued"after the war 
until the historic Liberal Party suffered a seemingly
3
irreparable defeat. Thus one of the professed aims of
3
It might be added that the same period witnessed 
the fall of the Nationalist Party in Ireland and its replace­
ment by Sinn Fein.
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Disraeli, which had been to unite the two "nations," the
aristocracy and the workers, or the classes and the masses
4
as they were often referred to, and to avoid the formation
5
of political parties along class lines, had failed.
This was a period when new ideas, new forces, new 
ideologies steadily gathered momentum and in so doing ap­
peared to threaten the traditional social order and with it 
the privileges of the propertied classes. These ideas and 
the programs and policies which they forebode clashed head- 
on with the traditional British stratified social structure.
A prime objective of the Conservatives was to maintain that
g
social order. Those who advocated the new democratic and 
collectivistic ideas viewed it as inequitable and wished to 
transform it in a less inequalitarian direction. The clash 
of these two forces, those seeking to reform society and 
those wishing to maintain the traditional order, lies at the 
root of the intense bitterness that permeated most of this 
period. Into this impassioned milieu entered the Irish 
demand for Home Rule. To most Conservatives the maintenance 
of the union between Britain and Ireland was imperative to
4
Paul Smith, Disraelian Conservatism and Social Re­
form (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 324-25.
^Somervell, English Thought, p. 145, and Peter Viereck, 
Conservatism, from John Adams to Churchill (Princeton:
D. van Nostrand Company, 1956), p. 43.
®Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism (London: Williams &
Norgate, 1912), pp. 241-42? and Robert Blake, The Conserva­
tive Party from Peel to Churchill (London: Eyre &
Spottiswoode, 1970), pp. 132, 167-68.
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the maintenance of the existing social order, and they view­
ed the Home Rule movement as a part of those forces which 
were seeking to break down and radically transform that 
order. Hence they tended to look on concessions to the work­
ing class or to the Irish as a weakening of the social 
structure, and this view forced them to resist such con­
cessions with any effective means available to them, even to 
the extent of advocating armed rebellion against the govern­
ment. The Conservatives viewed the ideal society as one in
which the propertied classes would make the laws and admin- 
7
ister them. Many of them would have preferred to maintain 
society as it had existed prior to the Reform Bill of 1867. 
This was their ideal. But failing that, they hoped to be 
able to maintain a paternalistic and deferential order in 
which, to use the typical terminology of the time, though
Q
the masses might vote, it was the classes that ruled.
The rise of political democracy is one of the most 
conspicuous developments of the Home Rule era. It began 
with the Reform Bill of 1867 and ended with universal adult 
suffrage in 1918, though means would still be found to dis­
criminate against women until 1928. Still, the extension 
of the franchise in this period was momentous, and this
7
Dicey, Why England Maintains the Union, p. 9, and 
J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (6 vols.;
London: Macmillan & Co., 1932-1969), II, 191.
g
Dicey, Why England Maintains the Union, p* 9*
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development was the cause of serious misgivings on the part 
of many upper and middle class Englishmen. Some of the 
leading statesmen, as well as some of the leading scholars, 
of the period thought that the rise of democracy foreshadow­
ed an age of decadence in England. Lord Salisbury, the most 
successful Conservative statesman of the period, bore a well 
known disdain for democracy. He feared that such a political 
system would weaken the concept of individual ownership of 
property, and he supported the strengthening of the monarchy 
as a defense against it. Given a choice between the strength­
ening of democracy and the extension of the powers of the 
monarchy Salisbury would have chosen the latter. His bio­
grapher Lady Gwendolen Cecil writes:
Loyalty to the monarchy was with him more than a 
sentiment. . . .  He believed the monarchy to be 
. . . the only certain guarantee of the country's 
stability. He held it as a paramount duty to main­
tain its prerogatives, and would gladly have seen 
them extended had that been possible. . . .  He used 
to lament that he had not been born under a more ac­
tively monarchical constitution; he should have pre­
ferred service to a king than to a parliament.9
Salisbury's successor as prime minister, Arthur Bal­
four, had an equal disdain for democracy, a disdain which 
showed more conspicuously after the disastrous Conservative 
electoral defeat of 1906. Balfour looked upon the House of Lords 
as a Conservative instrument to prevent the enactment of legis­
lation which the Conservatives disapproved. After his defeat 
and the defeat of the Conservative Party, in the 1906 election,
9Cecil, Life of Salisbury, III, 180.
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Balfour stated quite frankly that "the great Unionist party 
should still control, whether in power or whether in opposi­
tion, the destinies of this great Empire."'*’0 This amounted 
in theory to a condition whereby the principles of one party 
would dominate important legislative enactments; and in 
practice these principles were strongly adhered to, too 
strongly in fact, for the rejection of the 1909 budget by 
the Lords led directly to a major reduction in the power of 
that chamber.
A leading writer on conservatism, Peter Viereck, has 
pointed out that democracy "is often despised by conserva­
tives as a passionate mob agitated by revolutionists.
This view and the despair that gripped many Conservatives 
after the 1906 electoral defeat forced them to look upon 
the period as one of decadence. Balfour expressed this 
feeling in a speech at Newnham College in 1908:
When through an ancient and still powerful state there 
spreads a mood of deep discouragement, when the re­
action against recurring ills grows feebler, and the 
ship rises less buoyantly to each succeeding wave, when 
learning languishes, enterprise slackens, and vigour 
ebbs away, then, as I think, there is present some 
process of social degeneration which we must perforce 
recognize, and which, pending a satisfactory analysis, 
may conveniently be distinguished by the name of 
"decadence."12
*"°Quoted in Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel 
to Churchill, p. 190.
^Viereck, Conservatism, p. 19.
12A. J. Balfour, Essays Speculative and Political 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1920), p. 27.
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What Balfour and those who shared his views saw as 
decadent was really the spread of democracy, a fact which 
one of the leading Conservative thinkers of the period, W.
E. H. Lecky stated quite explicitly. "Parliamentary gov­
ernment in England," he wrote in 1896, "has entered on its
13period of decadence." The idea that the majority of the
people should determine legislative and governmental de-
14cisions was utterly alien to Lecky. In fact he despised 
democracy as many despised Jesuitism and in his writings 
he made a clever attempt to discredit democracy by com­
paring it to Jesuit teachings. By criticizing democracy in 
this way, Lecky was able to strike subtly at the nature of 
Catholicism as well, and thereby darken further the prevalent 
British image of the Irish and burden the path of Home Rule. 
In a work which won wide acclaim in Britain Lecky wrote:
"This new Jesuitism," meaning of course democracy,
has, indeed, much real affinity with the old one. The 
root idea of the old Jesuitism was strongly realized 
conviction that the Catholic Church is so emphatically 
the inspired teacher of mankind, and the representative 
of the Deity upon earth, that no act can be immoral 
which is performed in its service and is conducive to 
its interests. The root idea of the new Jesuitism 
[democracy] is the belief that the moral law has no 
deeper foundation and no higher sanction than utility, 
and that the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
is its supreme test and ideal.15
13William Edward Hartpole Lecky, Democracy and 
Liberty (2 vols.; New York: Longman's, Green, and Co., 18 96),
I, 247.
14Ibid., I, 223-24.
15Ibid., I, 224.
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There was obviously a good deal of anti-Catholic prejudice 
in this statement and the tactic of associating democracy 
with Jesuitism, a movement that held disagreeable connota­
tions for most Englishmen, was designed to retard further 
democratic progress.
And yet there was an apparent split in English Con­
servatism, a split between those like Salisbury and Balfour 
who were highly skeptical about the extension of the fran­
chise, and Conservatives like Benjamin Disraeli who took 
the "leap in the dark" in 1867. But this division existed 
essentially in respect to methods. As regards ultimate 
objectives both wings of Conservatism were largely in agree­
ment. Both sought, as a primary goal, the maintenance of 
property rights as they then existed,^ and with these they 
associated the continuance of the existing social system. 
"Nothing," wrote Lord Hugh Cecil,
has more effective significance in Conservatism than 
its bearing on questions of property. Ever since Con­
servatism arose to resist the revolutionary movement 
of 178 9, the defence of property has been one of its 
principal purposes.^
The Disraelian brand of Conservatism was premised on the 
assumption that the working class were largely conservative, 
that they were sentimentally attached to traditional values 
and traditional institutions. It might be possible there­
fore to safely extend the franchise to them, for their
*^Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism, p. 118.
17Ibid., p. 118.
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predominant inclination would be to preserve, not to inno­
vate. Despite this, however, Disraeli showed no particular 
zeal for the extension of the franchise. The Reform Bill of 
lii67 was, under Liberal pressure, more encompassing than he 
had anticipated and his acceptance of it was, in the final 
analysis, based as much, and perhaps more, on political 
tactics as on democratic theory.
Moreover, Disraeli's planned alliance between the 
"classes" and the "masses" was not intended to be function­
ally equalitarian. In political affairs the role of the 
aristocracy would be very different from that of the working 
class. It was certainly not intended, for instance, that 
the working class should sit in the House of Commons or 
participate in governmental decision-making. These roles 
were reserved for the aristocracy. The role of the working 
class would be to participate in the election of the mem­
bers of the House of Commons, but these members would be 
selected exclusively from the "classes." A. V. Dicey seemed 
to be suggesting a similar system when he wrote that "the 
rich must be the guides of the poor; the poor must put trust 
in the rich."^®
The second wing of Conservatism was skeptical about 
the possibility of a successful alliance between the aristo­
crats and the working class. They feared that such an 
alliance would require concessions which Conservatives could
18Dicey, Why England Maintains the Union, p. 9.
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19not safely make. These Conservatives rejected Disraelian 
reformism and the effort to build an alliance between them­
selves and the working class and aimed instead at obtaining 
cooperation between the aristocracy and the middle class.
This was the objective of Sir Robert Peel in the 1840s, an
objective which was partly responsible for Disraeli's break 
20with Peel. But in the 1880s the Peelite objective took
practical shape when a large group of Radical Unionists
broke with Gladstone, essentially on Irish policy, and
aligned with the Conservatives. The new Conservative Party,
or Unionist Party as it is sometimes called because of its
21rigid opposition to Home Rule, was in the process of for­
mation. The middle class element continued to grow, and 
when in 1911 one of their members, Bonar Law, took over the 
leadership of the Party the influence of the middle class 
had reached a very high peak. The Disraelian brand of Con­
servatism had largely vanished with its founder. After his 
death Conservatism allied with the middle class, and the 
principles of this alliance have dominated Conservatism since 
the 1880s.
19Paul Smith, Disraelian Conservatism, pp. 324-25.
20Somervell, English Thought, p. 145.
21L. P. Curtis states that this alliance was founded 
largely on the concept of Anglo-Saxon superiority and 
racial prejudice toward the Irish: "The best examples of
Anglo-Saxonist prejudice against the Irish Celts emanate 
from the Unionist coalition which was hastily patched to­
gether in the winter of 1886 in order to destroy the first 
Home Rule Bill." Anglo-Saxons and Celts, p. 16.
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In the Home Rule period, and since, Conservatives 
generally have claimed that one of the most important 
theorists of Conservatism was Edmund Burke. Since both the 
Conservatives and the Whigs claimed ideological descendency 
from Burke, the contest over this issue ended when the Whigs 
joined the Conservatives in the 1880s. However, there were 
two important elements in late nineteenth-century Conserva- 
tivism which did not form a part of Burke's philosophy.
These were democracy and imperialism. Both of these were 
added after 1867, and both were added by Disraeli. It is 
true that universal suffrage did not become a fact during 
Disraeli's lifetime, but his belief that the working class 
were innately conservative, and that the aristocracy should 
strive for an alliance with them, pointed in this direction. 
The 1867 Reform Bill was a first step toward that goal, and 
though, as has been pointed out, not all Conservatives could 
welcome future franchise bills with unbounded enthusiasm, a 
successful reform precedent had been set and a gesture made 
toward winning working class support.
It is interesting to ask how two such elements as 
democracy and imperialism could be made a part of the same 
ideology. Are they not contradictory? Are they not mutu­
ally exclusive? Does not democracy imply the right of 
distinct nationalities to self-determination, the right to 
frame their own mode of government, to decide their own 
alliances, mold their own future? And does not imperialism, 
on the contrary, imply the political control of one country
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or people, directly or indirectly, by another? Does it not 
in fact deny the precepts of democracy? Most English im­
perialists tended to believe that there was no real contra­
diction between these two concepts. They were convinced in 
fact that they had not only a moral right, but a moral obli­
gation, to rule those whom they deemed to be backward 
peoples. They believed that by ruling such peoples they 
were performing a civilizing mission, a mission that was in 
keeping with humanitarian principles. It is only later that 
they would begin to develop doubts in this mission, doubts 
that once unloosed would lead to widening cracks in the
imperialists' convictions and undermine the imperialist 
22rationale. Winston Churchill was very much aware of the
dangers of doubting the imperial mission and in debate on
the justice of Britain's imperial role in Asia he exhorted
his fellow countrymen to maintain an unwavering faith in
their work: "Once we lose confidence," he said, "in our
mission in the East . . . our presence in those countries
will be stripped of every moral sanction, and . . . cannot 
23long endure."
22This subject is well treated in two recent studies: 
Allen J. Greenberger, The British Image of India: A Study
in the Literature of Imperialism (London: Oxford University
Press, 1969), and A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its 
Enemies: A Study in British Power (Anchor Books. Garden
City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1968).
23Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., 
Vol. 233 (Dec. 9- Dec. 24, 1929), col. 2009.
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That many English imperialists felt no uneasiness in 
advocating both democracy and imperialism is revealed in 
their statements. After a conversation with Joseph Chamber- 
lain in March 1886/ Arthur Balfour was able to console his 
uncle Lord Salisbury about the nature of Chamberlain's 
radicalism. Though it might be democratic, they could rest 
assured that it was also imperialistic. "I think a demo­
cratic government," Chamberlain told Balfour,
should be the strongest government, from a military 
and Imperial point of view. . . .
The problem is to give the democracy the whole power, 
but to induce them to do no more in the way of using 
it than to decide on the general principles which they 
wish to see carried out. . . .24
It is noteworthy that Chamberlain's concept of democracy 
bore strong similarities to Disraeli's. It called for an 
alliance of the "masses" and the "classes," with the im­
portant difference that Chamberlain included a large seg­
ment of the middle class in a governing role with the land­
owners, whereas Disraeli seemed to exclude them. But in 
both philosophies the function of the working class was very 
different from that of the upper and middle classes. The 
working class, or "the democracy" to use Chamberlain's term, 
were merely to participate in elections; to the upper and 
middle classes was reserved the function of ruling.
In the summer of 1886 Chamberlain's opposition to 
Gladstone's Home Rule Bill was an encouraging sign to
O A
Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, II, 191.
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Conservatives. "If he is now firm in standing by his con­
victions," wrote The Times, "and bold in attacking measures 
he regards as dangerous to the State, he will vindicate the
faith of those who have discerned in his radicalism a strong
25leaven of imperial instincts and democratic spirit."
Chamberlain's views showed a remarkable harmony with those
of the Conservative Primrose League whose motto was
Imperium et Libertas, which might be translated as liberty
at home and imperialism abroad.
Differing with the Conservatives on this issue, Peter
Viereck feels that "there was a strong ethical conflict
between the increased imperialism and the increased demo-
2 6cracy of British Toryism." Viereck argues that the logic 
of British democratic principles implied that where a colony 
expressed a desire for self-government and national self- 
determination such wishes should be recognized as legitimate 
and should be granted. But the Conservatives, and most 
English imperialists, would have rejected the argument that 
the principles of democracy applied to all peoples at their 
existing stage of development. This was not their position, 
and one of the most candid expressions of this fact came 
from Lord Salisbury. In May 1886, in a speech opposing 
Home Rule for Ireland, he stated that the Irish were incap­
able of self-government, and went on to list a number of
^Quoted in ibid., II, 198.
26Viereck, Conservatism, p. 142.
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other peoples possessing similar disabilities. Among those
explicitly named were the Hottentots, the Indians, the
27Russians, and the Greeks. Having listed these groups
specifically, Salisbury then proceeded to explain that in
fact most national, ethnic, or racial groups were unfit for
self-government: "When you come to narrow it down," he
concluded, "you will find that this— which is called self
government but is really government by the majority--works
admirably when it is confided to people who are of Teutonic
race, but that it does not work so well when people of other
2 8races are called upon to join in it."
Professing the same theory was Joseph Chamberlain.
By espousing the principles of imperialism, he rejected the 
proposition that each national group has the right to de­
termine its own destiny. Addressing himself to the Irish 
demand for Home Rule, he argued that the national will of a 
people does not constitute a right. "I do not," he said, 
"consider that wishes and rights are necessarily identical, 
or that it is sufficient to find out what the majority of
the Irish people desire in order at once to grant their 
29demands." Chamberlain's democracy therefore had a rather 
narrow application, and like Salisbury he made a conscious
2^Cecil, Life of Salisbury, III, 302-04.
28Ibid., III, 302-04.
29Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, I, 57 9.
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distinction between the mental and cultural level of the 
Anglo-Saxons, and that of the various non-Anglo-Saxon peo­
ples. There was a dangerous emotionalism underlying this 
assumption of Anglo-Saxon superiority. This can be seen in 
the passionate outbursts that occurred over the Liberal con­
tention that the Irish were capable and deserving of self- 
government. Chamberlain's official biographer, J. L.
Garvin, describes the emotional demonstration that erupted 
among the anti-Home Rulers on the defeat of Gladstone's 
first Home Rule Bill. When it is considered that this out­
burst came from men who generally prided themselves on the 
high rationality of their behavior, the intensity of their 
feelings on this issue is revealed. "Members of the Stock 
Exchange," Garvin wrote, "marched in formation, and burnt
the Bill in front of the Guildhall, where Chamberlain, the
30principal speaker, was hailed with shouts of excitement."
There can be little doubt, therefore, that there was an 
inordinate measure of emotionalism in the opposition to Home 
Rule.
Ever since Burke had proclaimed that one of the func­
tions of government was to restrain the passions of indivi-
31duals and groups, Conservatives had attempted to set
~^Ibid., II, 563. In the House of Commons on the de­
feat of the Bill "the rank and file of the Conservative party 
shouted themselves hoarse with cheering, at the same time wav­
ing in exultation." See "The Division," The Times, June 8, 
1886, p. 9.
31Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in 
France, in The Works of Edmund Burke (Boston: Wells and
Lilly, 1826), III, 78.
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themselves up as the exclusive guardians of that precept.
But the passions to be restrained were always those of some
non-Conservative group. Conservatives seldom felt that
their own passions required to be controlled, a fact which
is explained by the nature of their self-image. They felt
that they, the possessors of extensive property, had been
especially endowed by birth, training, and by virtue of
their wealth, to control their own passions and those of the
masses. In this, too, they could look back to Burke who
32had expressed these sentiments rather fervently.
It was a widely-held view among most British imperial­
ists that the non-Anglo-Saxon peoples of the empire were 
incapable of self-government and it was therefore the duty 
and responsibility of England to govern them. It is only 
in this light that one can understand why they were able to 
advocate both democracy and imperialism simultaneously. 
Democracy was a system of government applicable only to those 
peoples who attained a certain mental and cultural level and 
who possessed a highly rational disposition. English im­
perialists generally believed that non-Anglo-Saxon peoples 
at their current stage of development did not possess the 
qualities necessary to the successful operation of democracy 
and any attempt by them to do so would lead only to disaster.
It is in a sense ironic that one of the great liberal 
thinkers of the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, should
3^Ibid., p. 77.
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have given a degree of approval, albeit indirect, and per­
haps inadvertantly, to these ideas. For in his classic 
work, On Liberty, Mill stated that "despotism is a legiti-
33mate mode of government in dealing with barbarians. . . . "
Much depended, however, on his definition of the term "bar­
barian," and on this perhaps he would have been less in­
clusive than most imperialists. Mill also maintained that 
the forceable government of "barbarians" was acceptable
only if "the end be their improvement, and the means justi-
34fied by actually effecting that end." It was, however, 
never difficult for the imperialists to persuade themselves 
and the British electorate that that end was being accom­
plished. They thought of themselves as lifting these back­
ward peoples upward, as educating and civilizing them, as 
preparing them for eventual self-government. To ask people 
who were as yet incapable of it to govern themselves would, 
in their view, have been both irresponsible and a derelic­
tion of duty. Few Englishmen would have given it serious 
consideration. To most of them, imperialism was an obligation 
demanded by moral and humanitarian principles. It was, as 
Kipling pointed out, a "burden" which the imperialist under­
took in order to educate the empire's "fluttered folk and 
wild," to improve their material conditions, and to prepare
33John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Boston: Ticknor and
Fields, 1863), p. 24.
^4Ibid., p. 24.
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35them for eventual self-government.
But the tragedy of this position was that many im­
perialists, especially among the Conservatives, could never 
seem to foresee a time when the various people of the 
empire would be ready to govern themselves. In fact most 
of them harbored serious reservations about the eventual 
advent of colonial self-government, for it seemed to fore­
shadow the dissolution of the empire. They were in fact 
prepared to undertake strong coercive measures, even to go 
to war, to prevent this eventuality, as they did, for ex­
ample, against the Boers, the Irish, the Egyptians, even 
when it seemed apparent that these people were capable of 
governing themselves. The fact is, as has already been 
pointed out, that the principles of democracy and national 
self-determination were often subordinated to imperial ob­
jectives. Conservatives in particular acquiesced in demo­
cracy under the pressure of political circumstances and 
because it seemed to offer the surest way of maintaining 
their social and political dominance. Crane Brinton perhaps 
captured their attitude correctly when he stated that "the
Tory, however much he may sympathize with democracy, is at
36bottom a patriarch." He harbors certain reservations 
about the fundamental principles on which democracy is 
based— trust in the political wisdom and the autonomy of
^Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden."
3 6Crane Brinton, English Political Thought, p. 225.
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the individual. As Brinton states it:
Tory democracy . . .  is a contradiction in terms. One 
half despairs, the other half hopes. One half dis­
trusts the human animal, the other half trusts him. 
Eventually one half is bound to triumph over the other. 
Disraeli the Tory was always stronger than Disraeli the
democrat.37
This paternalistic outlook was supported by the
social ideas of Walter Bagehot. In his famous work on the
English constitution Bagehot argued that the success of
British institutions rested on the long tradition of de-
38ference that existed in English society. That Englishmen 
bore a deep respect for rank was a fact of supreme impor­
tance, for it would help insure that the extension of the 
suffrage would not threaten the existing social system.
"If a political agitator were to lecture the peasants of 
Dorsetshire and try to excite political dissatisfaction," 
Bagehot wrote, "it is much more likely that he would be 
pelted than that he would succeed." For "rebelling against 
the structure of society is to their minds rebelling against 
the Queen."39
Conservatives generally denied the basic goodness of 
man and, as Russell Kirk points out, wished to "put a con­
trol upon his will and his appetite," for man is "governed
37Ibid., p. 147.
38Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, in The 
Works of Walter Bagehot, ed. by Forrest Morgan (4 vols.; 
Hartford: Travellers Insurance Company, 1891), IV, 267-73.
39Ibid., p. 270.
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more by emotion than by reason." He in fact possesses an
"anarchic impulse" which must be held in check by "tradition
40and sound prejudice." The anarchic impulse which the 
Conservatives assumed to exist in man was merely part of the 
image that they themselves had fashioned of certain classes 
and certain peoples. When they spoke of an anarchic impulse 
existing in man, they did not include themselves in this 
definition.
What the Conservatives really feared was the rise of 
the philosophy of socialism, a system which they ceaselessly 
condemned,4^ fearing that it would lead to a policy of in­
come redistribution that would drastically reduce their 
wealth and undermine their social and political position. 
When they spoke of the anarchic impulse of such groups, for 
example, as the working class or the Irish, they were re­
sponding to the demand of these groups for social and 
political reform. They felt that accession to these demands 
would lead to a decline of the spirit of deference and a
rejection of the view that "the highest classes . . . have
42more political ability than the lower classes." Like 
Bagehot they felt that only the wealthy classes should rule, 
only they were capable of ruling, and that the working 
classes were unable to do so because of the nature of their
40Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind, p. 8.
4^Ibid., p. 8.
4^Bagehot, The English Constitution, IV, 270.
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work which rendered them incapable of intelligent thought
or rational behavior. Bagehot explained it thus:
A life of labor, an incomplete education, a monotonous 
occupation, a career in which the hands are used much 
and the judgment is used little, cannot create as much 
flexible thought, as much applicable intelligence, as 
a life of leisure, a long culture, a varied experience, 
an existence by which the judgment is incessantly 
exercised and by which it may be incessantly improved.
A country of respectful poor, though far less happy 
than where there are no poor, . . .  is never the less 
far more fitted for the best government.43
As late as 1921 many Conservatives were still strong­
ly motivated by deferential concepts. Arthur Balfour, for 
example, was appalled at the government's submission to
Irish demands. His biographer Blanche Dugdale writes that
44it "outraged all his traditions and instincts." It was
not that he was any longer seriously opposed to the terms
45of the "Treaty." It was simply that his aristocratic and 
paternalistic temperament made it difficult for him to ac­
cept the fact that an English government had been driven, 
under pressure of armed force, to yield to the demands of 
the Irish. Balfour, like most Englishmen, tended to be­
lieve that armed force, when used by the Irish against 
Britain, was the act of criminals. The Irish, he stated, 
"owed their success to crime. . . . They had defied British
43Ibid., pp. 270-71.
44Blanche E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (2 
vols.; London: Hutchinson & Co., 1936), II, 337-38.
45Ibid., II, 337-38.
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46rule,--and British rulers had given in to them." There was 
also resentment of the fact, as R. C. K. Ensor points out of 
an earlier period, "that in Ireland justice had been over­
borne by force, and that England's reputation for fair deal-
47ing had been compromised." Many British imperialists 
tended to feel that surrender to physical force was an ex­
tremely dangerous act, for it would convince Irish rebels 
and other colonial nationalists that physical force against 
Britain would be successful. It would encourage other colonial 
rebels to resort to violence, and would in the end lead to 
the disintegration of the empire.
It is hardly surprising that as formal class barriers
were removed in England the Conservatives, lacking Disraeli's
confidence in the working class, experienced increased fears
and tensions. The period from 1867 to 1918 witnessed the
elimination of all formal, or legal, political privileges
based on wealth. These privileges had guaranteed to the
upper and middle classes that no radical alteration could
constitutionally be made in the social system without their
approval. With the gradual extension of the franchise that
guarantee began to lose its value. Philip Mason writes that:
as formal barriers went down, more rigid barriers went 
up in the mind. . . .  In the twenty years before 1914, 
communication between classes in England was probably
46Ibid., II, 337-38.
A 7
R. C. K. Ensor, "Some Political and Economic In­
teractions in Later Victorian England," Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 4th ser., Vol. XXXI (1949) p. 27.
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at its lowest ebb— and the reason . . . was a deep 
unconscious fear among the upper and middle classes.
These fears increased after 1917, as is revealed by the
various actions taken against the Bolsheviks, by the reaction
to the "Zinoviev letter" in 1924 and to the general strike of
1926. Mason describes the intense class feelings that the
general strike unleashed among his fellow students at Oxford:
I remember in Britain the general strike of 1926, when 
I suddenly realized that in their attitude to the class 
structure of Britain some of my fellow undergraduates 
were poles apart from myself. They identified them­
selves with the propertied classes in a way I certainly 
could not, rushed off to join up as special constables
and talked eagerly of the chance of fighting and hurting
the strikers.49
It is significant that Mason, who sees a close link between
class, ethnic, and racial prejudice, finds that this period
of increasing social antagonism in Britain was paralleled by
a growing racism. Referring to the situation in India Mason
writes that in that country "white racial arrogance was at
50its worst from about 1880 to about 1920." The same period
witnessed "the worst of snobbishness in Britain. . . .
As late as 1917 this snobbery and arrogance had a deleterious 
influence on British-American relations. C. P. Scott reports 
that the U. S. ambassador Walter H. Page informed him that
48Philip Mason, Patterns of Dominance (London: Oxford
University Press, 1970) , pp. 22-23.
49Mason, Prospero1s Magic (London: Oxford University
Press, 1962), p. 34.
50Ibid., p. 29.
51Ibid., p. 29.
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apart from the Irish question the greatest obstacle to closer
relations between the two countries was "the supercilious
arrogance still remaining in a large part of our governing 
52class.
This air of superiority had its roots in a deep- 
seated conviction among the propertied classes that they were 
indeed superior. Lecky reflected and supported their feel­
ings when he argued that the possession of a large amount 
of wealth was proof of one's superiority. "Superior talent,
superior industry, superior thrift; lie at the root of the
53great accumulations of every civilized age." Lecky of 
course was attempting to justify the extremes of poverty and 
wealth and to dispel any collectivist effort to radically 
alter the social system. Any attempt by government, Lecky 
argued, to reduce the existing degree of economic inequality 
would be unnatural and artificial, for men were naturally 
unequal, and it was this "great natural inequality" which
was "the true source of the enormous disparities" that
. , , 54 existed.
The widespread discussion and advocacy of a less in- 
equalitarian social system which occurred throughout this 
period was a constant source of trepidation for the
52C. P. Scott, The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott,
1911-1929, ed. by Trevor Wilson {Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1970), p. 263.
^Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, II, 317.
54Ibid., II, 317.
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Conservatives. This does not mean that all Conservatives 
were opposed to meaningful social reform or that all 
Liberals supported it. But when one compares, for example, 
the elements of the Newcastle Program and the social legis­
lation enacted by the Liberals between 1906 and 1914 with 
that enacted by the Conservatives during their long tenure 
of office prior to December 1905, it is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that, whatever individual Conservatives may 
have felt, the Party as a whole enacted little meaningful 
social legislation during this lengthy period. Despite the 
assertions of Tory democracy Conservatives by and large con­
tinued to subscribe rather firmly to the views of Herbert 
Spencer that the state should not intervene in economic mat­
ters in order to modify the extremes of income distribution. 
Gladstone's partial abandonment of the principles of laissez- 
faire with respect to the system of land tenure and rent in 
Ireland and his disestablishment of the Anglican Church there 
were anathema to most of them. They opposed these as a step 
in the direction of socialism. When the Bishop of Peter­
borough, Dr. Magee, denounced the disestablishment of the 
Anglican Church in Ireland in 1869 he prophecied that this 
would eventually lead to communism: "Revolutions," he said,
"commence with sacrilege and they go on to communism; or, to
put it in . . . more . . . euphemistic language, . . . revo-
55lutions begin with the Church and go on to the land." Lady
^ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., Vol. 196 
{May 3- June 16, 1869), col. 1855.
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Gwendolen adds that the principles contained in the Land Act
of 1881 were "profoundly shocking to the ideas of British 
56Conservatism." And W. H. Smith was so disturbed by Glad­
stone's proposed Land Bill of 18 86 and by the Home Rule Bill 
of the same year that he considered fleeing the country. "I 
have been studying the new Home Rule and the Land Purchase 
Bill. . . /"he noted, "and if these bills pass I am very 
much inclined to clear out of the country altogether, . . .
57and find a home clear of the dishonour of English politics."
Despite their resistance to Gladstone's land bills 
and the economic and political principles they contained, the 
Conservatives themselves were later forced to adopt and even 
extend those principles in the enactment of further land 
legislation. But they did so reluctantly and with great 
bitterness, for the social transformation of Ireland into a 
land of peasant proprietors would eradicate the Anglo-Irish 
landed aristocracy, the system of primogeniture that main­
tained it, and consequently perhaps the stratified and priv­
ileged social order that was based upon it. But it is unlikely 
that the landlords could have maintained their position much 
longer because of the fall in the price of farm goods under 
foreign competition. They also resented the system of dual 
ownership which Gladstone's land laws had created, as well as
56Cecil, Gwendolen, Life of Salisbury, III, 42.
57 . .Sir Herbert Maxwell, Life and Times of the Right
Honourable William Henry Smith (2 vols.; Edinburgh and 
London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1893), II, 172-73.
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the judicial fixing of rents, which had substantially reduced
them. Many landlords therefore came to welcome government
financing of peasant land purchase as a relatively secure
and profitable way of liquidating their holdings. John E.
Pomfret, who has made an extensive study of the land problem
in Ireland from 1800 to 1923, writes as follows:
The system of dual ownership was no more popular with 
the landlords than with the tenants. Fair rents had 
meant lower rents and lower rents, in the face of an 
organized peasantry, were as difficult to collect as 
high rents. Moreover, with the rise of democracy their 
power waned and in Great Britain their arguments were 
no longer accepted at face value. Under the kindly 
aegis of the Conservative Party they were enabled to 
seek cover. A succession of land purchase acts per­
mitted them to retire from the field with a minimum of 
loss.58
As late as 1932, however, Lady Gwendolen Cecil, despite the
fact that the Conservatives had continued and extended the
principles of Gladstone's land laws, could still refer to
59those laws as "pernicious."
The Liberals and Conservatives had at first tried a 
combination of coercion and economic war against Irish ten­
ants. While the various administrations pursued a policy of 
extraordinary law some of the leading Whig and Conservative 
landlords undertook their own remedies. When the tenants 
united to force down the price of rents, some landlords at­
tempted to form syndicates to resist them. The purpose of
CO
John E. Pomfret, The Struggle for Land in Ireland, 
1800-1923 (Princeton University Press, 1930), p. xi.
^Cecil, Life of Salisbury, III, 151.
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these syndicates was to step in when a particular landlord 
appeared likely to yield to tenant pressure, purchase his 
estate, and maintain the rents at their previous level. If 
the tenants then refused to pay these amounts, they were 
evicted. Lord Midleton describes these tactics in the follow­
ing passage:
Parnell made a special onslaught upon the owner of the 
Ponsonby Estate near Youghal. . . . The owner . . . 
was on the point of surrendering. . . . Smith-Barry, 
with the aid of some other Southerners, enlisted twelve 
of the strongest capitalists in Great Britain and 
Ireland to subscribe £10,000 a piece, and within a 
week sent Ponsonby an offer of twenty years' purchase, 
which was promptly accepted. The syndicate then chal­
lenged Parnell who at once withheld all rent; 300 
tenants were evicted.60
Although the successes the landlords achieved along these 
lines were rather limited, the relish with which they ac­
claimed each victory, as the above passage indicates, reveals 
the bitterness of the conflict between landlord and tenant. 
Lord Lansdowne gives further evidence of the nature of this 
struggle. He, too, was waging an economic contest with the 
tenants on his estate. In December 1880 he wrote to his 
mother: "The . . . tenants are obdurate. . . . They are too
far gone, and nothing is left for it but to fight it out. We 
shall probably single out the two richest men and make bank­
rupts of them."^
^Earl of Midleton, Records &- Recollection's, 1856- 
1939 (London: John Murray, 1939), p. 227.
61
Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography (London:
Macmillan and Co. , 1929") , p. 20~. _
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Queen Victoria fully supported these coercive tactics. 
She was an unwavering advocate of repressive policies and she 
constantly urged Liberal governments to undertake more 
stringent measures. She found it insufferable that Irish 
peasants should violate the law in quest of economic demands. 
Beyond that she had a deep fear that the violence in Ireland 
might lead to revolution there and perhaps even spread to 
Britain.
In December 1880 she wrote, in her usual third person,
to the Chief Secretary for Ireland, W. E. Forster:
She does not doubt that the Irish Government wish to do 
what they can to put a stop to a state of lawlessness 
which is quite unexampled and which brings the British 
Government into the greatest disrepute. But she does 
blame them for not insisting on more powers being given 
them long ere this, and for not taking measures earlier 
to prevent a state of affairs which is becoming every 
day more and more serious, and may spread to England 
and Scotland if the strongest measures are not speedily 
taken.62
The economic revolution that was occurring in Ireland 
and the seeming growing advocacy of collectivistic and social­
istic theories in England were a source of much concern for 
the Conservatives. How were they to dispel the appeal of 
these new ideas? Disraeli's answer had been to make certain 
concessions to the working class in order to unite them with 
the aristocracy. But his successors did not successfully 
continue these policies, as is revealed by the strikes of the 
1880s and the rise of the Independent Labor Party in the
62George Earle Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria 
(6 vols.; London: John Murray, 1926-1932), 2d ser., Vol.
Ill, p. 165.
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1890s. Disraeli's most conspicuous achievement, the uniting 
of the working class behind a policy of nationalism and im­
perialism, which he hoped would prevent the development of 
class conflict, had been pursued by his successors, but with 
only partial success. The basic reason for this was that the 
Conservatives did not adequately continue to develop and im­
plement Disraeli's social reformism. They concentrated 
primarily on wooing the workers with a policy of nationalism 
and imperialism. But without, at the same time, enacting 
effective and timely reforms it was impossible to deflect for 
long their awareness, impatience, and dissatisfaction with 
their social conditions. Working-class aspirations tended 
to exceed what most Conservatives were willing to yield.
Lord Salisbury was aware of this, but for ideological and 
Party reasons he was unable, and perhaps unwilling, to do 
much about it. "We have so to conduct our legislation," he 
wrote to Lord Randolph Churchill, "that we shall give some 
satisfaction to both Classes and Masses. This is especially 
difficult with the Classes because all legislation is rather
unwelcome to them as tending to disturb a state of things
6 3with which they are satisfied. . . . "
Out of these conditions there gradually emerged among 
the propertied classes the concept of what has come to be 
called social imperialism. Joseph A. Schumpeter defined
63Quoted in T. C. Worsley, Barbarians and Philis- 
tines: Democracy and the Public Schools (London: Robert
Hale [1940]), pp. 72-73.
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social imperialism as an attempt by the "entrepreneurs and
other elements" to "woo the workers" to a program of imper- 
64ialism. This was to be achieved through a number of
"social welfare concessions" which, it was asserted, would
only be possible on the basis of successful imperialism and
65"export monopolism." It was also hoped that social im­
perialism would defeat the divisive class arguments of the 
socialists. Bernard Semmel, who deals at length with this 
subject in his Imperialism and Social Reform, explains that
social-imperialism was designed to draw all classes 
together in defence of the nation and empire and aimed 
to prove to the least well-to-do class that its 
interests were inseparable from those of the nation.
It aimed at undermining the argument of the social­
ists. . . .66
Cecil Rhodes, one of the most aggressive imperialists
of the Home Rule era, was convinced that only through a
vigorous policy of imperial expansion could civil war and
social revolution be prevented in Britain. He called,
therefore, on all those who cherished the existing social
order to support an imperialist policy. "I was in the East
End of London yesterday," he stated,
and attended a meeting of the unemployed. And as I 
listened to the wild speeches, which were just a cry 
for bread, bread, bread, I became more than ever
64Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism; Social Classes 
(Meridan Books. Cleveland and New York; World Publishing 
Company), p. 175.
65Ibid., pp. 86-87, 175-76.
**^ Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: 
English Social-Imperial Thought, 1895-1914 (Anchor Books. 
Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1960), p. 12.
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convinced of the importance of imperialism. . . . My 
cherished idea is a solution of the social problem, 
that is, in order to save the 40,000,000 inhabitants 
of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we 
colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle 
the surplus population, to provide new factories and 
mines. The empire, as I have always said, is a bread
and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war,
you must become imperialists.67
The Conservatives of course were not alone in their
opposition to socialism. On this matter there was very
little difference between the two major parties, although 
Liberals on the whole did gradually become more amenable to 
collectivistic social reform. This, however, did not reduce 
their general distaste for pure socialism, as is revealed 
quite clearly by the cooperative efforts of the Coalition 
Liberals and the Conservative Party after World War I to 
discredit the Labor Party by arguing that it was in league 
with Bolshevism and that it was a threat to British liberities 
and institutions. Arno J. Mayer, who has made an intensive 
study of the diplomacy of World War I, holds that the prime 
preoccupation of the diplomats at Versailles was to streng­
then and maintain the position of the ruling classes against
6 8the challenge of labor and socialism. And when one finds 
Lloyd George, the erstwhile radical and democrat, the maker 
of the famous Limehouse speeches, contemplating in 1919 that 
the House of Lords should be strengthened as a barrier
67Quoted in ibid., p. 4.
68See Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peace­
making; Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 
1918-1919 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967).
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69against the programs of the Labor Party, one becomes aware 
that the fear of socialism was indeed widespread.
In seeking to dike the socialist tide the opponents 
of socialism were fortunate to find intellectual support 
among the biological sciences. Darwin's theory of evolution 
through natural selection could be, and was, used to rein­
force the view that competition and struggle were an inevit­
able part of human existence. Darwin was speaking primarily 
of biological evolution and argued that in that sphere there 
rages a continual struggle for existence which brings about 
the survival of the fittest. Others quickly adopted this 
theory and applied it to human activities as a whole. It 
was used to justify laissez-faire economics and political 
rule by the propertied classes. In 1898 Benjamin Kidd argued 
that "the law of life has always been the same from the be­
ginning,— ceaseless and inevitable struggle and competition, 
ceaseless and inevitable selection and rejection, ceaseless 
and inevitable progress."^® By linking struggle and progress 
together in this way Kidd was attempting to prove that 
struggle was the sole source of progress, and that only through 
this means could progress be attained. "It is an inevitable 
law of life,” he wrote, "amongst the higher forms, that 
competition and selection must not only always accompany
69Diaries of C. P. Scott, p. 38.
70Benjamin Kidd, Social Evolution (New York:
Macmillan and Co., 1894), p. 39.
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progress, but that they must prevail amongst every form of
71life which is not actually retrograding." This argument 
was enthusiastically embraced by the opponents of meaningful 
collectivistic social reform. As Crane Brinton points out, 
these ideas, advanced by Benjamin Kidd in his Social Evolu­
tion, served a function similar to that supported a century
72earlier by Robert Malthus in his Essay on Population. They
justified existing social conditions and the existing social
and economic system.
If struggle and competition were the only source of
progress, then it followed that anything which weakened
these forces would impede human and social advance. Since
the essence of socialism was that in theory it substituted
cooperation for competition among individuals, classes, and
nations, it followed that socialism would retard progress.
Some eugenists in fact even questioned the wisdom of further
developing medical science, feeling, as D. C. Somervell
points out, that it would make "possible the survival and
73propagation of the unfit who formerly went to the wall."
But if socialism was theoretically cooperationist, 
pacifist, and internationalist, Conservatism emphasized compe­
tition, struggle, and nationalism. The force of nationalism 
in Britain received renewed vigor and meaning in the late
71Ibid., p. 37.
72Brinton, English Political Thought, p. 282.
73Somervell, English Thought, p. 140.
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nineteenth century when Disraeli adopted it and linked it to 
imperialism. Two factors motivated Disraeli. One was the 
need for a policy or creed that would win working class elec­
toral support for the Conservative Party. The other was the 
rise of socialism on the premise that in existing society 
class interests were antipathetic. Disraeli saw well the 
dangers that would ensue if an ideology which held that the 
interests of the various classes were antithetical was per­
mitted to gain popular acceptance. He therefore undertook 
to discredit this ideology and to unite the aristocracy and 
the working class. For this a new ideology had to be found, 
and Disraeli discovered it in the concepts of nationalism and 
imperialism.
That Disraeli's nationalistic ideology would win an 
easy victory over socialism is not surprising. In the Home 
Rule era most Englishmen could identify with the concept of 
conflict between nations much more easily than conflict be­
tween classes. The idea that class interests were anti­
pathetic was relatively new. In addition it was difficult 
for large numbers of the working class to assume that the men 
who had ruled them for generations had pursued their own 
interests at the expense of theirs. Especially was this so 
in a differential society, where workers often tended to look 
upon their leaders as basically men of altruistic conscience 
and impartiality who were committed to the interests of 
society as a whole. It was also much easier to believe that 
evil existed in foreign nationalities. Nations had fought
71
each other for centuries. It was widely believed that their 
interests were often antagonistic. Classes had seldom fought 
each other, and had in fact usually fought together against 
foreign enemies.
While national conflict might deflect attention from 
class antagonism, however, it also carried with it other 
characteristics from which the thoughtful Conservative could 
take little solace. Conflict between nations could lead to 
the assertion that one is right and the other wrong, that 
one is just and the other unjust, that one is good and the 
other evil. This in turn can lead to the rise of national, 
ethnic, or racial prejudice. It can lead to an unquestioning 
assumption of national superiority or national genius, an 
assumption that permeated much of English society throughout 
the Home Rule era. It was this overwhelming characteristic 
which led the Victorian Englishmen to the confident feeling 
"that he was a member of the greatest nation in the 
world. . . .1,74
In addition nationalism, while it succeeded in reduc­
ing class conflict temporarily, failed to do so permanently. 
Instead'it helped lead to World War I, which ended with the 
defeat of the old aristocratic ruling elites in many parts of 
Europe and the rise of socialism in Russia. In many of the 
defeated countries the workers had lost much of their former 
respect for the ruling classes, and in England itself more
74Ibid., p. 233.
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of them were turning to the support of the Labor Party.
Nationalism also helped open an unbridgeable gulf between
England and Ireland, which led eventually to war and to the
termination of the union. The course which the Conservatives
had pursued as an antidote to class consciousness, major
social reform, and Home Rule failed in the end to achieve
those ends. This failure is well summarized by Peter Viereck:
"Conservative hopes that nationalism would stabilize the
status quo against revolutions were dashed when, instead, it
brought two world wars, causing revolutions, social chaos,
75and the moral chaos of racist atrocities.”
If the Conservatives adopted a policy of nationalism 
and imperialism to counter radical social change, they also 
proved willing to resort to stronger tactics where necessary. 
For generations they had proclaimed the sanctity of law. 
Disrespect for the law was abhorrent to them. They portrayed 
themselves as the party of law and order, and denounced any 
violation of the law in the severest terms. This was es­
pecially so in relation to Ireland, where they continually 
criticized the Liberals for being soft and timid, and demanded 
that the law be enforced rigorously.
Yet in 1886, in 1893, and again during the period
1912-1914 influential and leading members of the Conservative 
Party openly advocated resistance to the law. They asserted 
that if Parliament passed a Home Rule Bill the Unionists
75Viereck, Conservatism, p. 24.
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would not only be justified in resisting by force the imple­
mentation of that Bill in Ulster, but that they would in 
7 6fact do so. This threat by the Unionists to revolt against 
the government, to refuse to acknowledge the legality of an 
act of Parliament, was an astonishing event in English his­
tory. Those men who had for centuries proclaimed their 
respect for Parliament, and for constitutional processes, had 
suddenly declared their refusal to abide by its enactments. 
Their willingness to advocate rebellion reveals an attitude, 
state of mind, and extremism that were produced by inordinate 
circumstances.
The fact is that Conservatives felt, especially in 
the period 1906-1914, that the social system was gravely en­
dangered by those forces which were seemingly pushing England
toward a collectivistic and socialistic society and they
77determined to use the House of Lords to prevent this. Sir 
Robert Ensor believes that the Conservatives were losing 
their control and felt strongly, as early as the 1880s, the 
pressure of those forces seeking to reform society. He 
writes that the "nineteen years of Unionist supremacy that 
ended in 1906 may be looked on as a successful rally of the 
governing families to maintain their position, propped
7 6The threat by the Conservatives to resort to civil 
war, what George Dangerfield calls the Tory Revolt, will be 
discussed at greater length in the following chapter.
77Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill,
p. 190.
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and modified by their alliance with the ablest leader of the
78upstarts— Chamberlain." When Balfour's decision to employ
the House of Lords to prevent the enactment of progressive 
legislation led to the Taff Vale decision, the rejection of 
the 1909 budget, and consequently to the passage of the Par­
liament Act, many Conservatives, feeling frustrated, turned
79against him and removed him from the Party leadership.
To explain therefore the outburst of Conservative
passions, as revealed in the support of armed insurrection
and the encouragement of the army to disobey the government
solely in terms of the Irish problem would be inadequate. It
80was a product of various factors discussed in this chapter.
It was a reaction and a response to what the Conservatives 
viewed as an undermining democratic, socialistic, and secular 
attack on the existing social order. They feared that the 
aristocratic world was slipping away, aided by the attack of 
these various forces, and they determined to fight with every 
weapon available, constitutional or unconstitutional, legal 
or illegal, to maintain it. In The Conservative Mind Russell 
Kirk writes: "No old dominant class ever really relinquishes
7 f t
R. C. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914 (Oxford: Claren­
don Press, 1963), p. 388.
7 9Balfour's use of the House of Lords in this period 
is well analyzed in Roy Jenkins, Mr. Balfour's Poodle: An
Account of the Struggle between the House of Lords and the 
Government of Mr. Asquith (London: Collins, 1954).
80This explosion of Tory passions and the factors be­
hind it are dramatically discussed for the period 1910-1914 
by George Dangerfied, The Strange Death of Liberal England 
(New York: Capricorn Books, 1935).
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power until its nerve has failed— until, losing confidence in
its own virtue and its own justice, that powerful order allows
the sceptre or the sword to slip from its grasp, mesmerized
81rather than vanquished." While it is true that by the end
of the Home Rule era the landed aristocracy had lost much of
its power, and the sceptre and the sword had largely passed
to a new class, that class had been deeply influenced by the
aristocracy and professed many of its social, economic, and
8 2imperial principles. If the landed aristocracy had lost
much of its former distinctive political predominance, this
was partly a reflection of the fact that land was losing its
pre-eminence as a source of individual wealth and the former
landed magnates were deriving much of their income from in-
8 3dustrial, commercial, and financial investments. This was 
true to an even greater extent of the Anglo-Irish landlords, 
who in this period relinquished most of their land to the 
peasants. Thus while the middle class was exercising an in­
creasing influence in the Conservative Party, many of the 
aristocrats had also developed middle class interests. The 
middle class did not bring an entirely new set of values or 
objectives to the Conservative Party. They adopted many of 
the social, economic, and imperial principles of the aristo­
cracy, as is revealed especially by their willingness to
81Kirk, The Conservative Mind, p. 288.
82Worsley, Barbarians and Philistines, p. 35.
83Ibid., p. 35.
76
revolt over the Irish i s s u e . G i v e n  this development, it 
was certain therefore that no radical transformation of the 
social order would occur and that no major concessions would 
be freely and willingly made to the nationalist aspirations 
of the Irish.
84Ibid., p. 35. See also A. P. Thornton, The Habit 
of Authority: Paternalism in British History (London:
George Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 17.
CHAPTER III
THE CONSERVATIVE SELF-IMAGE
Our vocation in the world has been to undertake the 
government of vast uncivilized population and to raise them 
gradually to a higher standard of life.
— Lord Hugh Cecil
No other people are doing so much to explore, subdue, 
and civilize far-distant and savage lands.
— W. E. H. Lecky2
All the law and all the civilization in Ireland are 
the work of England. ^
— Arthur James Balfour
The Victorian Englishman felt that he was a member 
of the greatest nation in the world. . . .
— D. C. Somervell
Throughout the period of the Home Rule struggle most 
Englishmen in general and Conservatives in particular held a 
highly complimentary self-image. They looked upon themselves 
with a sense of pride and accomplishment that would be dif­
ficult to duplicate in any historical period. They thought 
of England as having attained the highest level of
^Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism, p. 214.
2
Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, I, 249.
3
Balfour, Aspects of Home Rule (London: George Rout-
ledge & Sons, 1912), p. 170.
^Somervell, English Thought, p. 233.
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civilization that had yet been developed anywhere, and they 
thought of themselves as seated at the pinnacle of that civil­
ization. They looked upon themselves as the wisest law­
makers and the most capable and generous governmental and 
imperial administrators in existence; and they viewed the 
English constitutional and political system as the very 
paragon of excellence.
What a contrast they detected when they looked at the 
various non-Anglo-Saxon peoples throughout the empire. Al­
most everywhere they saw what they considered to be mentally 
and culturally backward peoples, peoples who, in their view, 
lacked both law and civilization. In fact many Englishmen 
seemed to believe that no people could be civilized unless 
they partook to some extent of the English political and 
legal system. Arthur Balfour's assertion that "before the 
English . . . went to Ireland, Ireland was . . . without 
law" is a prime example of this attitude.** Of course Ireland 
had possessed laws, but they were not England's laws, and to 
Balfour this invalidated them. Lord Hugh Cecil expressed 
similar sentiments when he specifically excluded from the 
pale of civilization all societies which were not influenced 
to some extent by the English constitutional system: "The
Constitution," he said,
^Ibid., p. 233; and A. P. Thornton, The Imperial 
Idea, p. 240.
^Balfour, Aspects of Home Rule, p. 170.
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is the greatest contribution that the English people 
have made to human progress and it bears deeply im­
printed upon it their peculiar characteristics. With 
various degrees of faithfulness it has been copied in 
every civilized country in the world. Nowhere where 
civilization exists is there a land which does not bear 
traces of its influence.?
One of the yardsticks which was widely used for measur­
ing the degree of backwardness or advancement of a particular 
people was their military ability to defend themselves from 
conquest by foreign powers. Those peoples, such as the Irish, 
who had proved unable to maintain their sovereignty were 
charged with possessing various characteristics of inferior­
ity. Conversely, those peoples who were able through military 
force to conquer and dominate others were considered to be
p
the bearers of certain superior attributes. It was a method 
which was highly satisfying to most Englishmen because it 
seemed to prove their assumption of superiority. It was in 
fact nothing more than the continued application of the old 
might-makes-right argument, the argument that those who have 
the power to do so are justified in imposing their will 
wherever they desire. It was a naked appeal to force. Force 
became the arbiter and final proof of the rightness of those 
who wielded it. In fact the successful use of force proved 
not only the superiority of those who exercised it but the
7
Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism, p. 218.
O
See Carlton J. H. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism, 
1871-1900, pp. 249-50. This theme is also touched upon in a 
recent work by Christine Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971).
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backwardness of those who suffered from it.
These ideas were not restricted only to militarists 
or jingoists, or to the unintellectual elements of society. 
Even some presumably highly thoughtful members of the Fabian 
Society assumed that Englishmen, on the basis of their 
military power, were mentally, culturally, and morally 
superior to other less powerful peoples, and they approved, 
on that basis, the military conquest and political domina­
tion of the latter. The Fabians, therefore, supported the 
Conservatives in the Boer War, and produced a pamphlet, 
Fabianism and the Empire, setting forth their justification 
for so doing and for their imperial views in general. They 
assumed that England's higher sense of moral responsibility 
would insure that she would not go to war without strong 
and justifiable reasons. "The fact remains,” wrote Bernard 
Shaw,
that a Great Power, consciously or unconsciously, must 
govern in the interests of civilization as a whole; and 
it is not to those interests that such mighty forces 
as gold-fields, and the formidable armaments that can 
be built upon them, should be wielded irresponsibly by 
small communities of frontiersmen.9
g
Bernard Shaw, ed., Fabianism and the Empire; A 
Manifesto by the Fabian Society (London: Grant Richards,
1900), p. 23. It is interesting to note that Shaw, while 
implicitly supporting the might-makes-right argument, was, 
somewhat paradoxically it would seem, a bitter opponent of 
the theory of natural selection and an advocate of the 
creative, rather than competitive, evolution of J. B. 
Lamarck and Henri Bergson. See especially the Preface to 
his Back to Methusalah: A Metabiological Pentateuch (New
York: Brentano's, 1921).
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The use of the term "frontiermen" is important, for it is 
obviously and intentionally pejorative, reflecting the un­
stated assumption that Englishmen were morally superior to, 
and politically more responsible than, the Boers, and pre­
sumably also the Irish and other less technologically ad­
vanced and militarily powerful peoples.
Competition, struggle, and power became important con­
cepts among many Englishmen. Force was considered a neces­
sary factor in ruling the Irish and other such rebellious 
and turbulent colonial people. In addition power was visu­
alized as a measure of a people's greatness, and their ad­
vanced degree of development and achievement. It demonstrated 
their technological, organizational, and military prowess, 
and won, or at least ought to win, admiration and respect for 
those who possessed it. There was a widespread tendency in 
late Victorian and Edwardian England to think of war in terms 
of inevitability. This was in part a product of the concept 
that individuals, classes, and nations were in a state of 
constant competition and struggle. However, this does not 
mean that no attempt was made to avoid war. One of the argu­
ments for increased military strength and for firmness in 
dealing with foreign powers or Irish outrages, for example, 
was that it would prevent, or at least reduce, the frequency 
of military conflict. Still, there was a strong tendency to 
exalt martial values, as in Sir Henry Newbolt's exhortation 
"to count the life of battle good,"^ or as in the following
10See "Clifton Chapel."
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passage from Tom Brown's Schooldays. "After all," wrote
Thomas Hughes,
what would life be without fighting? . . . From the 
cradle to the grave, fighting, rightly understood, is 
the business, the real, highest, honestest of every 
son of man. Everyone who is worth his salt has his 
enemies, who must be beaten, be they evil thoughts and 
habits in himself or spiritual wickedness in high 
places, or Russians, or Border-ruffians. . . .
It is no good for Quakers, or any other body of men, 
to uplift their voices against fighting. Human nature 
is too strong for them. . . . Every soul of them is 
doing his own piece of fighting, somehow and somewhere.-*-^-
The basic cause of the conflict, which many Englishmen 
viewed as a constant element in the human experience, lay 
not in institutions, but in the nature of man himself. Most 
Englishmen, however, believed that man could be reformed and 
improved. This was a highly important theory to the im­
perialist, for without it he would have been unable to 
depict his imperialism as a charitable attempt to civilize 
backward peoples. It was, after all, only on the assumption 
that man was reformable that the mission to civilize him and 
prepare him for self-government became meaningful. The Irish, 
for example, were thought of as being in a rather backward 
cultural, moral, and intellectual state. The British had a 
duty and responsibility to rule them while they were in that 
condition. When they resorted to outrage and rebellion, they 
should be punished promptly and firmly, because Irish mental 
and cultural characteristics were such that they responded
^Thomas Hughes, Tom Brown's Schooldays (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1868), Pt. II, ch. v.
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most favorably to prompt and firm repression. There should 
be no vacillation on the part of the British administration 
in Ireland, for the successful imperial ruler must always 
demonstrate his authority fearlessly and swiftly.
These views, and the policies based upon them, led to 
endless difficulties for the British administration in Ire­
land, for as Irish nationalism developed, British imperial 
rule was more and more rejected. The fundamental element in 
Irish nationalism was the demand for self-government, and 
this the Unionists refused to concede. Their only resource 
therefore, when conciliatory overtures failed, was the appli­
cation of increased force to maintain British dominion. In 
fact the Irish demand for self-government infuriated most 
Englishmen, for they viewed it as a callous and ungrateful 
rejection of their civilizing efforts. "The Irish claim," 
writes A. P. Thornton, "that Ireland was a nation was one that 
was bitterly and passionately refuted by the late-Victorian 
Englishman and the generation he trained, who saw in it only 
a deliberate rejection of his own standards, which were, he 
was genuinely persuaded, the highest that men had yet attained 
to.1,12
The Unionists therefore could not bring themselves to 
concede self-government to Ireland. And all the threats, 
bombings, boycotts, killings, that the Irish perpetrated 
against English rule only stiffened their determination to
12Thornton, The Imperial Idea, p. 240.
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maintain it. In fact such acts of violence strengthened their 
belief that the Irish were basically criminal and anarchic, 
and therefore incapable of wise and efficient self-government. 
In this respect it is interesting to compare their attitude 
toward acts of violence committed by the Irish and similar 
acts committed in Ireland by the British. When the latter 
used force to achieve their goals this was looked upon as a 
dignified, restrained, and responsible use of power to bring 
law, justice, and civilized order to a situation that was 
gravely threatened by the erratic schemes of Irish anarchists 
and revolutionaries. Violence, thus, when used by the 
British was the just and orderly act of grave and sagacious 
imperial statesmen; when used by the Irish it was the reck­
less and terroristic act of criminals.
Given these conditions, it would, the Unionists argued, 
have been totally irresponsible and a dereliction of duty to 
grant self-government to the Irish, and they repeatedly 
attacked on this basis those followers of Gladstone who 
supported it. They pictured themselves as improving, at the 
greatest possible pace, the condition of a rather backward 
and recalcitrant people, and they became extremely indignant 
when their efforts were criticized and denounced. Some 
Englishmen even asserted that England should continue to rule 
Ireland no matter what the results were. This was certainly 
the case with Lord Salisbury who stated quite frankly that 
he was not interested in the justice or injustice of Home 
Rule. The ethics or practical merits of the question did
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not concern him. "Rightly or wrongly," he stated, "I have 
not the slightest desire to satisfy the national aspirations 
of Ireland."13
The Unionists had profound faith in the rightness of 
their position and refused to be shaken in that faith by Irish 
Nationalists or Gladstonian Liberals. Irish opinion of 
course was quite worthless, since the Irish were not intel­
lectually equipped to make an intelligent judgment. The 
honorable and wise path therefore was to ignore it. In the 
House of Commons Arthur Balfour usually treated the Irish 
representatives with contempt and considered their statements 
and questions so unimportant as to refuse either to take them 
seriously, or at times even to condescend to answer them.
When Irish M.P.s would question his policies, Kenneth Young 
writes,
he would simply laugh at their heroics, and his reply 
would be a playful prodding in the ribs rather than a 
serious attempt to answer.
He refused to treat Parnell and his associates as 
true representatives of Ireland; and often, instead of 
answering himself, would show his disdain by simply 
sending in his Parliamentary Secretary . . .  to read 
out a statement.
The Queen shared Balfour's attitude toward the Nationalist
M.P.s and on occasion exhorted Gladstone, and even Lord
Salisbury who indeed needed little encouragement, to avoid
13Cecil, Life of Salisbury, III, 293.
14Kenneth Young, Arthur James Balfour; The Happy 
Life of the Politician, Prime Minister, Statesman, and Phi­
losopher, 1848-1930 (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1963), p. 103.
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15any intercourse with them. By some seemingly unfathomable 
process of analysis the Queen and the Unionists would argue on 
occasion that the Nationalist M.P.s did not represent the Irish
people. It is difficult to discover how they reached this
conclusion or exactly what their motives were. It may
simply have stemmed from a wish to believe that a majority
of the Irish people were loyal; or conversely, and much more
likely, they may merely have used this as justification for
X6ignoring the criticisms and demands of the Irish.
The correct course, most Unionist believed, was for 
Britain to continue to govern Ireland imperially despite 
Irish criticism and objections.'1'7 Since the Conservatives 
and the Whigs generally considered themselves the best judges 
of what was good for Ireland they were determined to act 
accordingly. It was true that this might lead to resistance 
and the consequent use of force to maintain order, but 
neither the Whigs nor the Conservatives recoiled from this. 
Indeed they believed that the periodic application of force 
was a highly effective way of demonstrating to the Irish that 
British statesmen knew how to impose their authority and did 
not shrink from whatever means were necessary to do so. On
15Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria, 2d ser.,
Vol. Ill, pp. 294, 687.
"^Young, Arthur James Balfour, p. 103.
1 7 Bernard Holland, The Life of Spencer Compton;
Eighth Duke of Devonshire (2 vols.; London: Longman’s,
Green 6 Co., 1911), II, 143-44.
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the contrary they were proud of their ability to administer
18punishment to wrongdoers. It was a mark of their Stoicism
19and imperial temper, of their ability and right to rule,
and proved that they were neither weak, timid, nor
effeminate— characteristics which they disdained, and which
20they associated contemptuously with the Irish. There was 
little critical analysis of the merits of these values. 
Intellectualizing on such matters was looked upon as a 
feminine, and hence objectionable, pursuit. The imperial 
administrator espoused the ideals of firmness and toughness, 
of masculinity and muscularity. These were the qualities 
fostered in the public schools, institutions which almost 
every imperial administrator passed through at one stage of 
his life and to which he looked back with fond nostalgia.
An example of these views may be cited from the writ­
ings of G. F.-H. Berkeley, who had once been a student at
Wellington College, and who was certainly not among the most
21extreme in his adherence to public school values. He 
approvingly defined public school objectives as aiming for 
the development of "hardy and dashing breed" of a young
18Worsley, Barbarians and Philistines, p. 43.
19Ibid., p. 43.
20Ibid., p. 43; see also Hayes, A Generation of Ma­
terialism, 1871-1900, pp. 256, 269.
21Berkeley opposed the Coalition's nakedly ruthless 
policy of repression and reprisal in Ireland in the period 
1919-1921.
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22men. The faculty at Wellington, he stated, were ideal
for this purpose since they were "competent and muscular 
23Britons.” Berkeley depreciated the intellectual and
scholarly teacher. "One knows,” he wrote,
that in many schoolrooms throughout England, the boys 
have looked at the master in charge and have said,
"This man can pester us with his Latin and Greek and 
I can't retaliate, but in reality what a poor type of 
fellow he is! I could smash him at any type of game
or sport."24
In Berkeley's view the mark of a good teacher was his ability
to dominate on the sports field. "That was the sort of
25master that was required. . . . "
The purpose of education, as generally purveyed in 
the public schools, was to inculcate these physical values. 
The student was to become loyal, obedient, and courageous, 
characteristics deemed basic, not only to the soldier, but 
to the successful imperial administrator as well. In 
"Ionicus" Sir Henry Newbolt warmly praised the public school 
teacher who spent his days far "from fame and power," but 
who dreamed faithfully and loyally to the end of his life 
"of the sound and splendour of England's war." Newbolt left 
no doubt of his admiration for the martial values instilled 
by the public schools, as is revealed in the following
22George F.-H. Berkeley, My Recollections of Welling­
ton College, (Newport, Mon.: R. H. Johns, 1945), p. 30.
23Ibid., p. 34.
24Ibid., p. 34.
25Ibid., p. 34.
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nostalgic passage about Clifton:
Clifton, remember these thy sons who fell 
Fighting far over sea;
For they in a dark hour remembered well 
Their warfare learned of thee.26
The inculcation of these values was the principal 
objective of public school education. However, there was 
another aspect to this education which was equally impor­
tant. This was the pedagogical method used not only to 
achieve academic results but to instill discipline and self- 
control. This method amounted largely to the liberal appli­
cation of corporal punishment. The beatings perpetrated in 
the public schools were designed not only to instill dis­
cipline in the recipient, but to mold in him the kind of 
temper and disposition deemed necessary to successful im­
perial rule. In suffering them unflinchingly, the student 
was learning not only to endure in silence whatever trials 
or hardships he might later encounter in his imperial and 
governmental career, but also to inflict similar punishment 
on those he governed, in the firm knowledge that he was 
thereby furthering the maintenance of law, order, and the 
cause of England's civilizing mission. By this process the 
student learned to control his passions and emotions, and 
through a similar process he would perhaps some day control 
the passions and emotions of the Irish and other backward 
and rebellious colonial peoples.
2 6Henry Newbolt, Collected Poems, 1897-1907 (London: 
Thomas Nelson & Sons [1910]), "notes."
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In later life these students could recall their public 
school beatings not only with pride, but with unshakeable 
confidence in their value and effectiveness. Sir Ian Hamil­
ton's pleasant recollections of the punishment he received 
at Wellington College are highly illustrative. He describes 
how the headmaster, the Reverend Edward White Benson, under­
took to instill in him the habit of punctuality:
That term he had set before himself the high design 
of making me punctual. So to his study every morning 
at 9:30 a.m. I brought a little note from my form 
masters. On reading this he rushed about searching for 
a cane. . . .  A great deal depended on the cane; there 
was a special sort which grew larger and heavier towards 
the business end. The moment he found one he laid on 
to my back till all was blue. . . . When I went to the 
bathing lake and stripped, I felt as a peacock must 
feel when spreading his tail. . . . The blues of the 
previous week had turned to green and yellow, whilst 
along the ribs, under my arms, where the point of the 
cane curled, the stripes were dark purple. . . . '
Hamilton was aware that his public school education had
taught him nothing of an intellectual nature; it had put
little emphasis on objective thought or value analysis.
This, however, was a fact to be proud of, not ashamed.
"Wellington College," he boasted, "taught me no learning,
brought me no fame, but it taught me to smile while I was
being thrashed."28
And yet it was extremely difficult to achieve reforms
27General Sir Ian Hamilton, Introduction to J. L. 
Bevir, The Making of Wellington College: Being an Account
of the First Sixteen Years of Its Existence (London:
Edward Arnold, 1920), p. vii. It is interesting to note 
that Benson later became archbishop of Canterbury.
28Ibid., p. vii.
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in public school education. Those who defended the emphasis 
on muscular and physical values and the severity, frequency, 
and necessity of corporal punishment felt that these were 
indispensable to the development and training of aristo­
cratic youth. As T. C. Worsley points out, "In the practice 
of flogging and being flogged the gentleman is supposed to
display his aristocratic virtues, courage and the ability
29to bear and to inflict pain without flinching." Rather 
than question or examine the nature and merits of the values 
which the public schools inculcated, or the methods applied 
there, public school enthusiasts more often condemned those 
who did. This was perhaps a natural consequence of public 
school education. It tended to foster loyalty, duty, and 
obedience, and stifle such intellectual activities as rigid 
self-analysis or critical disputation regarding the merits 
of British cultural or moral values.
The tendency of most Whigs and Conservatives there­
fore was to guard against the possibility of a decline in 
"those stronger and more robust qualities that chiefly lead 
to political greatness."30 One of the most prominent Con­
servative theorists of this period, the Anglo-Irish his­
torian W. E. H. Lecky, addressed himself to this question in 
the 1890s and found that generally "the fibre of the race is
29Horace Annesley Vachell, The Hill: A Romance of
Friendship (London: John Murray, 1905), ch. i.
30Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, I, 249.
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still unimpaired."
Whether . . . there has been any decadence . . .  is 
a question on which it is difficult to pronounce. The 
last occasion in which England was engaged in a life- 
and-death struggle against overwhelming odds was in 
the Indian Mutiny? and, in that now distant crisis, it 
must be owned that there was no failing in the stronger, 
fiercer, and more tenacious qualities that have made 
England what she is. Amid all the much-obtruded senti­
mentalisms of our time there are indications that the 
fibre of the race is still unimpaired. The old love 
of manly sports was never more abundantly displayed; 
in the great fields of adventure and discovery, in the 
forms of commercial and industrial enterprise that most 
tax the energies and resources of men, modern English­
men bear their full part, and no other people are doing 
so much to explore, subdue, and civilize far-distant 
and ravage lands.^1
Although Lecky's analysis exudes a general air of 
self-confidence there runs throughout his work an under­
current of doubt, or pessimism, as indicated not only by 
his reference to "all the much-obtruded sentimentalisms of 
our time," but by the very fact that he would consider it 
necessary to undertake a discussion of this question. The 
rise of democracy, the widening acceptance of socialism, and 
the growing concern among certain groups for the welfare of 
the poor, as revealed, for example, by the works and ac­
tivities of Charles Booth and Beatrice Potter, was not an 
entirely happy omen for most Conservatives. Nor was the 
fact that in the 1890s the Ladies' Football League began to 
play "manly sports" before large crowds. Many Englishmen 
tended to react to such signs of decadence by adopting a 
more stubborn adherence to the old values. It was doubtless 
under a sense of siege and defensiveness that the British
31Ibid., I, 249.
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exalted Lord Kitchener as a sort of virility symbol while 
rejecting and incarcerating Oscar Wilde as symbol of de­
cadence.
The Whigs and Conservatives gave little critical con­
sideration to the merits of the ideas, values, and practices 
they espoused. The justice of British rule in Ireland, for 
example, and the right of the Irish to self-government were 
matters that were not open to discussion. Most of them 
found it impossible to entertain seriously the view that 
other ideas or other customs might be as valid or as tenable 
as theirs. The tendency to do so called forth their wrath 
and condemnation. In a world of struggle ideas, cultures, 
and peoples were in constant competition. It was outrageous 
to ask most English imperialists to discuss seriously the 
possibility that their ideas and customs could possibly be 
little more than a conglomeration of concepts and practices 
that had emerged over a period of time in response to the 
aspirations of a particular group in a specific locale 
under a particular set of conditions, and that in different 
circumstances other ideas and practices might have developed. 
The admission of this possibility would open the door to a 
pervasive relativism which most of them abhorred. It might 
mean that any set of customs could be justified on the basis 
of environmentalism, and would undermine the concept of 
absolutism in these matters which they wished to maintain.
The moral and cultural relativism implied in the 
philosophy of democracy was a disturbing factor for many
upper and middle class Englishmen. It was only in rare mo­
ments and then only reluctantly and grudgingly that they 
conceded that some non-Anglo-Saxon customs might be appro­
priate and permissible in their native setting. Even then 
such concessions were usually made merely as an expedient to 
facilitate a degree of harmony in colonial government. It 
was never admitted that such customs were of the same stand­
ard as those of the imperialist. Such a concession could 
not be granted, for to do so would have been to remove one 
of the important bases of imperialism— the need to civilize 
backward peoples. The Irish argument, for example, that the 
conditions of land tenure in Ireland were inequitable, and 
that the tenants were justified in banding together to alter 
those conditions and to force down the cost of rents, ap­
peared as stark injustice to most Whigs and Conservatives. 
Here were two antithetical concepts of economic justice 
existing within the United Kingdom, and produced by closely 
related economic factors. The molding of ideas by circum­
stances was obvious. And yet most English imperialists 
refused to acknowledge this. While they were willing to 
concede that Irish ideas on the land laws were produced by 
their economic conditions and aspirations, they denied that 
such factors influenced their own attitudes. They seemed 
to assume that the social system in Ireland had been created 
in the absence of egoistic forces, and that it was the em­
bodiment therefore of pure justice. Far from conceding 
validity to Irish ideas, the Unionists generally ignored
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them as self-oriented and therefore unworthy of considera­
tion. Most of the imperial administrators who governed 
Ireland seemed to look upon the Irish as being in a long and 
protracted stage of infancy.
The obverse side of the coin of course implied that 
English society was adult, that it was mature. From this it 
was an easy step to the concept of a father-child relation­
ship. England was the mature adult society; Ireland was in 
a state of immaturity. Britain therefore should rule Ireland 
just as the father rules the child. And correct paternal 
behavior, in the view of most imperialists, was the very 
opposite of democratic. It was strictly authoritarian. The 
father was a rigid disciplinarian, an advocate of punishment, 
and possessed of the necessary temper to administer that 
punishment unflinchingly. It was firmly believed that ample 
application of punishment would correct most problems of 
Irish misbehavior. To most imperialists punishment was an 
important ingredient for successful rule of the Irish. They 
applied it with such uncommon liberality that one wonders 
whether it was intended primarily to alter Irish behavior or 
as an element of justification for British imperialism. 
Winston Churchill points out that his father. Lord Randolph, 
reached the revealing conclusion "that special legislation 
was not regarded by the Government as a hateful necessity; 
but as something good in itself, producing a salutary effect 
on the Irish people and raising the temper of the
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Ministerial party."^
These tactics, coupled with the authoritarian and 
self-righteous character of the typical English imperial 
administrator, led to a form of despotism in Ireland which 
studiously ignored the advice or appeals of Irish Nation­
alist M.P.s. Major pieces of legislation were drawn up and
enacted into law without any consultation with Irish Parli-
33amentary representatives. Not only were the Nationalists 
habitually excluded from the construction of Irish legis­
lation, but the innumerable special powers acts, those acts 
suspending habeas corpus and ordinary law in Ireland, were 
passed expressly against their wishes. Indeed the very 
virtue of much of the legislation dealing with Ireland often 
seemed to lie in the fact that the Nationalist members op­
posed i t . ^
These practices and attitudes had deleterious conse­
quences for English rule in Ireland. The close association 
with the Anglo-Irish class, both in London and Dublin, and 
the refusal to give serious consideration to Nationalist
32W. S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill (2 vols.; 
New York: Macmillan Company, 1906), II, 342.
33Lord Eversley, Gladstone and Ireland: The Irish
Policy of Parliament from 1850-1894 (London: Methuen & Co.,
1912), p. 151.
34John Morley states that it was "almost a point of 
honour . . . for British cabinets to make Irish laws out of 
their own heads." John Morley, The Life of William Ewart 
Gladstone (new ed., 3 vols.; New York: Macmillan Company,
1932), II, 292; see also Eversley, Gladstone and Ireland, 
p. 151.
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complaints, prevented English administrators from discover­
ing the real nature of Irish conditions and from learning 
the consequences of their policies. Lord Eversley's des­
cription of W. E. Forster was characteristic of most Conser­
vative and Whig administrators in Ireland. "There, was in 
him," Eversley wrote, "a dogmatic self-confidence, which, 
added to a brusk manner, made it difficult for those, with 
whom he did not agree, to present their views, and prevented 
him from learning, by free communication with all classes
of persons, the effect of his measures, and the necessity
35for a change of policy.
Whig and Conservative administrators in Ireland tended
to view their institutions and policies as the best that
could be devised, and they became extremely critical of those
who suggested otherwise. If the Irish were suffering from
economic or other ills, the basic cause was not to be found
in British policies and institutions, but in the character
of the Irish themselves. If the Irish repeatedly violated
the law this did not so much indicate the existence of an
unjust law as the anarchic and criminal propensities of
Irish character. Violation of the law in Ireland was
anathema to most Unionists, and any leniency or compromise
3 6with law-breakers was unthinkable. To the Unionists it
35Eversley, Gladstone and Ireland, pp. 211-12.
36R. C. K. Ensor believes that Irish agrarian crime 
in the 1880s was one of the major determinants in the Radical 
Unionists' decision to oppose Gladstone on Irish policy. 
Ensor, "Some Political and Economic Interactions."
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was more than just a matter of the sanctity of the law. It
was the challenge of an inferior social class and ethnic
group to the authority of the ruling class. Such challenges
were seen to be in the long run a threat to the whole social
and political fabric, and as such they could not be endured.
Unionist M.P.s therefore tended to despise the Irish and
their Parliamentary representatives whose demands they viewed
37as "unparalleled effrontary.” It was, W. H. Smith stated,
extremely "annoying to have to endure insult and provocation
38from these men.”
The fact that from 1886 onward the Nationalists held 
more than 80 per cent of Ireland's Parliamentary seats was 
of grave concern to the Unionists, since the major plank in 
the Nationalist platform was self-government for Ireland.
In this situation the Whigs and Conservatives, as has pre­
viously been pointed out, resorted to the novel argument that 
the Irish Nationalists did not represent the Irish people.
The reasoning behind this seemed to be that the Nationalists 
had attained their victory through deceit and coercion of 
the electorate, and that consequently they were not repre­
sentative of Irish opinion. This was of course merely a 
political tactic to justify rejection of Home Rule, for the 
fact is that most Whigs and Conservatives constantly char­
acterized all elements of nationalist Ireland as untrustworthy,
37G. Smith, Irish History and the Irish Question, p.
198.
38Sir Herbert Maxwell, Life and Times of the Right 
Honourable William Henry Smith, II, 197.
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criminal, and anarchic. A typical example of this was
demonstrated by Lord Randolph Churchill at the time of the
debate on the first Home Rule Bill. Churchill's statement
reveals the widely held opinion among British Unionist
politicians that the Irish unionists, who were exalted by
their British counterparts as Protestant and Anglo-Saxon,
could never be expected to live under a government dominated
by Irish Catholics. "If political parties and political
leaders," Churchill wrote,
. . . hand over coldly [the Irish Unionists] . . .  to 
their hereditary and most bitter foes, make no doubt on 
this point— Ulster will not be a consenting party;
Ulster will resort to the supreme arbitrament of force; 
Ulster will fight, Ulster will be right; Ulster will 
emerge from the struggle victorious, because all that 
Ulster represents to us Britons will command the 
sympathy and support of an enormous section of our 
British community, and also, I feel certain, will at­
tract the admiration and the approval of free and
civilized nations.3®
By supporting the Ulster Protestants in their refusal to live
under a government dominated by Irish Catholics, Unionists
presumably saw themselves as furthering the cause of freedom
and civilization. Churchill does not indicate precisely
what he means by the words "all that Ulster represents to us
Britons," but the rest of his statement would seem to bear
out the interpretation that what Ulster represents is in
fact freedom and civilization. British Unionists tended to
see in Irish Protestants those qualities which they assumed
to exist in themselves, and in the native Irish they saw only
^ W .  S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, II, 65.
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those characteristics which they abhorred. Churchill con­
centrated his attention on Ulster, making little reference 
to the Anglo-Irish scattered throughout the other three prov­
inces. This was merely a political tactic, however, for if 
the Protestants of Ulster could not in justice be asked to 
live under a government dominated by Irish Catholics, cer­
tainly the Protestants of the other three provinces did not 
deserve less consideration. By pointing out the dishonor, 
and presumably therefore the impossibility, of placing the 
Ulster Protestants under Irish rule, Churchill hoped to pre­
vent the enactment of self-government for any part of Ireland. 
His highly laudatory view of the Ulster Protestants was ex­
pressed in 1886. In 1911 Arthur Balfour could still publicly 
repeat the same sentiments:
When you remember who and what [my italics] they are 
who plead with you that the Union should be maintain­
ed, . .  . when you compare . . . the character . . .  of 
those who ask for Home Rule in Ireland, and the char­
acter . . .  of those who implore you not to hand over 
the minority helpless to a majority, then I think the 
Constitutional statesman will feel a generous and ir­
resistible irritation at the cowardly policy of the 
Government, which has proposed to sacrifice [the union­
ists of Ireland].40
How exactly were the unionists of Ulster to be sacri­
ficed? By placing them under a government that would be 
dominated by Irish Catholics. When Goldwin Smith asserted 
that Ulster was "a part, not so much of Catholic and Keltic 
Ireland, as of Saxon and Presbyterian Scotland," he was 
emphasizing a religious distinction between the various
40Balfour, Aspects of Home Rule, p. 20.
101
41groups in Ireland which was important to British Unionists. 
Since they were looking for divisive factors rather than 
unifying ones, they concentrated on ethnicity and religion 
as dichotomous elements that could not be surmounted. By so 
doing they drove the wedge of religious and ethnic division 
deeper between the two principal groups in Ireland, and they 
prolonged the anti-Catholic prejudice that still existed in 
England making an amicable settlement of the Irish problem 
impossible and the promotion of Catholics to important po­
litical positions more difficult. Efforts to appoint 
Catholics to high political office almost invariably called 
forth a wave of dissent. In 1886 the Protestant Alliance of 
Scotland warned Lord Randolph Churchill that they could not
and would not accept the "elevation of Roman Catholics to
. . . . 42positions of power and trust in the British Empire." Five
years later, when Gladstone sought to remove certain civil
and political disabilities on Catholics, he was confronted
by a startling storm of opposition. The Liberal leader had
introduced in the House of Commons a bill to permit Catholics
to hold the office of Lord Chancellor and Viceroy of Ireland.
But the Unionists vehemently opposed this measure, and there-
43by prevented its passage. Harold Nicolson points out that 
as late as 1913 the king was inundated with letters opposing
4^G. Smith, Irish History and Irish Character, p. 2. 
42W. S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, II, 134.
42Maxwell, Life of William Henry Smith, III, 300-01.
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the Home Rule Bill on religious grounds. The general theme
of these was that it would be immoral and dishonorable to
place the Protestants of Ulster under the dominion of a
44Catholic-dominated government.
It was a common view among many Englishmen that the 
Irish were slavish in religion and tyrannical in politics 
and that the British were the guardians of religious freedom 
and equal rights for all citizens of the United Kingdom.
They maintained this view of themselves with such tenacity 
that it was impossible to demonstrate its inaccuracy to them. 
It did no use to point out the long history in England of 
discriminatory laws against Catholics. It did no use to 
point out, as the Nationalist member of Parliament Thomas 
O'Conner Power did, that "the number of Catholics . . . re­
turned to Parliament by English and Scotch constituencies 
since the Reformation might be counted on the fingers of one
44Harold Nicholson, King George the Fifth: His Life
and Reign, (London: Constable & Co., 1952), p. 221. There
was a deep and widespread religious prejudice in England, 
even in the early decades of the twentieth century, which is 
often ignored. This prejudice did not extend only toward 
Catholicism but toward non-Christian religions also. An 
example of this appeared in 1895 when Lord Rosebery advised 
the Queen, at the latter's request, that in the future she 
should deny the Garter to all non-Christians:
"I desire to leave on record at your Majesty's command 
. . . the expression of my earnest hope that, in spite 
of at least two unfortunate precedents in the past, 
which induce every Oriental Potentate, however little 
civilised, to hope for the same distinction, the 
Garter will never again be conferred on non-Christian 
Sovereigns.
To do so is in fact to lower the Garter. . . . "  
Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria, 3d ser., Vol. II, p. 
530. Lord Salisbury, a few months later, advised the Queen 
to the same effect. Ibid., 3d ser., Vol. II, p. 530.
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45hand." It did no use to point out that in recent history 
the Irish had successively elected two Protestants as leaders 
of the Nationalist Party— Issac Butt and Charles Stewart 
Parnell. Arguments of this nature had little effect, for 
Englishmen whose thought tended to run along these.lines had 
a rather firmly fixed view not only of the respect for in­
dividual liberty which they practiced but of the lack of 
such respect among Irish Catholics. Their "great defect," 
wrote Goldwin Smith, "is want of independence and of that
strong sense of right by which law and personal liberty are 
46upheld." E. R. Norman, who has made an extensive study of 
anti-Catholicism in Victorian England, bears out the per­
vasiveness of this view: "To the Protestant . . . Catholics
seemed obvious candidates for control and even suppression.
Their religion was believed to be opposed to enlightenment,
47and therefore to sound civil government. . . . "  Most 
English imperialists were in fact thoroughly convinced that 
they were doing the work of God, with the approval of God, 
and that God was solidly on their side. "It was also a 
commonplace," writes Norman, "that Catholic countries were 
bad at trade and commerce; an indication to most Englishmen
45Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons),
3d ser., Vol. 255 (Aug. 3-Aug. 24, 1880), col. 2049.
46G. Smith, Irish History and Irish Character, p. 18.
i*i
E. R. Norman, Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), pp. 18-19.
104
48that God's blessing was withheld." The assumption that
God and the Unionists were working hand in hand was indirect­
ly asserted by Arthur Balfour in the House of Commons:
"There are those," he stated, "who talk as if Irishmen were 
justified in disobeying the law because the law comes to them
in foreign garb. I see no reason why any local colour should
49be given to the Ten Commandments." W. E. Forster supported
this contention, and repeated Balfour's warning that in vio­
lating England's laws the Irish were violating God's laws.
The Irish, he said, "have got a stronger force against them 
than the Irish Government, or Parliament, or the British
50people— they have got against them the force of God's laws."
And yet there was a serious discrepancy in Unionist 
policy toward Ireland. If the Unionists were to be true to 
their expressed mission, which was to civilize the Irish, 
then, since Catholicism was identified with a lower form of 
civilization, since it was looked upon as a regressive force, 
one of their prime objectives should have been the conversion 
of Catholics to Protestantism. This was all the more sig­
nificant since most of them believed that Catholicism inspired 
effeminacy, submissiveness, obscurantism, despotism, and the
48Ibid., pp. 18-19.
49Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, I, 134.
50T. Wemyss Reid, Life of the Right Honourable William 
Edward Forster (2 vols.; London: Chapman and Hall, 1888),
II, 400.
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discouragement of work. If these vices were to be eradicated 
and the Irish civilized, conversion to Protestantism was 
essential. But the Unionists did not undertake to convert 
the Irish to Protestantism, a fact which would seem to indi­
cate that the urge to civilize them was far from overwhelm­
ing.
To many Englishmen, religion was a signpost to one's 
character as well as one's commercial and political propen­
sities. And just as Catholicism was considered the religion 
of the weak, submissive, and effeminate, so Protestantism was 
looked upon as the religion of the strong, dominant, and 
masculine. In this way religion became associated with the 
characteristics and aptitudes of a people, it became a mark 
of progressiveness or backwardness, and gradually became an 
element in English nationalism and imperialism, and as such 
became identified with patriotism. Conversely, support of 
Catholicism could be interpreted as bordering on treason, 
while anti-Catholicism could be viewed as patriotic. As 
E. R. Norman points out, "British anti-Catholicism was pecu­
liarly related to popularly subscribed precepts about the
ends and nature of the British state; it was chauvinistic.
,,51
• • •
This attitude toward Protestantism and Catholicism 
played a large part in molding the Conservative image of
51E. R. Norman, Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 20.
106
themselves and their allies in Ireland. In the character of 
Irish Protestants, Conservatives saw a partial reflection of 
themselves. They attributed to them all those character­
istics which they found commendable and which they were 
convinced formed the essence of their own character. They 
looked upon Ulster Protestants, therefore, as "naturally 
reserved, laconic of speech, without 'gush,' far from lavish
in compliment, slow to commit themselves or to give their
52confidence without good and proved reason." There was,
most Unionists maintained, a profound distinction between the
Irish Catholics and the Protestants of Ulster. The latter
53were "a strong and masterful Saxon element." The unstint­
ing praise lavished on them contrasts sharply with the crit­
icisms levelled at the nationalists. Two of the most famous 
leaders of the Ulster Protestants during this period were 
Colonel Edward Saunderson and Sir Edward Carson. Of Colonel 
Saunderson, Walter Long, a former chief secretary for Ireland, 
wrote: He "was really a most remarkable man. . . .  He was
one of the most attractive personalities with whom I ever 
came in contact. He possessed many accomplishments and loved
^McNeill, Ulster's Stand for Union, p. 43. It is 
ironic that it was the Irish unionist McNeill who wrote this 
description of the Anglo-Saxon Irish being "naturally re­
served" in contrast to the "volatile" Celt, for it was he 
who in the House of Commons in 1914, in a fit of rage, threw 
the Standing Orders at Winston Churchill, striking him on the 
head. (McNeill, incidentally, was one of the editors of the 
11th edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica.)
53G. Smith, Irish History and Irish Character, p.
220.
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54his country with passionate devotion." And of Sir Edward 
Carson Long wrote: He was "one of the most distinguished
Irishmen that country has ever produced— a great lawyer, 
with an immense practice— has sacrificed all his own personal 
advantages and devoted the whole of his strength, wonderful 
ability and passionate enthusiasm to the cause of Ulster.
It is revealing that in praising these two men Long emphasized 
their patriotism, or love of country. But to most Englishmen 
love of country meant love of England. It did not mean love 
of Ireland. This love of England, however, was usually 
expressed as love of the union or the empire. It was asserted 
that the Irish unionists possessed an exalted sense of duty 
and a selfless willingness to sacrifice themselves and their 
own particular material self-interests to the higher and 
nobler objectives of the British empire.
Nor was this highly favorable image confined solely 
to propertied and aristocratic unionists. It is true that 
many Whigs and Conservatives looked upon this class as en­
dowed with special political and administrative abilities 
denied to the working class. But, still, all unionists, by 
the very fact that they were unionists, revealed that they 
possessed virtues and characteristics which set them apart 
from and on a higher plane than Irish nationalists. Since 
they were also Protestant and assumed to be of Anglo-Saxon
54Long, Memories, pp. 171-72. 
5^Ibid., p. 208.
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origin, these basic traits were used to create a picture of 
the Irish unionist that contrasted sharply with that of his 
nationalist counterpart.
A fine example of this differentiation is afforded by 
the Ulster rebellion. During the various instances when the 
nationalists protested, demonstrated, and rebelled against 
what they considered to be unjust laws English unionists saw 
in them only anarchy, criminality, and ungratefulness. Such 
behavior, they felt, could emanate only from irresponsible 
and irreligious people. When, however, the Ulster Protestants 
engaged in similar activities, when they set up a provisional 
government, smuggled arms and other war material into the 
country, and threatened armed insurrection against the govern­
ment, English Unionists described their actions as those of 
solemn and religious men. During the period 1912-1914 when 
Ulster Protestants, encouraged and supported by the Unionists, 
demonstrated against the passage of the Home Rule Bill, and 
asserted openly that they would refuse to acknowledge its 
legality, The Times, not known for its advocacy of resistance 
to the law, supported the Ulster rebellion:
We remember no precedent in our domestic history since 
the Revolution of 1688 . . . for a movement among 
citizens, law-abiding by temperament and habit, which 
resembles the present movement of the Ulster Protestants. 
It is no rabble who have undertaken it. It is the work 
of orderly, prosperous, and deeply religious men.5^
5®"The Ulster Covenant," The Times, Aug. 22, 1912,
p. 5.
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In supporting the proposition that one has the right 
to rebel against those laws he considers unjust, The Times 
had to move extremely cautiously, for this was a period of 
profound social restlessness among the working class in 
Britain— and in Ireland— and it was important therefore, while 
justifying the rebellion of the Ulster Protestants, to make 
sure that one did not, by virtue of the same reasoning, 
justify the rebellion of industrial workers as well.
Certain working class leaders did in fact ponder where 
the line between obedience and resistance to the law was to 
be drawn. If, they asked, the Conservatives' conscience was 
sufficient to justify the violation of laws which they con­
sidered unjust, did not the conscience of other classes merit
57equal consideration? In the House of Commons in March 1914, 
while debating the resignation of those army officers who 
refused to maintain the law in Ulster if Home Rule were en­
acted, John Ward said:
This debate is the best illustration that we workmen 
have ever had in this House that all the talk about 
there being one and the same law for the rich and the 
poor is a miserable hypocrisy. Hon. Gentlemen belong­
ing to the wealthy classes have no more intention of 
obeying the law that is against their interests than 
of flying to the moon.58
Apart from the danger of justifying working class 
revolt Conservatives also had to insure that they did not
57See the speeches of J. H. Thomas and John Ward in 
The Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser.,
Vol. 60 (Mar. 23-April 1, 1914), pp. 251-55, 274-78.
58Quoted in Blake, Unrepentent Tory, p. 199.
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justify insurrection by Irish nationalists. This was attained 
by the rather tenuous method of distinguishing between the 
high mental, cultural, and moral level of Ulster Protestants 
and the much lower level of Irish Catholics. The Times there­
fore argued that the Ulster rebellion would be very different 
from the agrarian unrest that had long marked the behavior of 
the Irish nationalists. The reason for this was that the 
people engaged in it were of a different character. They 
were "law-abiding," both by "temperament and habit," the im­
plication being that Irish nationalists were not. They were, 
The Times asserted, "no rabble," an apparent suggestion that 
Irish nationalists were. And the final statement, that they 
were "deeply religious," merely underlines once more the fact 
that many in England tended to identify Protestantism with 
religiousness and social responsibility, and Catholicism with 
superstition and disloyalty.
The problem therefore of determining when rebellion 
against the government is justified is extremely difficult 
for the genuine adherent of democracy, parliamentarianism, 
and constitutionalism. The last time Englishmen had rebelled 
against their government was in the seventeenth century.
Since that time they had prided themselves on the smooth and 
constitutional operation of the political system. In 1886, 
1893, and in the period 1910-1912, however, many Englishmen, 
especially among the members and supporters of the Conserva­
tive Party, claimed the right to rebel in arms, and asserted 
that they would exercise that right, if Home Rule were enacted.
Ill
They also, both privately and publicly, urged army officers 
to refuse to impose Home Rule in Ulster. In this they were 
successful, and in March 1914, when they were ordered north 
from the Curragh, a large number of influential officers 
resigned instead. In so doing they argued that this was not 
a mutiny because they had been given the alternative of re­
signing, and they merely exercised that option. Still, it is 
interesting that when describing this event in his memoirs, 
one of the leading officers involved, General Hubert Gough, 
found it necessary to undertake a discussion of rebellion and 
its justification. He asserted that the question of deter­
mining when rebellion was justified was never a problem for 
him.5^ "God's voice" informed him of the appropriate moment.^ 
In such matters he was privy to God's wishes, an enviable 
privilege that, according to Alice Miller, none but English­
men may have shared. Gough quotes Miller's poem in explan­
ation:
Knowing what the English have always known,
. . . And perhaps have known alone—
Something that none can teach or tell—
The moment when God's voice says "Rebel.
There was a very large element of self-righteousness 
in this attitude, a self-righteousness that was further
59General Sir Hubert Gough, Soldiering on. Being the 
Memoirs of General Sir Hubert Gough (London: Arthur Barker,
1954), p. 104.
60Ibid., p. 104.
61Ibid., p. 104; see also Alice Duer Miller, "The 
White Cliffs," LI.
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evidenced by an important event in 1912. In that year the 
First Lord of Admiralty, Winston Churchill, planned to de­
liver a speech in the Ulster Hall in Belfast in favor of the 
Home Rule Bill. The Ulster Hall was a public building be­
longing to the people. But to Ulster unionists "the people" 
did not include Irish Catholics. This definition of the term
never seemed to occur to them. Consequently they asserted
their exclusive right to the building and refused to let
Churchill speak there. The Ulster unionist attitude is
typified in a statement by the Unionist M.P. Ronald McNeill. 
The unconscious self-righteousness, religious overtones, and 
disrespect for civil and political liberties that have per­
vaded much of Ulster's history since the seventeenth century 
are obvious in McNeill's statement: "Not only was he [Winston
Churchill] coming to Belfast; he was coming to the Ulster
Hall— to the very building which his father's oration had
62. . . consecrated to the Unionist cause, and which had come
63to be regarded as almost a loyalist shrine."
The fact that the Irish unionists were opposed to any 
change in the union endeared them to the Conservative Party. 
The maintenance of the union as the core and basis of the 
empire was a prime Conservative goal. Involved in the
62Lord Randolph Churchill had denounced Gladstone and 
Home Rule there in 1886. His denunciation was so violent 
that it touched off a series of sectarian riots and killings 
in Belfast and led to a Parliamentary inquiry. See W. S. 
Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, II, 64-66.
6^McNeill, Ulster's Stand for Union, p. 62.
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continuance of this was much that the Conservatives believed 
in. First was the assumption of their right to rule. As 
has already been pointed out the Conservatives feared that 
the dissolution of the union would lead to the disintegra­
tion of the empire and that this would lead inevitably to a 
deterioration of their social, economic, and political posi­
tion. They therefore commended the Irish unionists, and by 
implication themselves, for their loyalty. To most Conserva­
tives, loyalty meant avid fidelity to the British empire.
Those who showed such loyalty were lauded lavishly; those 
whose policies appeared in any way to weaken the existing 
imperial structure were condemned as disloyal and traitorous. 
The Conservatives were extremely adept at arrogating to them­
selves an exclusive claim to loyalty and all they had made 
that term stand for. Their opponents (Liberals, Irish Nation­
alists, and later the Labor Party) were ceaselessly branded 
as the advocates of disloyalty, disunity, weakness, and im­
perial retreat. This practice had been initiated by Disraeli, 
not only for its electoral value, but as a device to maintain 
the institutional structure of England and to stave off 
radical reform by identifying it as un-English and traitorous. 
During the election campaign of 1880 he deliberately used the 
issue of Home Rule as a device to win electoral support. He 
ignored the enmity, or the consequences thereof, which his 
tactics would create between the Irish and the English. 
Self-government for Ireland, he stated, would "in its ultimate 
results" be "scarcely less disastrous than pestilence and
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64famine." "Disraeli set a tradition," wrote Robert Blake,
from which the party has never deviated. Again and 
again . . . Conservatives were to try to pin the label 
of spiritual treason upon first their Liberal then their 
Labor opponents. . . . The Home Rulers, the pro-Boers, 
the pro-Russians exposed bv the Zinoviev letter, . . .
one can multiply examples.
In 1886 Disraeli's tactics were continued by Lord 
Salisbury. He too exploited anti-Irish prejudice in Britain 
in order to win votes. He informed Lord Randolph Churchill 
that the Conservatives could attack the Irish with political 
impunity. They need not fear the loss of votes because any 
such losses would be richly compensated for by gains in the 
anti-Irish vote. Any attack on the Irish could only bring 
electoral success, for "the instinctive feeling of an English- 
man is to get rid of an Irishman." In 1909 Sir Michael 
Hicks-Beach called for greater concentration on these polit­
ical methods. He was disturbed by the extent of the Conserva­
tive defeat in 1906 and he was determined that this should 
not happen again. What the Conservatives needed, he pointed 
out, was an issue that would arouse the emotions, an issue 
that involved the power and prestige of England. In 1909 
the only such issue readily available was Home Rule, and 
Hicks-Beach drew Balfour's attention to this fact. "All the
®^George Earle Buckle and W. F. Monypenny, The Life of 
Benjamin Disraeli: Earl of Beaconsfield (6 vols.; New York:
Macmillan and Company, 1910-1920), VI, 515.
6 5 Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill,
p. 130.
6 6 Cecil, Life of Salisbury, III, 298.
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political history of the last 50 years," he warned, "shows 
that the Unionist (or Conservative) party cannot win a Gen­
eral Election without some special aid, such as Home Rule or
the South African War."®^
While the Conservatives held a highly exalted image of
themselves, and while the qualities embodied in that image
were usually restricted to political and social leaders, at 
times they could in a curious way be extended to members of 
the working class as well. In the general election of De­
cember 1910 the Nationalists carried the borough of London­
derry, giving them a majority of the seats in Ulster. This 
was a source of deep despair for the Unionists, who had long 
argued that a majority of the people of Ulster were opposed 
to Home Rule. Their explanation for the loss of this seat 
harmonizes neatly with the Conservative self-image. The 
"better class of artisans," they explained, that is, the 
Protestants, had migrated to Belfast to seek employment, and 
a low type of worker, Catholic and nationalist, had "drifted 
in from the wilds of Donegal,” giving the Nationalist Party 
candidate a majority in the city. The words "drifted" and 
"wilds" are highly significant, for they indicate quite clear­
ly the prevalent Conservative view of Irish nationalists as 
being unstable and unsettled. There would also seem to be an 
impression of them as somewhat savage-like, a conclusion
67Lady Victoria Hicks Beach, Life of Sir Michael 
Hicks-Beach, II, 260.
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which seems justified by the connotations of the word "wilds." 
In contrast unionist workers were described as a much "better
go
class of artisans."
There was a fairly common view among members of the 
Conservative Party, including its Irish wing, that, they were 
the rightful guardians of the British empire and British 
liberties, which were wrapped up in traditional British in­
stitutions. The true loyalist and patriot was considered to 
be a Protestant and a unionist. If he belonged to the work­
ing class he was honest and hard-working.®^ He was contented 
and law-abiding.^® And yet he could rebel if conditions so 
warranted, and he knew when to rebel. Rebellion was not an 
undertaking he embarked on lightly and irresponsibly. It was 
a serious and somber matter, to be undertaken only when the 
government, the guardian of British institutions, had failed 
to live up to its responsibilities. When the government 
threatened to overturn traditional British institutions, as 
it did, according to the Conservatives, in the period 1910- 
1914, then it was the duty and responsibility of the Conserva­
tives to protect those institutions. Accordingly, P. E. Smith 
could warn the government during the struggle over the third 
Home Rule Bill that this measure was a "betrayal" of the
g o
McNeill, Ulsters* Stand for Union, pp. 144-45.
69Long, Memories, pp. 207-08.
70F. E. Smith, Unionist Policy and Other Essays 
(London: Williams & Norgate, 1913), p. 116.
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constitution and as such it "shall never deface the Statute 
71Book." Smith and the leaders of the Conservative Party 
had arrogated to themselves the right to judge the consti­
tutionality of Liberal legislation. They had also assumed 
that they must take whatever steps were necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to insure that their interpretation 
of the constitution was adhered to. Smith warned the govern­
ment that if it did not follow his instructions civil war 
would result: "Vote it [the Home Rule Bill] as you please,"
he warned. "There is a company of poor men that will spend
72all their blood before they see it settled so." This
"company of poor men" was the Ulster Protestants, and behind
them, "drawn up rank behind rank," was "the whole force of
73British Unionism."
Although this self-assumed authority to judge the con­
stitutionality of Liberal legislation came to a head in 1914, 
it had existed and had been openly expressed long before 
that. As far back as 1885 Lord Randolph Churchill had as­
serted the Conservative right to make such judgments, and to
act upon them, when he urged the Protestants of Ulster to
74rebel against Home Rule, stating that if they did so they 
would have the full support of "those of position and
7 1 Ibid., p. 109.
7 2 Ibid., p. 109.
73F. E. Smith, Unionist Policy and Other Essays, pp.
108-09.
74W. S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, II,
28-29, 59, 61-63.
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75influence." Conservative leaders consistently followed 
this position. It was approved by Lord Salisbury and Lord
7 6Wolseley, who threatened to organize the forces of revolt,
a threat which Lord Roberts actualized during the struggle
over the third Home Rule Bill. In 1893 Lord Hartington and
Arthur Balfour urged rebellion against the government if
77Home Rule were enacted. "Who can say," Lord Hartington
78stated, "that they have not a right . . .  to resist?" The 
answer of course was that only the Conservatives could say.
The assumption by the Conservatives that they were 
the guardians of the constitution and the social and imperial 
system, and that they had the right, duty, and responsibility 
to rebel to preserve these, was perhaps the loftiest peak on 
the mountain range of Conservative self-esteem. They viewed 
themselves as the very paragon of mental, moral, and cultural.
7 5 Ibid., 28-29, 63.
76Marquess of Crewe, Lord Rosebery (2 vols.; London: 
John Murray, 1931), II, 358.
77Bernard Holland, The Life of Spencer Compton: 
Eighth Duke of Devonshire (2 vols.; London: Longman's,
Green, & Co., 1911), II, 249-50.
78Ibid., II, 249-50. Some of the most illustrious 
names in English Conservatism either publicly advocated 
rebellion against the government or contributed large sums 
of money for the purchase of arms and other war material, 
including medical supplies. Apart from the names already 
listed a few of the others were Lord Lansdowne, Austen 
Chamberlain, Bonar Law, Sir Edward Carson, F. E. Smith,
A. V. Dicey, Rudyard Kipling, Sir Henry Wilson, the Duke 
of Marlborough, Walter Long, Lord Milner, Admiral Seymour, 
and Lord Balfour of Burleigh. See Long, Memories, pp. 201- 
02; McNeill, Ulster's Stand for Union, p. 170; and James, 
Lord Roberts, p. 473.
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excellence, a position they had achieved in the competitive 
and constant struggle which, they were convinced, rages in 
all societies. It was their responsibility to rule and to 
guide "lesser breeds." This was a duty which came with their 
social and economic position. Only they possessed the com­
petence, rationality, and objectivity to rule equitably. The 
existing social system was arranged in accordance with the 
laws of nature and the nature of man, and any attempt to alter 
it in an equalitarian direction would fly in the face of 
these facts. The only major reforms necessary was the reform 
of human character. The only people in the United Kingdom in 
serious need of such reform were the Irish. For Conserva­
tives, the Conservative self-image was highly consolatory.
CHAPTER IV
THE CONSERVATIVE IMAGE OF IRELAND
Nothing would be easier at the present moment than to 
get up in every large town an anti-Irish agitation almost as 
formidable as the anti-Jewish agitation in Russia. .
— Joseph Chamberlain
And your Ulsterman might, perhaps, go on to say "Do 
you intend to hand me over to a majority differing from me 
in race, differing from me for the most part in religion, 
whose ways are not my ways, who have not shown my power of 
enterprise, my forethought, my endurance; who have left the 
South and West of Ireland, a bye-word among agricultural 
countries, while the corner of the North-west [sic] which I 
inhabit, though it be the poorest soil in the whole island, 
blossoms like a garden? Are you going to hand me over to 
this majority, who have shown that they cannot govern them­
selves, and who assuredly are incapable of governing me?]?
— Arthur James Balfour
Of course the Irish are utterly irresponsible people. 
They differ so entirely from us that their mentality is not 
understandable by the average Englishman. Hence the impos­
sibility of governing them except despotically. Free gov­
ernment in Ireland means chaos. 2
— Viscount Reginald Esher
It is safe to say that throughout the period of the 
Home Rule struggle few issues so incensed and inflamed the 
passions of most Unionists as the Irish demand for a measure
^Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, I, 352.
2
Balfour, Aspects of Home Rule, p. 142.
3
Viscount Reginald Esher, Journals and Letters of 
Viscount Reginald Esher, ed. by Maurice V. Brett (4 vols.? 
London: Ivor, Nicholson, & Watson, 1934-1938), IV, 23.
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of national self-government. Indeed for long they even op­
posed the establishment of democratic self-government at the 
county and local level in Ireland, and when county government 
was reformed along more broadly representative lines in 
England in 1888, the Conservative government saw to it that 
Ireland was carefully excluded. Though the United Kingdom 
was supposedly a unilinear and homogeneous political unit, 
county government in Ireland continued on an exclusive and 
undemocratic basis until 1898. Even then it was granted, 
not because of a general Unionist ideological commitment to 
democratic principles, but because it was viewed as a useful 
and acceptable political expedient— now that the landlords 
were being protected by the various land purchase schemes—  
to make the governing of Ireland possible by methods accept­
able to the democratic world and to dispel the demand for 
Home Rule. It was granted, in other words, as part of a 
policy of killing home rule by kindness.
Why did most Unionists become so enraged at the pros­
pect of a separate parliament and executive in Dublin? In 
other parts of the British empire parliaments and executives 
responsible to them had been permitted to develop, notably 
in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, though 
in the latter case not without a bitter and complicated 
struggle. Why should a similar degree of self-government for 
Ireland have been so abhorrent? The explanation for this 
has several aspects, but its essence lies in the basic social, 
economic, and political objectives of the Unionists,
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objectives which played a predominant role in the molding of 
their image of the Irish, forcing them to emphasize the nega­
tive and unappealing aspects of Irish character and the in­
ability of the Irish to govern themselves and the Anglo- 
Irish and Ulster Protestant minorities. Most Unionists held 
trenchantly to this position in the fear that to admit the 
ability of the Irish to govern effectively and equitably 
might lead to the dissolution of the union, the consequent 
gradual disintegration of the empire, and eventually, as 
Cecil Rhodes warned so articulately, a social revolution in 
England.
As has already been pointed out most British imperial­
ists viewed mankind as composed of a number of different 
races, some highly intelligent and advanced, some extremely 
unintelligent and backward. Not surprisingly most of them 
placed themselves in the former group and the Irish in the 
latter. For the Irish one of the irritating consequences of 
being placed in this category was that they were generally 
characterized as possessing various unflattering traits and 
of being incapable of self-government. In accordance there­
fore with Unionist political and moral principles England 
should maintain her rule of Ireland for the benefit of that 
country and civilization as a whole. The Irish were not 
permitted to decide for themselves whether they wished to be 
governed by a foreign power, or if so, by which foreign 
power, since by definition they were intellectually incapable 
of making such a decision. This point was stated in plain
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and candid terms by Lord Salisbury in 1886. He was arguing,
as his biographer Lady Gwendolen Cecil explains, against the
contention that the Conservatives ought "to show confidence
in the Irish people by giving them independent representative 
4
government." Salisbury's famous retort, for which he was 
severely criticized by the supporters of Home Rule, was:
"You would not confide free representative institutions to 
the Hottentots," would you?^
It is important to note that in condemning Salisbury 
his opponents did not question or rebuke the validity or scorn 
of his remarks about the Hottentots. That a hierarchy of 
races existed was accepted by almost everyone, as was the 
lowly place of Negroes within that hierarchy. What they 
condemned him for was his assertion that the Irish were on 
the same low level as the Hottentots and that they therefore 
were similarly incapable of self-government. Nor did Salis­
bury see the Irish as a reasonably progressive people who, 
if not currently capable of self-government, at least would 
be in the foreseeable future. He never expressed this view 
in explicit terms but it is implied in his various assump­
tions and pronouncements. When he stated in 1886 that what 
the Irish needed was twenty years of resolute government,^ 
he did not intend that at the end of that period they would 
then be capable of governing themselves. On the contrary
^Cecil, Life of Salisbury, III, 302.
5 Ibid., III, 302.
6 Ibid., Ill, 302-04.
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what he meant was that after twenty years of such government
they would see that the English were determined to maintain
their rule by whatever means were necessary, and whether the
Irish opposed or approved, and that realizing this they
would cease their agitation:
What she [Ireland] wants is government— government that 
does not flinch, that does not vary; government that 
she cannot hope to beat down by agitations; . . . gov­
ernment that does not alter in its resolutions or its 
temperature by the party changes which take place at 
Westminster.7
If Ireland were governed "resolutely for twenty years," 
Salisbury stated, agitation and outrage would cease and it
g
would then be possible to govern it by ordinary law.
It is apparent that in Salisbury's political philo­
sophy the principles of democracy played little part. This 
is not surprising, for since the imperialists tended to be­
lieve firmly in the inequality of racial, ethnic, and nation­
al groups, it followed that democracy could, and should, be 
reserved for those deemed capable of it. It merely had to 
be shown that the Irish were a sufficiently backward people 
in order to justify English domination of them. For most 
Unionists this was not difficult to do, since they measured 
intelligence, ability, and progressiveness largely by the 
quantity of one's wealth, and by the consequent military 
power that could be built on it.
The fact that Ireland was dominated by large land­
owners of English extraction went far toward proving the
7 Ibid., III, 302-04.
8Ibid., III, 302-04.
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competency of the Anglo-Saxons and the corresponding back­
wardness of the Irish. That much of the land had been con­
fiscated and allotted to the British in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, and had since been maintained by an 
institutional apparatus of foreign making, caused no theo­
retical or moral problem for most Unionists. The power to 
conquer, to confiscate, and to rule, was in itself justifica­
tion for so doing. Those who questioned this rationale were 
dismissed with varying degrees of indignation, impatience, 
or contempt, in accordance with their social or ethnic back­
ground. Even Gladstone was denounced impatiently by his 
former colleague Lord Derby for suggesting that England had 
historically mistreated Ireland. In October 1885 Lord 
Kimberley informed Derby that on a recent visit to Hawarden 
he had found Gladstone contemplating Home Rule for Ireland. 
"He was much troubled," Kimberley reported, "by the immoral 
means which were used to bring about the Union; he felt that 
a great National sin had been committed and his conscience
was troubled." "Oh damn his conscience," was Lord Derby's 
9response.
The Anglo-Irish landlords, as the historian J. C. 
Beckett points out, "represented not only a social class but 
a political system. . . . The whole local administration of 
the country was in their hands. They controlled the
g
Arthur D. Elliot, The Life of George Joachim Goschen, 
First Viscount Goschen, 1831-1907 (2 vols.; London: Long­
man's Green, and Co., 1911), I, 316.
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magistracy, the police, the grand juries and the municipal 
corporations."*'® An important consequence of this was that 
social and ethnic prejudice became embedded in the institu­
tional structure. Since Ireland had been conquered and the 
land confiscated in opposition to the will of the native 
people, and since the economic conditions resulting from this 
confiscation were, in addition, extremely unfavorable to them, 
it became necessary to construct a political and legal struc­
ture that would of necessity be dominated by the landlord 
class, since its prime purpose was to protect their interests. 
To attain social and economic reforms the Irish were often 
forced to pursue an extra-legal course. This in turn usually 
forced the landlords to resort to coercion and extraordinary 
law. These two social, and indeed political, groups, the 
landlords and the tenants, viewed each other as alien and 
hostile forces. Ireland constituted a classic colonial situa­
tion, with a large alienated, poverty-stricken, politically 
and legally powerless mass of human beings at the bottom of 
the pyramid, dominated by a small group of people at the top, 
foreign in ethnic makeup, in outlook, and in loyalty, who 
considered themselves culturally, morally, and intellectually 
superior to the native population. Intercourse between these 
two groups was kept to a minimum, being in general no more 
than was required for strictly business purposes. Social 
relations seldom crossed class and ethnic lines. A perpetual
*~®Short History of Ireland, p. 134.
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state of dissatisfaction existed, with the native Irish liv­
ing in continual alienation, and the Anglo-Irish in a state 
of trepidation and uncertainty.
Throughout the period of the Home Rule struggle England 
was permeated with racial concepts and dogmas. "From 1870 
to 1914," writes Jacques Barzun, "English public opinion was 
saturated with the notion of a superior Anglo-Saxon race.
. . . " ^  The economic and imperial expansion of England
contributed to the growth of a "self-righteous pride" which
12was "heightened by racial contempt for the Irish." Goldwin
Smith, who always "preferred to describe himself as an Anglo- 
13Saxon," repeatedly expressed such contempt. In her study
of Smith, Elizabeth Wallace writes:
His prejudices were deep, and on few subjects was he 
more prejudiced than on Catholics . . . and on Celts, 
an ethnic group of which he thought the Irish the least 
attractive example. He described them succinctly as 
[a] . . . "thriftless, uncommercial, saint-worshipping, 
priest-ridden race."1^
To most Unionists these characteristics were highly undesir­
able. They were evidence that the Irish were a backward 
people requiring the guiding hand of the British for their
^Barzun, Race, p. 74.
12Ibid., p. 74. It should be remembered that while 
there was a widespread "self-righteous pride" about the eco­
nomic and imperial expansion of England there were also those, 
such as William Booth, who questioned the condition of the 
working classes in England.
■^Elizabeth Wallace, Goldwin Smith: Victorian Liberal
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), p. v.
14Ibid., p. 185.
128
salvation. It is enlightening to juxtapose Smith's view of
the Irish with Lord Charles Beresford's portrait of the
Anglo-Saxons, a portrait with which Smith would have happily
agreed. This "race," Beresford wrote, in reference to the
Anglo-Saxons, possesses not only "the keenest commercial
instincts," but "superior intellect, honesty in dealing, and
15special aptitude for trade." Through the intelligent use
of these it has "held all comers at bay."^® In fact the
Anglo-Saxons, Beresford optimistically concluded, were "a
practical common-sense people" through whom "all the nations
17of the world shall be blessed."
These lofty sentiments, and the hint of divine missions 
which they contain, were somewhat belied by the nature of 
British imperialism in practice. One of the professed aims 
of British imperialists was to prepare the various backward 
colonial peoples for self-government, to train them to rule 
themselves in accordance with the social, economic and po­
litical principles of the imperialists. This meant that 
when so trained a particular people would be able to govern 
themselves, and whatever minorities existed in their state, 
in a fair and equitable way, just as the imperialists, in 
their own estimation, ruled the various peoples of the empire.
^Lord Charles Beresford, "The Future of the Anglo- 
Saxon Race," North American Review, CLXX1 (Dec. 1900), 806.
1 6 Ibid., p. 806.
17Ibid., p. 810.
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But the question of when a particular people were ready for 
self-government posed a dilemma for many of them. On the one 
hand it was their professed aim to civilize and prepare people 
for self-government; yet on the other they were inflexibly 
committed to the maintenance of the empire. In addition, in 
relation to Ireland most Unionists spoke and acted in such a 
way as to imply that the Irish would never be capable of fair 
and equitable government. They would certainly never be con­
sidered capable of ruling the Anglo-Irish and Ulster Protes­
tant minority. Accordingly, since the Irish could not be 
educated to govern justly, and since, in the Unionist view, 
the ability to do so was one of the prime marks of civiliza­
tion, the civilizing mission in Ireland could have little 
meaning.
Not only did the Unionists consider the Irish in­
capable of enlightened government, they derived a peculiar 
satisfaction from this fact. One would have expected that, 
in keeping with their professed sympathy for, and sense of 
obligation toward backward peoples their admission that the 
Irish had severe limitations in this sphere would have been 
made with sincere sympathy and regret. But this was not the 
case. On the contrary the Unionists emphasized either ex­
istent or non-existent Irish shortcomings enthusiastically, 
often arrogantly, and went to great lengths to prove the 
truth of their assertions. George C. Brodrick asserted in 
the 1880s that the Irish were totally incapable of "the
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18honest exercise of civil rights." Nor could this failing 
be attributed to English or Anglo-Irish misgovernment. It
19was the native Irish themselves who were "mainly to blame."
The cause lay in their sluggish, lethargic, and unambitious
character. As a people they were a "lamentable failure in
civilization. "2t*
The Conservative member of Parliament C. W. Radcliffe
Cooke discovered that Ireland may have been better governed
and more remedial legislation enacted had it not been for
21the Nationalist M.P.s. Though this was a rather novel and 
startling explanation for the condition of Ireland, Cooke 
expressed it with amazing confidence and candor. The Na­
tionalists, he stated, often weakened their case in Parlia­
ment "by the ignorance they displayed, by the irrelevancy
22and even incoherency of their speeches." This is a highly 
revealing statement, displaying one of the frequent difficul­
ties of racist thinking. Cooke was so obsessed with the 
desire to condemn the character of the Irish that he slipped 
unconsciously into admitting the truth of Nationalist 
criticisms. In his eagerness to attack the Nationalists he
18George C. Brodrick, "Plain Facts about Ireland,"
The National Review, XI (Mar. 1888), 90.
1 9 Ibid., p. 8 8 .
2 0 Ibid., p. 8 8 .
2 ^W. C. Radcliffe Cooke, "The Parnellites in Parlia­
ment," The National Review, XIII (Mar. 1889), 181.
22Ibid., p. 181.
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inadvertently admitted the failures of English rule in Ire­
land; but in order to free the English from responsibility, 
and to fix the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Irish, 
he implied that corrective legislation would have been en­
acted for Ireland had it not been for the "ignorance," 
"irrelevancy," and "incoherency" of the Nationalists' Parlia­
mentary speeches.
In 1889, during the long press and Parliamentary cam­
paign against Parnell and the Nationalists, a rather unusual 
article appeared in the National Review. It bore the inter­
esting title, "Macbeth considered as a Celt," and was written 
with the obvious intention of demonstrating the unattractive­
ness and weakness of Irish character. The author discovered 
that "perhaps the most striking point in Celtic history is
the consistency with which the Celts preserve their incon-
23sistent character." He proceeded to lump together a number 
of dyslogistic and stereotyped images of Celtic character and 
presented them as the findings of sophisticated and objective 
research. Despite this claim, the author's prejudiced, con­
descending, and paternalistic attitude is extremely trans­
parent. Every potential Irish virtue is overshadowed by a 
vice. There is, he writes,
a rare identity of temperament in the Celtic race in 
all ages and under the most diverse conditions. Warm­
hearted, but fickle? brave, but wanting in endurance; 
brilliant, but ineffective; religious, but unprincipled;
23Jesse Douglas Montgomery, "Macbeth Considered as 
a Celt," The National Review, XIII (Mar. 1889), 181.
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fascinating, but infinitely provoking; with the fierce 
passions of men, the lack of sober calculation which 
often limits the power of the cleverest women, and the 
unreasonableness of children, they call forth very 
conflicting feelings. We love them, but they irritate 
us; we admire them, but they disappoint us; we would 
fain trust them, but . . . they betray us.24
The picture that emerges here is one in which the 
morally, emotionally, and intellectually superior Anglo- 
Saxon stand ready to offer every aid, hope, and consideration 
to the Irish only to be repeatedly frustrated and disappoint­
ed. They love, only to be irritated. They admire, only to 
be disappointed. They trust, only to be betrayed. The de­
cline of imperialist enthusiasm after the Boer War, and the 
holocaust of World War I, brought no conspicuous change in 
the Unionist image of the Irish. It was still largely rooted 
in the racist quagmire of the 1880s. The National Review 
could still ask in complete seriousness, "Are the Irish Celts 
an inferior race?" And it could answer in the affirmative 
with a confidence still unshaken by the rise and predominance
in Europe and North America of the theory that peoples have
25a rxght to national self-determination. The author's def­
inition of an inferior race was amazingly simple:
If in the course of centuries a race has proved prolific 
in criminals and degenerates, and at the same time has 
been markedly deficient in persons of distinction, few,
I think, would dispute that such a race must be regarded 
as an inferior r a c e . 26
2 4 Ibid., p. 181.
2^"Are the Irish Celts an Inferior Race?" The Na 
tional Review, LXXIV (Feb. 1920), 807.
2®Ibid., p. 797.
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The question was whether the Irish fitted this definition,
whether they were "prolific in criminals and degenerates,"
and whether at the same time they were "markedly deficient
in persons of distinction." The author found to his obvious
satisfaction that this was very definitely the case. He
summarized the results of his investigation as follows:
(1) The Irish Celtic race has produced hardly any men 
of genius— certainly not one-tenth of the proportion 
produced by the English and Scotch; (2) such contribu­
tions as they have made have been mainly, if not en­
tirely, as actors or orators whose talents have been 
of no permanent service to the human race; (3) . . . 
the Irish Celts have no capacity for greatness in art, 
literature, or science, and have, in the course of their 
whole history, not produced a single person of pre­
eminent gifts; (4) . . . while the Irish Celt is a 
good fighting man when properly led, he has no capacity 
for leadership, and the race has never produced a 
great master of strategy; (5) . . . as a race they 
are characteristically lawless. . . .27
This was an extremely depressing picture, not only of 
the existing capabilities of the Irish but of their future 
potentialities, for it seemed to suggest that there was 
little hope for progress. There was little in Irish history 
to indicate any latent talents possible of development. This 
of course proved the futility of attempting to prepare them 
for self-government.
The fact that the author, in attempting to determine 
the potentialities of the Irish, would select martial combat 
as one of his criteria reveals once again the importance of 
physical struggle in the value system of most imperialists. 
The horror of World War I does not seem to have dampened
27Ibid., p. 807.
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their admiration for the value of martial competence as a 
measure of a people's greatness. When, however, they de­
scended from the organized clash of armies to the area of 
common street brawls and proceeded to deprecate the capacity 
of the Irish in this rather questionable sphere of human 
activity, the full importance of combat in their value system 
becomes clear. In an article entitled "The Irish as Fighters" 
John J. Colquhoun, contrasted the combat skills of Irish 
Protestants with the shortcomings of their Catholic counter­
parts. "The Protestants of Ireland," he wrote, "are . . .
2 8second to none as fighters. . . . "  The reason for this
was that "they inherit all the fighting qualities of the
29Anglo-Saxon race to which they belong." Not only were they
generously endowed with a particular aptitude for this rather
questionable talent, but they had an exclusive possession of
pugilistic morality as well. As Colquhoun explains, "the
sense of fair-play and chivalry which is so strongly marked
in all classes of the British is absolutely non-existent
among the native Irish. " 3 9 The latter possess no sense of
fair play, honor, or courage. The only kind of combat in
which they will engage is "six men with sticks attacking one
31man without a stick." Moreover, in contrast to British
The National Review, LXXV (July 1920), 624.
2 9 Ibid., p. 624.
Ibid., p. 626.
31Ibid., p. 626.
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standards this mode of behavior was fully in keeping with the
Irish concept of morality. "In any part of Great Britain,
Colquhoun asserts, "a man who hired a crowd to batter his
rival . . . would be ashamed to look his fellows in the 
32face." In Ireland, on the other hand, "a man would consider
himself a fool if he faced his foe single-handed when he
33could get half a dozen others to help him." That the Irish
were cowardly and treacherous were facts whose truth had been
proven in all wars in which the Irish had engaged since the
34Middle Ages, including the Boer War and World War I. News­
paper accounts of sustained bravery and battle-skill in the
First World War were mere fabrications of an irresponsible 
35press. The Irish were simply too emotional, excitable,
and lacking in calm and rational deliberation to be capable
of such acts. "Like all emotional races, they are capable,
under the influence of strong excitement . . .  of making a
brilliant dash, but they are quite incapable of sustaining
any such effort. . . .  In retreat or defence they are not
36only useless, but worse than useless. . . . "
The phrase "like all emotional races" is important, 
for it reveals the continuing tendency among many Englishmen,
32Ibid., p. 626.
33Ibid., p. 626.
34Ibid., p. 626.
35Ibid., pp. 625-26, 631.
3®Ibid., p. 631.
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even at this late date, to think of the Irish as not only 
quite different from the Anglo-Saxons but also as very un­
attractive. This attitude also reached into the ranks of
the London police who in 1921 made little effort to inter- 
37vene when a crowd of Londoners attacked a small group of
Irish men and women who gathered outside a London prison to
demonstrate in behalf of a number of hunger-striking Irish
38political prisoners. Two years later the publication of 
a pamphlet entitled The Menace of the Irish Race to Our Na­
tionality revealed that many Scots, too, still thought of the 
Irish as a peculiarly unattractive people. This pamphlet
asserted that the Irish "cannot be assimilated and absorbed
39into the Scottish race." The reason was that "they remain
a people by themselves, segregated by reason of their race,
their customs, their traditions and, above all, by their
40
loyalty to their Church."
And yet the claim that the Irish constituted a distinct 
national group with the right of national self-determination 
aroused indignation and opposition among large number of 
Englishmen. They vigorously denied the truth of this
37Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic; A Documented 
Chronicle of the Anglo-Irish Conflict and the Partitioning 
of Ireland, with a Detailed Account of the Period 1916-1923 
(New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1965), p. 345.
3 ®Ibid., p. 345.
39Quoted in James Edmund Handley, The Irish in Scot­
land, 1798-1845 (Cork University Press, 1945), p. 288.
40Ibid., p. 288.
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proposition. This is somewhat puzzling in light of the fact 
that they repeatedly asserted that the great mass of the 
Irish people were of the Celtic "race" and were therefore 
"racially" different from the British. It is explained to 
some extent by the desire to maintain the union. Unionists 
seem to have felt, though this was never clearly spelled out, 
that to admit the contention that the Irish constituted a 
distinct national group implied their right to self-determina­
tion. In response therefore to the arguments of the Home 
Rulers that the Irish constituted such an entity the Unionists 
replied that if that were true then the Protestants of Ire­
land also formed a distinct national group, and a superior 
one as well. And since this was the case, it was unthinkable 
that they should be asked to participate in a parliament and 
government which would be dominated by Irish Catholics. It 
was the assumed inferiority of the latter that precluded the 
application of the 1867 Reform Bill to Ireland and necessi­
tated the establishment of special franchise standards there, 
aiming to limit the franchise to as few Irish Catholics as 
possible so that the Anglo-Irish might continue as previously 
to dominate the country. In 1880 a resolution in the House 
of Commons to correct this anomaly was strongly opposed by 
the Conservatives. During the debates on this resolution the
Chief Secretary for Ireland, James Lowther, admitted candidly
41that the Irish hated British rule. Lowther, however, was
^ Hansard1s Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons),
3d ser., Vol. 250 (5-28 Feb. 1880), col. 871.
138
not particularly disturbed by this. He drew a peculiar con­
solation from the fact that, in his view, the Tories were 
not hated quite so much as the Whigs. "The Irish people did 
not love the Tories much," he said, but "they hated the Whigs 
more. " 42
He did not believe that Ireland should be governed in 
accordance with the wishes of the Irish majority. Nor did 
he believe that a government which generates widespread, 
deep-seated, and perennial hatred and hostility toward it has 
necessarily failed in certain basic governmental functions.
He would not concede that the aggravation of bitter and ir­
reconcilable feelings among the various communities in Ire­
land was the fault, at least in part, of the social and 
political system. To him the enmity that existed between 
them was merely additional proof of the turbulent nature of 
Irish Catholics and indicated that what Ireland needed was 
more, not less, imperial and authoritarian government.
Despite the fact that the Unionists refused to concede 
the right of self-determination to the Irish they repeatedly 
condemned them for their lack of democratic principles. It 
would be unethical to grant them self-government, they main­
tained, because such government would not be democratic. Not 
only was it the natural inclination of the Irish to seek a 
dictator, but in addition they had no sense of the rights of
42Ibid., col. 871.
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43the individual or of minority groups. The Queen advanced
these views in her correspondence with Gladstone. "Whether
the Irish people," she wrote, "can be trusted with the same
liberties as the people of Great Britain, it is useless to
discuss, as it is a question on which opinions differ so 
44widely." The uselessness of discussing it, however, did 
not prevent the Queen from immediately proceeding to do so.
In incredibly contorted prose, purporting to give an air of 
objective aloofness, she sided as usual with those who ques­
tioned the governing capacity of the Irish. She held grave 
doubts, she stated, as to "whether those who might find them­
selves in future opposed to the policy of purely Irish Gov­
ernment could rely on that impartial hearing of their ap­
peals, which has hitherto given confidence to the Queen's 
subjects and encouraged them to depend on the proverbial 
'fair play' of an Englishman. ,'4'*
This lack of trust in the Irish is well typified in 
the English reaction to the series of articles published in 
The Times in 1887 entitled "Parnellism and Crime." One
43G. Smith, Irish History and Irish Character, p. 18; 
Esher, Journals and Letters, I, 6 6 ; Buckle, Letters of Queen 
Victoria, 2d ser,., Vol. Ill, p. 655; and Holland, Life of 
Devonshire, I, 390.
44Buckle, Letters of Queen Victoria, 3d ser., Vol. II,
p. 182.
4 5 Ibid., p. 182.
46See especially the following issues of The Times,
Mar. 7, 10, 14, Apr. 18, May 13, 20, and June 1, 1887.
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object of these was to identify Parnell and the Nationalist
Party with those who had assassinated Lord Frederick Cavendish
47and Thomas Burke in 1882. By associating them with these 
assassins The Times hoped to portray Parnell and the Nation­
alist members of Parliament as criminals, thereby creating
48opposition toward them and the policy of Home Rule. During
this campaign The Times printed the facsimile of a letter
purportedly written by Parnell to those who had plotted the
49assassinations. This letter was of course a forgery, but 
the important point is that most Englishmen never doubted 
the claims of The Times that it was authentic, while the 
denials of Parnell were summarily dismissed.^ A half cen­
tury later the writers of The History of The Times could 
recount, not without amazement, the remarkable faith that
Englishmen placed in the trustworthiness of The Times and
51lack thereof in the Irish. This attitude prevailed not 
only among Unionists, but among many Liberals as well. "It 
is significant," stated the writers of The History of The 
Times, "that even among the majority of Home Rule Liberals
A "7
"Parnellism and Crime," The Times, Apr. 18, 1887,
p. 1 .
48The History of The Times, Vol. Ill: The Twentieth
Century Test, 1884-1912 (4 vols.; London: Times Publishing
Company, 1935-1952), pp. 43-44, 49-50, 56-57.
49"Parnellism and Crime," The Times. Apr. 18, 1887,
p. 1.
^ The History of The Times, III, 57.
51Ibid., p. 57.
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faith in the accuracy of The Times so far outweighed confi­
dence" in the Nationalist Party "that the idea of forgery
52occurred to very few." It did, however, occur to Parnell, 
and the nonchalance, the complete lack of emotion and sur­
prise with which he reacted to the letter and the indictment, 
reveal that while the Queen might think of the English as 
possessing a proverbial sense of fair play, Parnell's view 
was generally not quite so lofty. On being shown the letter 
in The Times, he glanced at it for a moment, then responded 
quite indifferently with respect to what was alleged to be
53his signature: "I did not make an S like that since 1878."
This wilful campaign by one of the most prestigious 
and reputedly responsible newspapers indicates one of the 
difficulties of Unionist policy toward Ireland. The prime 
objective of that policy was to maintain the union. Yet 
culturally and religiously most Unionists found the Irish 
quite contemptible. To mold the United Kingdom into a 
permanently harmonious political entity it was necessary to 
treat all religious and ethnic groups equitably. But the 
Unionists were prevented from so doing by their social and 
cultural outlook and by their image of the Irish. Conse­
quently, the conditions created by British rule in Ireland 
helped stimulate the growth of an intense nationalism among
5 2 Ibid., p. 57.
53John Howard Parnell, Charles Stewart Parnell: A
Memoir (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1914), p. 223.
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the Irish, which the Unionists were never able to dispel.
The more the Irish resisted British law, policies, and ad­
ministration, the more the Unionists denounced them. Lord 
Eversley states that Arthur Balfour, during his chief secre­
taryship (1887-1891), never consulted or cooperated with the 
Nationalist Party in the framing of policy or legislation for 
Ireland or in the administration of that country. On the 
contrary,
he adopted the airs of a superior person, who looked 
down from philosophic altitudes on the disorderly crew 
which Ireland sent to Parliament. His attitude in 
Parliament gave the cue to the Castle officials, the 
resident magistrates, the police and the prison 
wardens in Ireland in their treatment of Irish mem­
bers. . . .  He defended these subordinates with un­
failing zeal. . . .  He never made the smallest con­
cession to the Irish members.54
This mode of behavior prevailed among the Unionists 
as long as the Irish struggle for self-government continued. 
They treated the Irish as political and social outcasts with 
whom it was dangerous to associate or even communicate with­
out endangering one's political or moral purity. Their 
participation in World War I, the principles for which that 
war was allegedly fought, and the mounting pressure of Irish 
opinion in the Dominions and the United States did little to 
transform these basic attitudes.^ It was still possible to 
undertake a vicious military campaign against Ireland after 
World War I. It was still possible for Austen Chamberlain
54Eversley, Gladstone and Ireland, p. 346. 
^Diaries of C. P. Scott, p. 402.
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to boast that he and the Irish had nothing in common. Of 
Michael Collins he wrote: "He had his own code of honour;
. . . but it was not mine, and between him and me there 
could be no real sympathy. . . ."5® ^ < 5  it was still pos­
sible for Sir Henry Wilson to assert that he would prefer
"to be shot at" by the Irish "than to have to shake hands 
57with them." The Unionists were determined to retain within 
the existing political structure a people for whom they 
possessed neither sympathy nor affection. As far as they 
were concerned the Irish were, ironically, an alien and un­
welcome force at Westminster, whose Parliamentary speeches 
had to be auricularly tolerated though in practice the de­
mands and indictments contained in them could be magnani­
mously ignored.
This was logically possible for the ethnocentric 
Englishman because of his belief that the will of the Irish 
was subordinate to the will of the Anglo-Saxons. The demands 
of the former could be rejected therefore in accordance with
56Sir Austen Chamberlain, Down the Years (London: 
Cassell and Company, 1935), p. 146.
^Major-General Sir C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshall 
Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London: Cassell
and Company, 1927), II, 344. Incidentally, Wilson's feel­
ings are not unlike those expressed by Sir William Harcourt 
after Gladstone's split with Parnell over the O'Shea divorce 
case in 1890. "I feel some satisfaction," Harcourt stated, 
"in remembering that I have never shaken hands with him." 
When one considers that Parnell had sat in Parliament for 
fifteen consecutive years and had led the Nationalist Party 
for most of that time the extent of the antipathy toward the 
Irish, and the pursuant social ostracism, is to some extent 
revealed. For Harcourt's remarks see Gardiner, Life of Sir 
William Harcourt, II, 87.
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this principle. But even if this had not justified Unionist 
policy, even if there had been no plausible theoretical or 
practical justification for it, most Unionists would probably 
have pursued it anyhow. Lord Salisbury had stated explicitly 
that whether the objectives of the Nationalist Party were
right or wrong was a matter with which he was not concerned.
58He did not intend to grant them in any case. Even the
Tory Democrat Lord Randolph Churchill was in agreement with 
59this view. He expressed in passionate terms his opposition
to the wishes of nationalist Ireland. "Let the Irish know,"
he told an audience at Edinburgh,
that, though they cry day and night, though they vex 
you with much wickedness and harass you with much dis­
order, though they incessantly divert your attention 
from your own affairs, though they cause you all manner 
of trial and trouble, . . . there is one thing you 
will never listen to, there is one thing you will never 
yield— and that is their demand for an Irish Parliament, 
and that to their yells . . . you answer an unchanging, 
an unchangeable, and an unanimous "No."®®
By 1916, however, having witnessed the failure of three 
Home Rule bills, an important segment of the Irish abandoned 
all faith in the ability or desire of English governments 
to solve Irish problems. They decided that they would no 
longer appeal to Westminster. They would simply set up their 
own government unilaterally and proceed as if Britain and 
British institutions did not exist. Under these conditions
58Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish Nation, p. 73.
5 9W. S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, I, 281.
60Ibid., I, 281.
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the old methods of repression could no longer keep Ireland 
tolerably quiescent; nor could they be indefinitely employed 
in the face of world opinion. Still, it was difficult for 
many Englishmen to abandon their belief in them. Thousands 
of troops therefore were poured into Ireland in a last des­
perate effort to maintain British authority. The indiscrim­
inate and destructive reprisals carried out by these troops, 
and the satisfaction they derived from these activities, are 
difficult to reconcile with the affection that purportedly 
formed the driving force behind England's civilizing mission. 
C. P. Scott felt that "the things done" in Ireland, "in 1921 
were on the whole worse than those done in 1798." For a 
parallel, Scott felt, "it would probably be necessary to go 
back to Cromwell.
When certain Coalition leaders, at the direct sugges­
tion of the South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts, finally 
agreed in 1921 to attempt a negotiated settlement, a number 
of Unionists, led by Sir Edward Carson, opposed this policy,
insisting that a solution could still be found through the
6 3use of coercion. The contrast between such willingness, 
indeed eagerness, to coerce Irish Catholics and the oft- 
enunciated view that the coercion of Ulster Protestants
61Diaries of C. P. Scott, p. 394.
6 2 Ibid., p. 394.
63Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), 5th ser.. 
Vol. 48 (Dec. 14-19, 1921), cols. 35-53.
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would be unthinkable is highly enlightening. It reveals 
the divergent Unionist attitude toward the two communities 
in Ireland. Because of the ethnic, mental, and religious 
nature of the Ulster Protestants they could not be compelled 
to live under a Dublin government to which they were opposed. 
The nature of the Irish Catholics, on the other hand, was 
such that the long enforcement of them to live under a London 
government to which they were opposed was thoroughly justi­
fiable.
What justified it of course, in the final analysis,
was the egotistic and national objectives which the Unionists
sought. Underlying this, however, and making possible the
severe and frequent coercion of the Irish was the predominant
Unionist image of them. The fairly widespread assumption,
whether explicit or obscure, that they were both superstitous
and savage-like justified much. "You fought for your Union
against Slavery," Goldwin Smith wrote to an American friend
in reference to the United States' Civil War, "we are fight-
64ing for ours against Savagery and Superstition." Such a 
distorted and prejudiced attitude blinded the Unionists to 
the fact that if the Irish were still savages after several 
centuries of English contact, influence, and rule, surely 
this was, to some extent, an indictment of British policies 
and administration. If the Irish were not civilized after 
the years of effort already expended, what grounds were there
64Wallace, Goldwin Smith: Victorian Liberal, p. 92.
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for optimism? By condemning the Irish the Unionists tended 
to condemn themselves, the policies they pursued, and their 
civilizing abilities. The prudent path therefore might well 
have been for England to withdraw and leave the Irish to govern 
themselves, a proposal which Gladstone advanced in a limited 
form in the 1880s. But this the Unionists would not consider. 
Lord Salisbury expressed their opposition to it in the follow­
ing terms: "If we have failed after centuries to make Ire­
land . . . civilized, we have no moral right to abandon our 
65post. . . . "  Arthur Balfour was appalled at the proposal 
to grant self-government to the Irish. These were people 
who, in his view, were simply incapable of approaching prob­
lems in an unemotional way. They were therefore incapable
of self-government. They were simply not "reasonable beings"
6 6with whom it was possible to carry on rational debate. He
would as soon, he told an audience at Limehouse, argue with
67"a cage of monkeys in a menagerie."
If the Irish were apish in respect to their ability 
to engage in orderly and rational disputation, they resembled 
a much more destructive animal in other activities. Many 
Unionists looked upon them as incorrigiable law-breakers with 
little respect for human or property rights. They
6 5[Lord Salisbury], "Disintegration," The Quarterly 
Review, CLVI (Oct. 1883), 355.
66Balfour, Aspects of Home Rule, p. 54.
67Ibid., p. 54.
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persistently advanced this point of view when expediency re­
quired it. Having imprinted it firmly in the minds of most 
Englishmen, they kept it in reserve as an extremely effi­
cacious device that could be drawn upon and utilized when 
occasion warranted. Parnell found it necessary to. point out 
in the House of Commons the injustice of this tactic. "What," 
he asked,
did the English nation know of the Irish nation? Every 
day the English people read in their newspapers ac­
counts of murders and outrages in Ireland, many of 
which were carefully rehashed and kept alive week after 
week, to be reproduced when necessary. . . . This was 
the only type of news which the English people ever 
obtained respecting Ireland. . .
The writers of the History of The Times point out that
"throughout the year 1887 The Times constantly kept the
subject of Irish terrorism and its support by the Irish
69leaders before its readers' eyes." Not only did politicians 
and the popular press engage in this kind of image-making, 
so also did many respected publicists. In this area of anti- 
Irish attack, as in so many others, Goldwin Smith excelled.
The number of disparaging epithets that he could pack into a 
brief passage was a tribute not only to his creative genius 
but to his enthusiasm for his task. He depicted the Irish as 
the embodiment of cruelty, recklessness, and fiendishness; as 
given to the use of "violent invective" and "uncontrolled
68Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons),
3d ser., Vol. 255 (3-24 Aug. 1880), col. 2015.
6Q
The History of The Times, III, 60.
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exhibitions of passion."7^ They were not, he was generous
enough to concede, totally depraved, but possessed rather by
71a "most wretched kind of weakness." Smith describes some
of these characteristics in the following passage:
Cruelty and recklessness of human life seem the qual­
ities of a fiend. But it will be found that, like 
indulgence in violent invective and other uncontrolled 
exhibitions of passion, they are often connected less 
with deep depravity than with a most wretched kind of 
weakness. They may often be classed among those in­
firmities to which the Latin language gave the ex­
pressive name of impotentia. The civil wars, the 
religious persecutions, the revolutions of French 
history are marked by these qualities in their worst 
form; and the same may be said of the civil wars, 
rebellions, and agrarian insurrections of I r e l a n d .
Addressing an audience of unionists in Belfast in
1912, F. E. Smith contrasted their character with that of
Irish nationalists. The former, he said, were "contented,
73prosperous, law-abiding, and loyal." Unlike the national­
ists, he stated in commendation, "you have maimed no dumb
animal; you have shot no woman; you have stabbed no Sunday- 
74school child." When the final struggle for national self- 
government in Ireland erupted after World War I the Union­
ists once more resorted to these old tactics. The Irish
7 ®G. Smith, Irish History and Irish Character, p. 12.
7 ^Ibid., p. 1 2 .
7 2 Ibid., p. 1 2 .
73F. E. Smith, Unionist Policy and Other Essays, p.
116.
74Ibid., p. 116.
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75Chief Secretary, Sir Hamar Greenwood, reopened the old
grab-bag of stereotypes, though he also added a number of
new ones. The members of Sinn Fein and the Irish Volunteers
were constantly referred to as the "murder gang.” Greenwood,
however, sorted out the new Irish leader, Eamon de Valera,
for special treatment. De Valera, he said, belonged to a
76"race of treacherous murderers." Presumably he was refer­
ring to the non-Irish aspect of De Valera's ethnic background,
for the Irish leader, he said, had "inducted Ireland into
77the murderous treachery of his race."
It was also the practice among many Englishmen to 
characterize the Irish as collectivistic and clannish, or 
as Jacobins, a term which in this period was synonymous 
with terror, republicanism, and communism. They maintained 
that the Irish intended to expropriate the propertied 
classes and undertake a program of economic and social 
levelling. So sensitive were certain Englishmen on this 
issue that they tended to identify almost any call for a 
reduction in the extremes of wealth and poverty as communistic 
and anarchic. They believed that there could be no stable 
political system if the upper and upper middle classes were
7 5Greenwood was actually a Canadian from Whitby, 
Ontario. His ancestors were among the American loyalists 
who fled to Canada after the American Revolution. See The 
Dictionary of National Biography. 1941-1950, pp. 324-25.
7 fiQuoted in Bromage, De Valera and the March of a 
Nation, p. 111.
77Ibid., p. 111.
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subjected to any serious reduction in their economic status.
It followed therefore that proposals for meaningful social
and economic reform could be characterized as the first steps
toward anarchy. Queen Victoria herself was saturated with 
78these ideas, so that she constantly harangued her ministers
with anxious exhortations to enforce the law vigorously in
Ireland. The propertied classes in particular deplored the
fact that "there appears to be something in the Keltic
character . . . which loves the social equality arising from
79minute subdivision of property. . . . "  Many of them op­
posed the establishment of the franchise in Ireland on the 
same basis as in England and Scotland on the grounds that 
the Irish were susceptible to "obnoxious influence— the in­
fluence of revolutionary agitators, . . . demagogues, men who 
traded in politics, and loved revolution because it led to 
disorder. . . .
Lord Midleton was explicit and outspoken in his view 
that the Irish sought not only a political but a communistic 
social and economic revolution. He denounced the land re­
former Michael Davitt as having embarked on a "mission of
81communistic propagandism." The Irish, he argued, thought
78Buckle, Letters of Queen Victoria, 2d ser., Vol.
Ill, p. 301.
79G. Smith, Irish History and Irish Character, p. 23.
8 0Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 
3d ser., Vol. 250 (5-28 Feb., 1880), col. 831.
81Viscount Midleton, "Irish Legislation and Its Re­
sults," The National Review, I (Mar. 1883), 135.
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in class terms and were consequently incapable of governing
in such a way as to treat all classes justly. For the same
reason they should not be permitted to undertake important
legal roles, such, for example, as judges or jurors, for, in
Midleton's words, they made "no secret of their sympathies
82being with the people and against the 'quality.'" The 
result of Gladstone's Irish legislation, such as the land 
acts and the Ballot Act, Midleton argued, has been "to break 
the power of the heretofore ruling class. . . . The influ­
ences of birth, of breeding," he maintained, have been des-
8 3troyed and revolutionaries are gaining control of Ireland.
Lord Cranbrook criticized Gladstone's Land Bill of
1886 and his first Home Rule Bill on the same grounds. "The
gentry," he complained, "are to be bought out, . . . and one
84dead and uniform level of society is sought. . . . "  In 
1885 Edward Styche Hart, opposing the extension of the fran­
chise in Ireland, condemned "the Catholic vote" because of 
its socialist leanings. The Irish, he said, "have devoted 
themselves to the teaching of doctrines which resemble more 
nearly the Socialism of the Continent than any phase of 
English political life. " 8 8 With this attitude prevailing,
8 2 Ibid., p. 143.
8 3 Ibid., p. 143.
84Viscount Cranbrook, "Dismemberment Disguised," The
National Review, VII (May 1886), 293.
88Edward Styche Hart, "The Catholic Vote," The Na­
tional Review, VI (Sept. 1885), 105.
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it is not surprising that during the 1880s the Nationalist 
members of Parliament were largely outcasts in London, both 
socially and politically. While the great estate owners of 
Ireland were acceptable guests in England's stately homes, 
the Nationalists were not.
In 1912, in a book describing the historical and cur­
rent nature of Conservatism, Lord Hugh Cecil still thought 
of the Irish in terms of republicanism and communism, as 
tainted with all the characteristics Conservatives associated 
with French Jacobinism. "Home Rule," he wrote,
is repulsive to them I the Conservatives] because they 
regard it as the triumph of a movement deeply tainted 
with Jacobinism. According to Conservative ideas, 
there has been nothing more Jacobinical in modern 
politics than the Land League agitation under the 
leadership of Mr. Parnell and Mr. Davitt. The violence 
and intimidation that disfigured it; the hideous 
crimes that ominously coincided with it; the reckless 
disregard of private property and the cruel oppression 
which it involved, reproduced some of the worst fea­
tures of the spirit of French terrorism. Conservatism 
would fail in its primary character as the opponent of 
Jacobinism, if it did not oppose to the utmost the 
setting up of an Irish Parliament which would be in 
the hands of a party whose history is so deeply
stained.
According to this statement the prime function of Conserva­
tism was to fight Jacobinism, which was defined as a com­
posite of terror, republicanism, and communism. Since the 
Irish supposedly embodied these characteristics, it was 
essential for the Conservatives to prevent the enactment of 
Home Rule. As late as 1922 many of them still thought of
8 6Lord Hugh Cecil, Conservatism, pp. 241-32.
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the Irish in these terms. In an article in the National 
Review the Duke of Northumberland launched a passionate at­
tack on Sinn Fein. He condemned it as a world communist 
revolutionary movement, a description which was of course 
far from the truth. When he characterized James Connolly, 
executed for his part in the rebellion of 1916, as an "In­
ternational Revolutionary," he was on reasonably safe 
87ground. But when he asserted that his "successor" was
"admirably fitted" to follow in his footsteps he was really
8 8stretching the bounds of accuracy. The successor North­
umberland had in mind was of course Eamon de Valera, whom he 
described in highly racial tones as "a South-American Jew 
Irishman. 1,89
Associated with the presumed widespread communist 
tendencies of the Irish, and in part explaining the cause 
of these tendencies, was the vice of laziness. It is inter­
esting to find that these two characteristics were usually 
coupled in the mind of many Unionists. They stem in part 
from the assumptions of laissez-faire. According to these 
assumptions those who worked industriously and practiced 
thrift became materially successful, a state which was de­
fined as the achievement of material abundance, or, at the
87Duke of Northumberland, "The Irish Tragedy," The 
National Review, LXXVIII (Jan. 1922), 616,
88Northumberland was also wrong of course in referring 
to De Valera as the successor to James Connolly as the leader 
of Sinn Fein. Connolly was never the leader of that Party.
89Ibid., p. 616.
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very least, material security. The achievement of either of 
these instilled in the individual a high degree of satisfac­
tion with the nature of his society. For him there was 
little reason to attack his social and political institutions. 
Such attacks came from the lazy and lethargic, from those 
who were unwilling to work or incapable of diligence, and 
therefore had not succeeded. It was they who advocated 
social reform or revolution, and it was they consequently 
who were the adherents of communism. The Unionists fully 
appreciated the importance of this analysis, for it explained, 
without indicting English rule, the cause of poverty, un­
employment, and economic and social stagnation in Ireland.
It is hardly surprising therefore to find them constantly 
emphasizing the inordinate laziness of the Irish. It was 
the self-righteousness, however, with which this was done 
that betrays their motivation, for it is apparent that they 
were rather pleased with this analysis. They were happy to 
be able to postulate with conviction that the Irish were 
lazy, for it both explained the degraded state of their 
social conditions and justified English rule.
In the 1890s Sir Herbert Jekyll complained that the 
Irish lacked initiative and self-reliance. They habitually 
depended on the government to solve their problems. "This,"
said Jekyll, "is the natural fruit of the system of doles
90and grants that have prevailed for so long. . . . "  By this
90Sir Algernon West, Private Diaries of the Rt. Hon.
Sir Algernon West, ed. by Horace G. Hutchinson (London: John
Murray, 1922), p. 181.
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statement Jekyll was inadvertently condemning English rule 
in Ireland, for by permitting the long existence of unem­
ployment it had, in his view, destroyed in the Irish the 
virtues of self-reliance and initiative, and had bred in them 
an inordinate degree of apathy and dependence. But instead 
of proceeding to condemn British statesmen and the policies 
which had produced these characteristics, Jekyll lapsed into 
the usual habit of condemning the Irish for possessing them. 
Many small farmers and agricultural laborers go off to Eng­
land for the harvest, he said, "and they come back in the
autumn with enough money to keep them through the winter,
91which they spend in idleness." They had little interest
in the improvement of the dwellings in which they existed,
dwellings which, in some cases, revealed, according to
Jekyll, "a lower state of civilization than I had ever seen
92out of a savage country." Many homes, he stated, especially
in parts of the west of Ireland,
had neither window nor chimney. One end of the house 
was divided into two compartments, in one of which 
lived a pony and a foal, and in the other a cow. The 
fire was on the floor, and the whole interior was black
with smoke. In one corner was a heap of dark rags that
might have been a bed, and there was a shelf above it 
that might have been another.93
Jekyll believed that the Irish could have improved their
9 1 Ibid., p. 182.
Ibid., p. 181.
93Ibid., pp. 181-82.
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94material conditions had they chosen to do so. But, he
stated, the problem lay in their nature. "There would seem," 
he wrote, "to be some racial instinct in the pure Celt which 
is too strong to be overcome, otherwise it is impossible 
to account for the deliberate squalor in which he elects to 
live. " 9 5
This description of the Irish contains a number of
seeming contradictions. While, on the one hand, they re-
9 6fused to work "for more than half the year," they possessed,
at the same time, a startling "short-sighted greediness of 
97gam." While they could live for an entire year on savings
accumulated during six months of work, they also showed "a
terrible want of thrift," with their earnings being "gener-
98ally spent at once— mostly on drink." This picture is 
remarkably reminiscent of that drawn previously by Goldwin 
Smith. "What an Englishman wants to make him happy," Smith 
had written, . . is a full belly and a warm back; what 
an Irishman wants to make him happy is a glass of whiskey 
and a stick. " 9 9
9 4 Ibid., p. 182.
9 5 Ibid., p. 182.
9 6 Ibid., p. 182.
9 7 Ibid., p. 179.
9 8 Ibid., p. 181.
99G. Smith, Irish History and Irish Character, p. 13.
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The Unionists had of course fostered a widespread 
antipathy toward the Irish among the English working class. 
They had established a kind of reservoir of prejudice upon 
which they were able to draw when political or electoral 
expediency so demanded. Those politicians who denounced 
the Irish with the greatest enthusiasm and seeming sincerity 
were generally assured of victory in English constituencies. 
When still a member of the Liberal Party Joseph Chamberlain 
repeatedly warned that "anything like a bargain with the 
Celtic Irish" for electoral purposes "would be resented by 
the English and Scotch workmen and that a Tory-Whig coalition 
appealing to their prejudices . . . would carry all before 
them."'*'8 8 The Unionists of course exploited these pre­
judices. They warned English workers that if Home Rule were 
enacted Ireland would be so misgoverned that England would 
be swamped with Irish labor. 1 0 1 The wise policy therefore 
was to support the existing union in order to keep the Irish 
out of England. This projected influx of job-seeking Irish 
peasants contrasts sharply with the usual charge of laziness 
attributed to them. Moreover, the fact that Unionists were 
able to base their appeal on these grounds reveals the extent 
of anti-Irish feeling among English workers. As Karl Marx 
wrote in 1870 the "ordinary English worker hates the Irish
100Algar Labouchere Thorold, The Life of Henry 
Labouchere (London: Constable and Company, 1913), p. 250.
1 0 1 Balfour, Aspects of Home Rule, pp. 28-29.
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102worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life."
In addition he attains a special satisfaction from the fact 
that "in relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a 
member of the ruling nation. " 3 ^ 3 Incredible as it may seem 
this anti-Irish prejudice carried over into the Communist 
International where, according to Friedrich Engels, the 
English members detested the Irish and tried to keep them
in a subservient position, a policy against which Engels had
104to fight desperately. A. P. Thornton points out that
English workers had little interest in "the ultimate des-
105tinies of the Irish." In fact they looked upon "Irish
labour as 'black,' and therefore stayed resolutely un­
sympathetic to catalogues of the wrongs of Ireland.
Another stereotype that prevailed among many English­
men was that the Irish were peculiarly deceitful. .In either 
a professional or social capacity it was impossible to trust 
them. Lady Blanche Waterford believed that they possessed 
an uncontrollable urge to lie. She did not describe what 
factors were responsible for the growth of this character­
istic, whether it was culturally or genetically produced,
102Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, 1846- 
1895, p. 289.
1 0 3 Ibid., p. 289.
104Gustav Mayer, Friedrich Engels; A Biography 
(London: Chapman & Hall, 1936), p. 193.
105The Habit of Authority, p. 315.
106Ibid., p. 315.
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but she left no doubt of her belief in its existence.
They cannot help lying [she stated], and they have no 
shame, not merely in being found out, but in being 
known to be lying as the words come fresh from their 
lips. Man, woman, and child, they are soaked and 
saturated in insincerity.1 0 ?
John Morley found a similar attitude prevailing among the
county inspectors in Ireland. Their typical view was that
the Irish "simply don't know what truth means. They know
no difference between the truth and a lie. Which ever
108comes uppermost at the moment does well enough."
The fact that many Englishmen could hold such an 
unfounded and encompassing opinion with such conviction 
reflects not only their attitude toward the Irish but the 
emotional factors which underlay their opposition to Home 
Rule. Their fears of the consequences of self-government 
for the Irish forced them to adopt an attitude of hostility 
and contempt toward them. They described them as incredibly 
ignorant and unintelligent. Not only did they argue that 
it would be folly to grant them self-government, but in the 
1860s and 1880s many even opposed the extension of the fran­
chise to Ireland on an equal basis with Britain. To "give 
electoral power to that poor, miserable, ignorant residuum 
of the people of Ireland," it was argued, would be
38^Quoted in John Morley, Recollections (2 vols.;
New York: Macmillan Company, 1917), II, 36-37.
108Ibid., I, 332.
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109outrageous. In the 18 90s Joseph Chamberlain revealed how
shallow were the roots of his democracy by proclaiming that 
the Irish members of Parliament should not be permitted to 
vote on what he referred to as strictly English legislation. 
This he defined as all legislation that did not deal directly 
with Irish affairs. He maintained, in phrases which even 
his highly sympathetic biographer was forced to condemn, 
that they were unqualified to do so because they were "nom­
inated by priests" and "elected by illiterates."’*''^  In the 
same decade W. E. H. Lecky criticized the Reform Bill of 
1884 because it had extended the franchise among the Irish.
The "loyal and well-educated men," he complained, men of
"intelligence," that is, the Anglo-Irish, were being "swamped
112by an ignorant and influenced peasantry."
During World War I many Unionists still thought of the 
Irish as an "unthinking population." The suggestion to im­
pose conscription on them, Lord Midleton asserted, "brought 
together . . . the Catholic hierarchy, all the new Republicans,
the Old Home Rulers, and other representatives of an un-
113thinking population." The post-World-War-I efforts of
109Charles Lewis, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates 
(House of Commons), 3d ser., Vol. 250 (Feb. 5-28, 1880), 
col. 827.
^■^Garvin, Life of Chamberlain, II, 570.
^Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) , 4th 
ser.. Vol. 14 (June 26-July 18, 1893), col. 1519.
112Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, I, 28.
^"^Midleton, Records & Reactions, 1856-1939, p. 248.
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the Irish to wrest national independence from England by 
force, and the often ruthless nature of the struggle that 
ensued, served once more to reinforce the old prejudices. 
While the Unionists were at last forced to concede a large 
degree of national self-government to the Irish, this did not 
mean that they had changed their basic image of them. It 
was still possible to describe them as "cowardly butchers" 
of human beings. * * 4
Even after the Irish problem had been removed from 
English politics and the Irish had long since begun to govern 
themselves, it was still possible for some Englishmen to 
deprecate retrospectively the character of the former members 
of the Nationalist Party. Years later, when composing his 
memoirs, Lord Newton could still write of them that "the
115majority were quarrelsome, unmannerly, and ill-educated."
When it is remembered that Newton was writing in 1941, long 
after the Irish members had forsaken the halls of Westminster, 
it is surprising to find that he was still unable to temper 
the severity of his judgment. In this, there was little 
progress, little compromise. In such men, contemplation of 
the Irish still conjured up the old derogatory picture.
The lingering prominence of this image in the period 
1919-1921, when the Unionists finally acquiesced in the
**4Callwell, Sir Henry Wilson, II, 347.
115Lord Newton, Retrospection (London: John Murray,
1941), p. 37.
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establishment of self-government in Ireland, played a funda­
mental part in the solution that was adopted. In this respect 
the Conservative image of Irish Protestants was of equal 
importance. These two factors coalesced to influence the 
political settlement that was finally hammered out. Though 
the Anglo-Irish had at last to be abandoned to live under a 
Catholic-dominated government, the Ulster Protestants could 
still be protected. Their consolidation into the northeast 
corner of Ireland made it possible to divide the country into 
two separate states. Thus the various cultural, mental, and 
religious concepts that dominated the Conservative image of 
the Irish played a significant role in the settlement that 
was finally adopted.
PART III 
THE LIBERAL POSTURE
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CHAPTER V
THE CHANGING NATURE OF LIBERALISM
The virtues, the efficiency, the justice of self- 
government— that is one Liberal principle. The appreciation 
and encouragement of national sentiment— that is another 
Liberal principle. The recognition of the popular will con­
stitutionally expressed through the people's represen­
tatives— that is another Liberal principle. .
— Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman
What Liberalism had in view was a natural, peaceable 
step-by-step transition from aristocracy to democracy. . . .
— Hamilton Fyfe^
The Liberal . . . is at bottom an egalitarian.
— Crane Brinton^
One of the most remarkable developments of late Vic­
torian and Edwardian England was the transformation that 
came over Liberalism. This had important consequences not 
only for the nature of English society but for Liberal at­
titudes and policies toward Ireland. Liberalism altered 
markedly its concept of the just society and the role of 
government in social and economic affairs. It partly
■^J. A. Spender, The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry 
Campbell-Bannerman (2 vols.; London: Hodder and Stoughton,
II, 28.
2
Hamilton Fyfe, The British Liberal Party: An His­
torical Sketch (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928), p. 53.
3
Brinton, English Political Thought, p. 225.
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abandoned its rigid adherence to the theory of laissez-faire 
and adopted to some extent the principle of state interven­
tion in an effort to secure to the lower classes the cul­
tural and material equity they could not achieve under the 
regime of extreme economic individualism. In its policy 
toward Ireland too Liberalism followed a new direction. Not 
only was the power of government injected into the economic 
relations between tenant-farmer and landlord in order to 
secure more favorable conditions for the tenant, but most 
Liberals also adopted the view that the Irish had a right to 
a modicum of national self-government, and that they had the 
ability to operate it. The new Liberal concept of the just 
society and the role that government should play in its 
achievement, together with a changing attitude toward the 
character and rights of both the lower classes and the Irish, 
lie at the root of the transformation that occurred in 
Liberal theory and practice during this period. The 
Liberals' image of the just society was closely linked to 
their theory of the nature and rights of the lower classes, 
and this in turn interacted with and helped mold their per­
ception of themselves and of the Irish.
In order, however, to reveal more vividly the path 
which Liberalism took with the advent of Gladstone to the 
premiership in 1868, when he uttered those epochal words,
"my mission is to pacify Ireland,”  ^ it will be helpful to
^Philip Magnus, Gladstone: A Biography (London:
John Murray, 1954), p. 193.
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go back briefly and describe its predominant nature prior 
to this time. For Gladstone's first ministry not only 
triggered the transformation of Liberalism, it also recog­
nized the existence of various wrongs in Ireland and com­
mitted the Liberal Party to their solution. After 1868 the 
Liberals became, for the next half century, closely associ­
ated with the problems of Ireland, and it was in part while 
seeking solutions to those problems that it was forced to 
abandon many of its former precepts regarding the relation­
ship between government and socioeconomic matters. The 
widening acceptance among Liberals of the principles of 
democracy and the concept that a suitable and evolutionary 
degree of autonomy, consistent with British interests, should 
be conceded to those mature national groups which clearly 
articulate a demand for it helped force them into a pro­
gressively closer identification with the objectives of 
Irish nationalism and those of the working class in Britain, 
and this in turn helped influence the transformation that 
Liberalism underwent.
It should be remembered that the changing posture of 
Liberalism led to serious conflict and factional disputes 
within the Liberal Party. As has already been pointed out, 
there was a number of groups that could not accept some of 
the new ideas. The most important of these were the Whigs 
and the Radical Unionists, who in particular could not ac­
cept Gladstone's new policies toward Ireland. In 1886 
therefore they withdrew from the Party and aligned with the
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Conservatives. From this date the Liberal Party was a much 
less heterogeneous entity than previously— and on Irish 
policy it was reasonably homogeneous. There was still a 
number of people, the Liberal imperialists in particular, 
who lacked the commitment to Home Rule that Gladstone and 
certain of his followers experienced. However, with the 
possible exception of Lord Rosebery, they were not opposed 
to this policy. Their attitude tended to be one of in­
difference, or a playing down of Home Rule for electoral 
expediency. Thus while certain Liberals did not support 
Home Rule with much enthusiasm, they did not actually oppose 
it, so that on the Irish issue the Liberal Party was, after 
1886, reasonably united.
Prior to 1868, when Gladstone first became prime 
minister, Liberalism was predominantly concerned with the 
role— or lack of role— of the state in economic matters. 
Liberals were staunch supporters of the doctrine that the 
state should intervene as little as possible in the economic 
sphere. The three principal groups which developed this 
philosophy were the Classical Economists, the Philosophical 
Radicals, and the Manchester School. Between them these 
groups successfully discredited the old mercantilistic con­
cept that intervention by the state in economic affairs 
could benefit the nation and the individual. In 1776 Adam 
Smith, the most influential figure among the Classical 
Economists, launched a momentous attack against state
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intervention.5 He denounced the theory that the state 
should engage in extensive regulatory activities in order 
to increase the wealth and self-sufficiency of the nation.
It was self-defeating, he argued, for the state to establish 
colonies and regulate their industry and commerce.- The 
national competition and exclusiveness that ensued not only 
led to wars but actually hindered economic growth and de­
velopment. It was Smith's view that if individual entre­
preneurs were left free to pursue their own economic 
interests untrammelled by the weight of state interference, 
not only would the wealth of individuals increase, but so 
also would the wealth of nations.
The philosopher Jeremy Bentham adopted Smith's eco­
nomic theories, marshalled additional arguments in their 
support, and gave them a wide publicity. Bentham attempted 
to establish Smith's economic principles firmly on a theory 
of human nature and the economic relationships between in­
dividuals. According to Bentham human beings were motivated
g
by an extremely egoistic impulse. Their prime objective
7
was the pursuit of pleasure. In quest of this self­
oriented goal the individual contributed in the most
5
This was of course the year in which he published 
his Wealth of Nations.
g
See Elie Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radical­
ism, trans. by Mary Morris (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966),
pp. 14-15, 30.
7 Ibid., pp. 26-33; and John Stuart Mill, Utilitar­
ianism (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957) , 9-18.
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efficient way possible to the general welfare of society, 
or, as Bentham put it, to the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number, for there could be no conflict between 
individual objectives and the objectives of society as a
Q
whole. This conclusion was based on the assumption that
a natural harmony, or natural identity, of interests existed
9
among all individuals in a given society. Adam Smith had 
also believed in the existence of this harmonizing factor, 
which he had of course referred to, rather metaphysically, 
as "an invisible hand."1^
In the system constructed by the Classical Economists 
and the Philosophical Radicals there was little room for 
positive government action. This followed logically from 
the postulate that the interests of all individuals har­
monized naturally. Generally, government should not inter­
fere in economic matters because such intervention would 
prove counter-productive. Both these groups would sanction 
government involvement in only the most exceptional circum­
stances. The Classical Economists agreed that government 
should perform those functions which the individual or a 
group of individuals would not do because of their unprofit­
ability.1 1 The Philosophical Radicals reluctantly conceded
Q
Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, pp.
15-17.
9 Ibid., pp. 15-17.
1®Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, I, 421.
11Ibid., II, 184-85.
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that the state might legitimately intervene to insure the
12availability of an education to each citizen.
In the early nineteenth century there emerged in 
Manchester a group of businessmen who fervently welcomed 
these ideas. They became uncompromising advocates of in­
dividual liberty in economic matters. They did not, however, 
press these principles quite as vigorously in non-economic 
areas. And they did very little to implement the concept
of universal manhood suffrage, which the Philosophical
13Radicals had advocated, and which was perhaps the logical 
implication of their philosophy. They concentrated their 
attention almost exclusively on economic matters, and the 
repeal of the Corn Laws and the Navigation Laws in the 1840s 
represented the most extensive and successful implementation 
of their philosophy.
The practical application of these Manchester School 
ideas reached its peak in the mid-Victorian era. Manchester 
School Liberals firmly believed that the acquisition of 
wealth was proof of superior ability. They were opposed to 
the idea that government should intervene to redistribute 
the national income in such a way as to reduce the extremes 
of poverty and wealth. They believed that the best govern­
ment was that which spent, and therefore taxed, least. In
12Halevy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, pp. 
289-90, 490.
13Ibid., pp. 168, 262-264, 491.
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their view a society based on complete individual liberty 
in economic affairs provided a just opportunity for everyone 
to achieve material success. In addition this system separ­
ated the intelligent and the industrious from those who 
lacked these qualities. Any attempt by government' to tamper 
with the operation of the system of economic individualism 
by a policy of income redistribution would only destroy 
incentive, penalize the proficient and the diligent, retard 
production, and increase rather than decrease poverty. This 
was a highly flattering theory for those who succeeded, for 
it proved their superior competence. It was a correspond­
ingly depressing one for those who did not succeed, for it 
verified their lack of success-producing qualities. It not 
only placed individuals on a different plane, but justified, 
in economic, social, and political terms, the perpetuation 
of a conspicuously stratified society. Moreover, by logical 
extension these theories could be applied to those countries 
which lagged behind technologically, industrially, and com­
mercially, to prove that they too lacked those qualities 
which contributed to material progress. Those classes, 
nations, and races therefore which failed to make significant 
advances in technological and material matters were in 
danger of being stigmatized as possessing the characteristics 
of backwardness or inferiority not only in economic terms, 
but in cultural and biological terms as well.
This was the predominant nature of Liberalism at the 
beginning of the Home Rule era. It was a set of ideas and
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principles that had sprung from divergent and multifarious 
sources, and consequently was composed of various aspects. 
The change that came over it in the late nineteenth century 
was made possible primarily by the reception given to 
certain new social, economic, and political ideas, but also 
by the emergence of some of Liberalism's latent elements. 
The predominance of Manchester school principles in the mid­
nineteenth century tended to cloud the fact that Liberalism 
also comprised certain other important factors, some of 
which were clearly enumerated by Alan Bullock and Maurice 
Shock. The Liberal tradition, they wrote,
owes much to the Dissenters with their strong belief 
in individualism, the place of conscience in politics 
and their democratic tradition of self-government, but 
something also to the Whigs with their aristocratic 
tradition of civil and religious liberty and their 
dislike of arbitrary government. It inherits a belief 
in natural law and natural rights only to see these 
scornfully repudiated by Bentham and the Philosophical 
Radicals in favour of the principle of utility. From 
the Classical Economists and the Manchester School it 
derives the orthodoxy of free trade and laissez-faire, 
yet at the end of the 19th century embraces the 
heretical view of working-class radicalism that some­
thing ought to be done for the poor.14
A close examination of these various elements indi­
cates that there lay at the roots of Liberalism a dualistic 
concept of man and the just society. There was within it a 
certain polarity of ideas and principles which seem highly 
incompatible. In consonance with Manchester School ideas
14Alan Bullock and Maurice Shock, eds., The Liberal 
Tradition: From Fox to Keynes (London: Adam & Charles
Black, 1956), pp. xix-xx.
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there was a strong emphasis on economic individualism, ir­
respective of the social and economic conditions that ensued. 
But there was also a certain emphasis on democracy and the 
nobility of all human life. There was a demand for the 
application of conscience to politics; and in the Home Rule 
era there developed the concept that the state has a moral 
obligation to intervene in economic and social affairs to 
improve the conditions of the working class and to make 
available to all citizens the opportunity to attain an edu­
cation and to enrich their cultural and social life. Through 
out the Home Rule era this collectivistic principle was in 
constant competition with the free trade, freedom of con­
tract, and laissez-faire ideas of the Manchester School.
The gradual acceptance among certain Liberals of the prin­
ciple of state intervention and the concept of collectivism 
slowly forced the Party in a new direction. Liberalism 
therefore was in a long state of flux, moving from the 
position of rigid economic individualism to a cautious ac­
ceptance of the principle of collectivism. When the ideas 
of such Liberal theorists as the later John Stuart Mill,
T. H. Green, D. G. Ritchie, John Hobson, and John Maynard 
Keynes are considered, as well as the policies and programs 
of the various Liberal governments throughout the Home Rule 
period, the gradual, though often reluctant, shift in 
Liberalism away from the laissez-faire of the Classical 
Economists and the Manchester School to the adoption of 
state intervention as a means of solving certain social and
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economic grievances becomes apparent.
It was this new trend in Liberalism, especially as
reflected in the legislation in behalf of Irish tenant
farmers and the decision to concede the Irish a degree of
self-government, that drove most of the Whigs out of the
Liberal Party. With their exodus the Party was henceforth
15composed largely of the middle class, with a slowly grow­
ing segment of working class representation. The continuing 
disunity of the Liberal Party was in part a product of the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the middle class and the 
disharmony of interests that it represented. It was com­
posed of a number of different elements, ranging from the 
great industrialists, bankers, and commercial magnates at 
one end of the scale to the artisan and laboring class, 
which made up the Lib-Labs, at the other. Sandwiched be­
tween these two groups was the professional middle class, 
among them professors and journalists, who in this period 
were often the theorists and advocates of new collectivist 
ideas. Carlton J. H. Hayes describes the complex and con­
flicting composition of the middle class as follows:
The urban "middle class"— the "bourgeoisie"— was not a 
simple class but a congeries of classes. There was a 
moneyed bourgeoisie, growing mightily in wealth and 
influence. . . .  It embraced well-to-do industrialists, 
commercial magnates, and bankers. . . . Between in­
dustrialists and commercial magnates developed
It should be noted that many of the Whigs were also 
developing middle class economic interests. Sir Ivor 
Jennings, Party Politics, Vol. II: The Growth of Parties
(Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 123.
176
conflicts of economic interest and political policy; 
and bankers who tried to resolve the conflicts found 
themselves frequently assailed from both sides. There 
was likewise a professional bourgeoisie, comprising 
lawyers, physicians, engineers, journalists, professors, 
trained civil servants. . . . There was, most numerous 
of all, a petty bourgeoisie, made up of small manufac­
turers and traders, retailers and shopkeepers, handi­
craftsmen and clerks, and tailing off into an artisan 
class.16
These three major groupings had not only conflicting
interests and outlooks but even within the various groups
there was a lack of harmony. Hayes's description of the
contrasting interests of the upper middle class, the haute
bourgeoisie, is borne out by Bernard Seiranel, and helps
explain the divergent attitudes of this group toward the
17empire and Home Rule. Those industries and interests, 
such as banking, insurance, ship-building, and the cotton 
industry, which had not yet felt the pinch of foreign compe­
tition, continued to support free trade imperialism and did
18not in general oppose self-government for the Irish.
Those industries, such as the iron and steel industry of the 
Midlands, which were struggling against the pressure of 
foreign competition, tended to become converts to protec­
tionism, supporters of imperial federation, and opponents 
19of Home Rule. Many of these Liberals, led of course by
1 8Hayes, A Generation of Materialism, 1871-1900,
p. 62.
17Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform, pp. 133-40.
1 8 Ibid., pp. 136-38.
19Ibid., pp. 131-43.
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Joseph Chamberlain, withdrew from the Liberal Party from
the 1880s onward.
As the various theorists espoused the principles of
collectivism they added a new dimension to Liberalism.
This new development is symbolized by the former Benthamite
John Stuart Mill who in later life moved steadily away from
laissez-faire toward the principle of state intervention.
He abandoned the belief that the policy of laissez-faire
gave rise to the most equitable society possible. He came
to feel that the extremes of wealth and poverty were unjust,
that they could, with general social advantage, be modified;
and in each edition of The Principles of Political Economy
he extended the areas in which government might intervene
in the economic relations between individuals. Mill in fact
eventually abandoned much of his Benthamite Liberalism and
20adopted a rather sympathetic view of socialism.
It is perhaps not surprising that one of the most 
destructive challenges to laissez-faire should come from the 
intellectual community. It is true that professional poli­
ticians were simultaneously denying piecemeal the universal 
application of laissez-faire principles by enacting selective 
collectivistic measures to remedy specific social ills. The 
Education Act of 1870 was the first major step in this di­
rection. The Irish Land Act of the same year was also an 
epochal act of government intervention in economic matters.
20Brinton, English Political Thought, p. 212.
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Although collectivist reforms were thereafter inaugurated 
extremely slowly, it is a fact that by 1914 collectivist 
principles had been embodied in a number of important social 
programs, mostly by Liberal administrations, though Conserva­
tives had also made important contributions, especially in 
Ireland. Although these reforms were often enacted in 
response to the pressures of politically important segments 
of society, rather than on the basis of pure philosophic 
commitment, it is also a fact that if the principles of 
laissez-faire were to be successfully abandoned, their in­
tellectual underpinnings would have to be destroyed, and it 
was here that the intellectuals rendered their greatest 
service. The task was not easy, since the newly propounded 
theory of natural selection, and the philosophy of social 
Darwinism built upon it, was interpreted as lending renewed 
credence to laissez-faire principles. The belief that gov­
ernment and the individual were in irreconcilable opposition, 
so persuasively juxtaposed in Spencer's title, Man versus 
the State, was difficult to break down.
It is in a sense therefore ironic that one of the first 
important attacks on this theory should come from John Stuart 
Mill, for Mill had previously been very much concerned with 
the possible tyranny of the state over the individual, as 
he had explained in his essay, On Liberty. This is in part 
explained by Mill's own personal intellectual history which 
steadily underwent a slow metamorphosis. Having started out 
as a firm supporter of complete freedom of contract, he had
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by 1868 so abandoned this philosophy that he was able to
write a pamphlet acknowledging its failure as it applied to
landlord and tenant in Ireland, and calling for the inter-
21vention of the government to buy out the landlords.
The Oxford philosopher T. H. Green pursued a similar
line of reasoning. It was useless, he said, "to insist on
maintaining the forms of free contract where the reality was 
22impossible." He rejected the view that a natural identity 
of interests existed among all individuals in a given so­
ciety and that freedom of contract would bring the best 
possible benefits to all. Crane Brinton writes that no one
marks better than Green "the change which came over English
23Liberalism in the latter half of the nineteenth century." 
"The nature of the genuine political reformer," Green main-
O  A
tained, is perhaps "always the same." The cause for which
he fights does not vary. It is the "cause of social good
25against class interests." "It is the business of the 
state," Green argued, "to take the best security it can for 
the young citizens' growing up in such health and with so
21John Stuart Mill, England and Ireland (London: 
Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1868).
22 "Lecture on Liberal Legislation and Freedom of 
Contract," in Works of Thomas Hill Green, ed. by R. L. 
Nettleship (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1888), III, 382.
23Brinton, English Political Thought, p. 212.
24"Lecture on Liberal Legislation," p. 367.
25Ibid., p. 367.
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2 fimuch knowledge as is necessary for their real freedom."
He rejected the proposition that "the enlightened self-
interest or benevolence of individuals, working under a
system of unlimited freedom of contract, ** brought the great-
27est good to the greatest number.
In an influential work published in 1891, entitled 
The Principles of State Interference, D. G. Ritchie took 
issue with the Spencerian concept that the state and the 
individual were in opposition. He was willing to admit that 
this may have been true prior to the advent of democracy, 
but in a democratic society the state represented the in­
dividual; it was his instrument, to be used for the develop­
ment of the general good. "The arguments used against 'gov­
ernment' action," he stated,
where the government is entirely or mainly in the hands 
of a ruling class or caste . . . lose their force just 
in proportion as government becomes more and more genu­
inely the government of the people by the people them­
selves. The explicit recognition of popular sovereignty 
tends to abolish the antithesis between "the Man" and 
"the State." The State becomes not "I" indeed, but 
"we. " 28
Ritchie completely denied the validity not only of Spencer- 
ianism but of the laissez-faire ideas of the Classical Eco­
nomists, the Benthamites, and the Manchester School. "The
2 ®Ibid., p. 375.
2 7 Ibid., p. 376.
28David G. Ritchie, The Principles of State Inter­
ference: Four Essays on the Political Philosophy of Mr.
Herbert Spencer, J. S. Mill, and T. H. Green (London:
Swan Sonnenshein & Co., 1891), p. 64.
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main reason for desiring more State action/' he said, "is
in order to give the individual a greater chance of develop-
29ing all his activities in a healthy way." If, under the
system of laissez-faire, the individual was reduced to grind­
ing poverty, as was too often the case, that was a mere 
caricature of liberty. Liberty, it was now argued, consist­
ed, in part, of the opportunity to develop one's talents to 
the full; it involved access on equitable terms to a mean­
ingful existence. The state therefore, where necessary, 
should intervene positively to make available whatever op­
portunities were required. There must "remain in Liberal­
ism," John Hobson stated, "no relics of that positive 
hostility to public methods of co-operation which crippled 
the old Radicalism."3® In fact the state must undertake to
insure "an enlargement of personal liberty, . . .  to set
31free new and larger opportunities. . . . "  The system of
laissez-faire cannot provide these opportunities. They can
only be attained through positive government action, and
when such action is required "no theoretic objections to the
32State can be permitted to militate" against it.
2 9 Ibid., p. 64.
3 ®J. A. Hobson, The Crisis of Liberalism: New Issues
of Democracy (London: P. S. King & Son, 1909), pp. 94-95.
3 1Ibid., p. 94.
32Ibid., p. 95.
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It was fitting that the last great blow to the eco­
nomic theories underlying laissez-faire should have been 
struck by an economist. One and a half centuries after 
Adam Smith propounded his non-interventionist economic theory 
in The Wealth of Nations, John Maynard Keynes impressively 
refuted it in a study appropriately entitled The End of 
Laissez-faire. Keynes levelled his main attack against the 
assertion that there existed in society a natural harmony 
of interests between the goals of the individual and those 
of society as a whole. There was, he stated, no evidence 
for the existence of such a principle.
The world is not so governed from above that private 
and social interests always coincide. It is not so 
managed here below that in practice they coincide. It 
is not a correct deduction from the Principles of 
Economics that enlightened self-interest always oper­
ates in the public interest. Nor is it true that 
self-interest generally ^s enlightened; more often 
individuals acting separately to promote their own 
ends are too ignorant or too weak to attain even these. 
Experience does not show that individuals, when they 
make up a social unit, are always less clear-sighted 
than when they act separately.
We cannot therefore settle on abstract grounds.
• * • ^
While the theoreticians were abandoning the principles 
of laissez-faire, so also, to some extent, though often with 
great reluctance, were some of the politicians. The various 
governments from 1868 to 1914 slowly undertook a number of 
collectivistic reforms, and in the period 1906-1910 actually 
laid the foundation for England's welfare state. Surprisingly
33John Maynard Keynes, The End of Laissez-faire 
(London: Hogarth Press, 1927), pp. 39-40.
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the first steps in this direction were taken under Gladstone
during the Parliament of 1868-1874. R. C. K. Ensor states
that this "was the greatest reforming Parliament" since the 
34early 1830s." It was the aim of Gladstone's ministry "to
abolish class privileges and unbar to all the doors of po-
35litical, economic, and cultural opportunity." This is
not to say that Gladstone achieved this goal, either in this
ministry or in his later ones. Indeed it was really not
achieved during the Home Rule period. However, important
steps were taken in this direction, steps which not only
altered in a revolutionary way the concept of the role of
government in social and economic matters but were founded
on a new image of man.
This new Liberalism began with two basic assumptions:
One of these started from the postulate that all men 
are brothers, that the differences between them are 
trifling when set beside their points of resemblance, 
that all have an equal right to the necessaries and 
the pleasures of life. The second channel was hollowed 
out by a vague belief that it was possible, by using 
the machinery of government, to do away with poverty 
and with superfluous wealth; to even things up so 
effectually that all should have enough and none more
than enough.36
If all men were "brothers," if the differences between one 
class and another, between one nationality and another, 
between the English and the Irish, were "trifling," it would
34Ensor, England, 1870-1914, p. 2.
3 5 Ibid., p. 3.
36Fyfe, The British Liberal Party, p. 20.
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be difficult to argue on moral or mental grounds that one 
class should rule another or that the British should rule 
the Irish.
The implication of these ideas was not only that all 
classes should have a similar voice in political matters 
but so also, it would seem, should all nationalities. It 
took most Liberals some time of course to recognize and ac­
knowledge the full consequences of these principles, and in 
fact many of them became enthusiastic and rather self- 
righteous imperialists. However, the most influential 
Liberal of this period, Gladstone, never adopted the new 
imperialism; and his ideas on imperial matters continued to 
play an important role in Liberalism, as is revealed by the 
predominant Liberal policies toward South Africa prior to 
the Boer War, to some extent during that war, and again 
afterwards; by the advocacy of self-government for Ireland; 
and by the attempts, as revealed, for example, in the Morley- 
Minto reforms, to evolve a system of self-government in 
India.
In light of these facts it is not surprising to find 
that one of the most momentous developments of this period 
was the rise of political democracy. Prior to 1867 the 
right to participate in the political process, the right to 
the franchise, was based on property. It was property really 
that was represented in Parliament despite the fact that the 
Reform Bill of 1832 was officially entitled "An Act to Amend 
the Representation of the People. . . . "  The Second and
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Third Reform Bills did not abolish this anomaly. The right 
to vote was still based on property, and the maneuvering on 
this issue of both political parties reveals that practical 
political considerations were perhaps as important a moti­
vating factor as political theory or ideals. It should be 
understood therefore that in this area, as in others, Lib­
erals did not follow the implications of their assumptions 
to their logical conclusion. Although they took steps to 
extend the franchise, they did not extend it universally to 
all adults, or indeed to all male adults. It was in fact 
not until 1918 that property as a basis for the franchise 
was finally abolished.
It is interesting to note that even after many mem­
bers of the working class had been granted the Parliamentary 
franchise women of all classes were still excluded. This 
tendency to discriminate against women was the product of a 
male self-image, coupled with a perception of the female 
and her role, which may have had its roots in the same soil 
that produced the social prejudice and political discrimina­
tion toward the working class in England and the ethnic and 
racial prejudice toward the Irish. It is, in any case, a 
fact that this discriminatory attitude toward women was so 
deeply embedded in the mind of most males, Liberal and Con­
servative, that all the demonstrations, disturbances, and 
destruction that the Suffragettes perpetrated in the years 
prior to World War I were powerless to remove it. When the 
Reform Bill of 1867 was being debated, John Stuart Mill
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proposed an amendment to extend the suffrage to women, an
amendment that was solidly defeated. Mill then published
an essay with the challenging title, The Subjection of
Women, in which he continued to advocate this cause. But
all the persuasiveness of that highly accomplished logician
could not sway the majority of M.P.s. It was not until 1918
that Parliament agreed to extend the franchise to women—
an act which was finally made possible by their contributions
during World War I. It should be pointed out that on this
issue there was very little difference between the attitudes
of the two major parties. Neither had a majority in support
of it until the advent of the war. Even then, the intensity
of the resistance to equal rights for women on this matter
is revealed by the fact that women were still not permitted
to vote until they had attained the age of thirty.
If Liberals and Conservatives held similar positions
on the issue of voting rights for women, this was not the
case on the question of education. Prior to 1870 elementary
education in England was for most children nonexistent.
There was no real government effort to create an effective
system of schools. Those which did exist were owned and
run by non-government agencies, mostly by the Church of
England. The Education Act of 1870 was the first major
attempt to apply the principle of collective responsibility 
37to education. Local school boards were created and given
37Sir Henry Slesser, A History of the Liberal Party 
(London: Hutchinson & Co., n.d.), p. 105.
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the authority to levy rates to build, staff, and administer 
schools. Elementary education was not by this Act made free 
for all children, but it was made free for the children of 
those parents who could not afford the fees. In addition 
the local school boards were given the authority to compel 
children to attend school until the age of thirteen. Gov­
ernment thus not only assumed the responsibility to provide 
an education for the children of those parents who were 
unable to pay, but felt also that it had an obligation to 
compel children to obtain an education, thereby adopting a 
principle of social responsibility which was a major break 
with previous practice.
The school problem, however, was not satisfactorily
solved; it continued to remain a source of agitation. One
reason for this was that the so-called voluntary schools,
basically those schools which were run by the Church of
England, were not permitted to levy rates and were given no
38support from them. In addition the board schools were 
prohibited from teaching denominational religion. These 
conditions disturbed the Anglican Church and its ally the 
Conservative Party, both of which continued to agitate this 
problem. In 1891 the Conservatives took the next major 
step in educational reform by abolishing school fees in all 
elementary schools. This raises the question as to why the
38They did, however, continue to receive small gov­
ernment grants, which they had obtained since 1833.
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Conservatives, opposed in general to the principle of col­
lectivism, would adopt such a measure. The answer, however,
is not far to seek. They did so in an attempt to save the
39Anglican schools from extinction. They felt that at some 
point in the future, when the Liberals returned to office, 
they would undertake to make education free for all students 
in board schools, an act which would put the Anglican 
schools at a grave financial disadvantage. Lord Salisbury 
pointed this out in a speech at the Carlton Club. It was 
imperative, he said, that the Conservatives deal with this 
issue, for "if their opponents should obtain a majority in 
a future Parliament, they would deal with it in such a
40manner that the voluntary schools would be swept away.”
Though the Liberal Education Bill of 1870 had serious 
limitations, particularly in its failure to make education 
free for all children in board schools, it should be acknow­
ledged that the adoption of the principle that society as a 
whole was responsible for the welfare of its members as far
as education was concerned was a momentous event. It was
41an important repudiation of laissez-faire Liberalism, and 
it indicated that in general the Liberal Party no longer 
accepted the principle that complete freedom of contract 
among individuals catered adequately to the needs of all
39The Annual Register for the Year 1891, p. 81
4 0 Ibid., p. 81.
4^Slesser, A History of the Liberal Party, p. 105.
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citizens. It implied that individual and social interests
did not harmonize naturally, that there might in fact, at
least in some areas, be a serious conflict between them.
This new line of reasoning denied the existence of a natural
identity of interests among all individuals. Belief in this
concept began to erode. Consequently, as Alan Bullock and
Maurice Shock point out, the "distrust of the power of the
state that was characteristic of 19th century Liberalism
42up to the last decades of the century," (my italics) was 
slowly broken down, and the principle of state intervention 
to attain a more equitable society underwent renewed con­
sideration.
Epochal as the Education Act of 1870 was, both in 
theory and in practice, it was accompanied in the same year 
by another important innovative measure. This was the Irish 
Land Act. With this statute Gladstone took another, though 
doubtless minor step as far as practical results were con­
cerned, away from the system of laissez-faire. He denied, 
in relation to Irish land issues, that the theory of free 
contractual relations between individuals would bring the 
most judicious degree of equity to each participant. He 
assumed in fact that the tenant, as the economically weaker 
party, could not obtain the kind of contract he deserved.
The government therefore should intervene in his behalf to 
achieve for him certain basic terms he had proved incapable
A O
Bullock and Shock, The Liberal Tradition, p. xxv.
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of obtaining for himself. While the new law stipulated that 
the tenant must receive compensation for eviction, or dis­
turbance as it was typically called, and while it provided 
that he must, under certain conditions, be compensated for 
whatever improvements he might have added to the property 
he rented during his period of tenure, it did not by any 
means meet the tenants' major demands, which were security 
of tenure and fair rents.
It is interesting to find that on this issue even
such a staunch Manchesterite as John Bright agreed that the
policy of freedom of contract operated unfairly against the
tenant and that the government, in the tenant's interest,
should intervene to rectify this. Bright was of course
denying, whether he was fully aware of it or not, the
validity and justice of a basic principle of laissez-faire.
"It is said," he explained,
that all this must be left to contract between the 
landlord and the tenant; but the public, which may 
be neither landlord nor tenant, has a great interest 
in this question; and I maintain that the interests 
of the public require that Parliament should secure 
to the tenant the property which he has invested in
his farm.43
But Bright went even further than this. He argued that in 
Ireland the laws had failed in another way. They had per­
mitted the land of Ireland to accumulate in the hands of 
a comparatively few proprietors. Bright held therefore that
A Q
John Bright, Speeches on Questions of Public Policy, 
ed. by James E. Thorold Rogers (2d ed.; 2 vols.; London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1869), I, 373.
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the government should intervene to bring about a redistri­
bution:
The great evil of Ireland is this--that the Irish 
people— the Irish nation— are dispossessed of the soil, 
and what we ought to do is to provide for, and aid in, 
their restoration to it by all measures of justice.
Why should we tolerate the system of entails? . Why 
should the object of the law be to accumulate land in 
great masses in few hands, and to make it almost im­
possible for persons of small means, and tenant- 
farmers, to become possessors of the land?44
Bright therefore proposed that the government advance funds 
to help tenants purchase their holdings, to transform Ire­
land into a land of peasant proprietors. This was certainly 
an unusual proposal for a leading Manchester School Liberal.
But it was adopted by the Party, and enacted into law as
45part of the Land Act of 1870. However, because of the 
amount of capital tenants were required to advance to pur­
chase their holdings, this aspect of the Act had little 
immediate impact. Its real importance lay in the fact that 
it was later expanded in such a way in successive measures—  
not only by Liberals but more importantly the Conservatives—  
that Ireland was eventually transformed into a nation of 
small proprietary farmers. Though the 1870 Act did little 
to attain a definitive solution of tenants' problems, it was
4 4 Ibid., I, 373.
45This act may well denote the most radical or liberal 
phase of Bright's career as far as social questions and his 
position toward Irish problems were concerned. From this 
point on he became increasingly conservative. See James L. 
Sturgis, John Bright and the Empire (London: Athlone Press,
1969), p. 175.
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in principle, as John Morley quite rightly pointed out, "a
46vast revolutionary stride."
Electoral, educational, and agrarian reforms were 
only three of the first important measures undertaken in 
this period. It is worth noting that though the Liberals 
set in motion the processes that led to the advent of reform 
in each of these areas, the Conservatives also added im­
portant practical contributions in each field. As has been 
pointed out, however, they did not for the most part, do so 
out of a philosophic commitment to the principles involved. 
They made education free in all elemen ary schools, for 
example, to save the Anglican schools. They adopted and 
extended the Liberal land acts in Ireland primarily to pro­
tect the landlords and to stave off the demand for Home 
Rule. And their acceptance of the Reform Bills of 1867 
and 1884 was certainly the result of political expediency 
and necessity rather than a philosophic commitment to demo­
cratically oriented principles. This is not by any means 
to suggest that the Liberal commitment to these measures 
was morally pure and void of political pressure and ex­
pediency. But, as Alan Bullock and Maurice Shock have 
pointed out, Liberalism was composed in part of various 
groups--the Dissenters, the Philosophical Radicals, and the 
working class radicals— who advocated either all or some of
^John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone 
(new ed., 3 vols.; New York: Macmillan Company, 1932), II,
294.
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these policies and who therefore gradually pushed the main­
stream of Liberalism toward the acceptance of these ideas 
and made it a generally positive, if often divisive, force 
working for their realization. Conservatism, on the other 
hand, apart from a small group of Tory Democrats, represen­
ted more socially conservative forces, and became therefore, 
especially after the passing of Disraeli, a largely acqui­
escent, rather than innovative force, as far as social and 
political reform was concerned. Thus while a number of Con­
servatives gave evidence of accepting some of these ideas, 
Conservatives as a whole concerned themselves primarily with 
imperial matters, arguing that reform could come only as a 
result of successful imperial policies.
Nevertheless the enactment of the above reformist 
measures set in motion a cautious trend toward social re­
construction which was continued in succeeding administra­
tions. In keeping with their changing concept of social 
justice and the role of government in its achievement, a 
small number of Liberals refused to accept as inevitable and 
ineradicable the often stringent and insecure conditions of 
the working class. A social system which permitted the
existence of superfluous wealth on the one hand and extreme
47poverty on the other came to be viewed as intolerable, and
47For explicit public statements of this point of view 
see Spender, Life of Campbell-Bannerman, II, 120, and Better 
Times; Speeches by the Right Hon. D. Lloyd George (London; 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1910), pp. 174-75.
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it was assumed that this could not only be corrected but that 
government had a responsibility to do so. Though the short­
lived Liberal administration of the 1890s enacted little 
social legislation, it did strike a further blow at the 
concept that the individual's property was inviolable and 
that he had the right to pass that property on to his heirs 
without interference by the state. The rather moderate 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir William Harcourt, intro­
duced a measure to impose a system of graduated taxes on 
inherited wealth. These were ranged on a scale from one to 
eight per cent, and were important more for the principle 
they embodied than for any immediate social gain they 
effected.
The last Liberal administrations enacted a number of 
important social reforms which at last lifted England clearly 
out of the era of extreme laissez-faire and laid the basis
48It should be noted, however, that Hamilton Fyfe 
believes this act did more "to break down the aristocratic 
principle in English government" than the Reform Acts of 
1832 or 1867. The repeated application of the principle 
involved, he wrote, was "to have an effect on England great­
er than that of any other event in this period. It was to 
destroy the power of the aristocracy by breaking up their 
vast estates." See Fyfe, The British Liberal Party, pp.
140, 143. R. C. K. Ensor, however, disagrees with this 
point, believing that the severest blow to the aristocracy 
and to British agriculture in general came from foreign 
competition and from the failure of the government to 
erect tariffs against foreign goods. Although Fyfe's 
point is probably exaggerated, it is also doubtful that 
Ensor's explanation is adequate, since foreign competition 
came mainly in the area of grains, and there seems to be 
no reason why English agriculturalists could not have trans­
ferred to a different kind of farming.
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for the welfare state. The principle of collectivism was
applied on an unprecedented scale so that among the measures
enacted were a Workingmen's Compensation Act, an Old-Age
Pensions Law, a more steeply graduated income tax, a tax on
unearned increments and on monopolies, a National -Insurance
Act, and a Minimum Wage Law. These reforms were achieved
not only despite the skepticism of the right wing of the
Liberal Party but in the face of persistent opposition and
obstruction from the Conservatives, especially in the House
of Lords, where they even went so far as to reject the budget
of 1909. The Conservative opposition to the 1909 budget, as
Blanche Dugdale admits, "sprang from the irresistible
instinct of self-preservation in the class from which the
Party derived its tradition and much of its strength. The
land taxes and the land valuation clauses were a death blow
49to the landed gentry."
But while the Conservatives and a number of right 
wing Liberals were appalled by these measures, left-wing 
Liberals were elated. In 1911 L. T. Hobhouse enthusiastic­
ally expressed his approval of the progress being made in 
the achievement of social reform. "On all sides," he wrote,
we find the State making active provisions for the poorer 
classes and not by any means for the destitute alone.
We find it educating the children, providing medical 
inspection, authorizing the feeding of the necessitous 
at the expense of the ratepayers, helping them to obtain 
employment through free Labour Exchanges, seeking to 
organize the labour market with a view to the mitigation
49Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, II, 55.
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of unemployment, and providing old age pensions for all 
whose incomes fall below thirteen shillings a week, 
without exacting any contribution.50
The historian E. L. Woodward, who lived through the years 
prior to World War I, recalls that "there was almost con­
tinuous excitement in the programme of the left wing of the 
Liberal Party, in the support of the great strikes which 
occurred during these years, in the plans for the nationali­
zation of the means of production, the expropriation of the
51landlords, the raising of the standard of life."
It has often been charged against the Liberals that 
their preoccupation with self-government for Ireland pre­
vented them from enacting the advanced social legislation 
that would have won electoral approval and given extended 
life to the Party. It is undoubtedly true that identifica­
tion with the policy of Home Rule cost the Liberals a large 
degree of electoral support. It is also true, however, that 
the social legislation they enacted in this period far sur­
passed that of any previous administration, or any previous 
era, and when they attempted to enact further reformist 
measures in the budget of 1909, the voters reduced their 
support of them in the elections of the following year. Nor 
did they turn en masse to the Labor Party. The bulk of the 
support which the Liberals lost went to the Conservatives,
5 0L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (London: Williams and
Norgate [1911]), pp. 157-58.
51E. L. Woodward, Short Journey (London: Faber and
Faber, 1942), p. 39.
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who had enacted little social reform during their long tenure 
of office, who opposed the reforms embodied in the budget, 
and who supported the power of the House of Lords. The 
contention therefore that a more vigorous policy of social 
reform would have won increased electoral support for the 
Liberals is probably not, as it stands, an acceptable 
thesis. If, however, such reform had been coupled with an 
aggressive foreign and anti-Irish policy, then the likelihood 
of the Liberals being more successful at the polls would 
have been much greater.
It is true that the Liberals' sympathy for the Irish 
cause earned them the opposition of many voters, and its 
lingering on as an unfinished issue for several decades may 
well have absorbed Liberal time and attention that might 
have been devoted to further social issues. But the fault 
for this must go to the Conservatives, and particularly to 
the House of Lords. It was the Lords that rejected the Home 
Rule Bill of 1893 and therefore were responsible for the 
continuance of this issue as a problem in British politics. 
Until the outbreak of World War I the Liberals were forced 
to wage a constant political struggle with the Lords. Time 
after time the upper house rejected Liberal measures, be­
coming in a sense an extension of the Conservative opposi­
tion, or as Lloyd George put it, Mr. Balfour's Poodle. Not
once throughout the Home Rule era was a Conservative bill 
52rejected, while advanced Liberal measures were not only
52Anthony Sampson, Anatomy of Britain (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1962), p. 24.
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obstructed in the House of Commons by amendments and embit­
tered debate, but were eventually nullified in the upper 
house if the Conservative leaders so requested. The Lords 
had long advertised themselves, without any conspicuous 
show of humility, as an august, cautious, and grave body, 
carefully guarding the traditions of the constitution. But 
when in 1894 they rejected in a few days bills which the 
Liberals had labored over for almost a year they displayed 
a reckless disregard for the will of the people that earned 
them the condemnation of the one man who could lend in­
calculable prestige and respectability to a cause— the 
reform of the House of Lords— which had hitherto seemed 
extremely radical. That man of course was Gladstone.
From time to time there had been various calls for 
changes in the upper chamber, but none of these had succeed­
ed in winning much support. When, however, Gladstone threw 
his immense prestige behind this cause in 1894 it not only 
became a part of Liberal 'policy, but within eighteen years 
was enacted into law. What had become intolerable was the 
increasingly contemptuous rejection by the Lords of so much 
Liberal legislation. In one session alone, that of 1893- 
1894, they rejected such major measures as the Employers' 
Liability Bill, the Salmon Fisheries Bill, and the Home Rule
Bill. In addition they so amended the Parish Councils Bill
53that it lost much of its meaning. "It was, therefore,"
5-*The Prime Ministers' Papers: W. E. Gladstone, Vol.
I: Autobiographica, ed. by John Brooke and Mary Sorenson
(London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971), p. 119.
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Gladstone wrote, "not too much to say that they had destroy­
ed the year's work which had cost the House of Commons two
54hundred nights of labour."
If the Lords were permitted the constitutional power 
to reject whatever legislation they wished, the Reform Acts 
and the Ballot Act would be rendered almost meaningless. The 
reconstruction of the political system to insure that the 
House of Commons represented the people was a mere facade 
if the will of the people could not receive legislative ex­
pression. As long as the Lords retained a veto power over 
the House of Commons this was a distinct possibility. The 
Liberals therefore, led by Gladstone, undertook to remove 
this power. In 1894, when they had rejected most of Glad­
stone's major legislation, he proposed to resign and call an 
election on this issue. "It appeared to me,” he wrote,
that they had . . . given us an opportunity, so 
brilliant as could not have been hoped for of raising 
the question between the two Houses by a dissolution. 
They had in their intemperance committed themselves 
to a hopeless p o s i t i o n . 55
But a majority of the cabinet were reluctant to take this 
step, and Gladstone, therefore, because of his age, 
dropped the matter. He could not help feeling, however, 
that the Liberals had missed "one of the finest opportun­
ities ever offered to statesmen." The Lords, Gladstone 
noted in extremely critical terms, "were not so far gone 
in idiocy as to refuse all concessions on the Parish
5 4 Ibid., I, 116.
55Ibid., I, 119.
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57Councils Bill." But at "this cheap and insignificant price 
they were allowed to walk peaceably out of the impasse in
C O
which they had lodged themselves."
When a few weeks later, he made his last speech in
the House of Commons, he launched a vigorous attack on the 
59upper house. This was a fitting and revealing close to 
the political career of a man who had begun as a high Tory 
and had moved throughout his life, though perhaps often 
rather slowly, in a liberal and democratic direction, until 
in the end he was prepared to undertake the removal of the 
last overt aristocratic barrier to the expression of the 
will of the people. Though his colleagues were unwilling, 
due to a combination of both political and philosophic 
motives, to follow him in 1894 they were forced, within a
5 6 Ibid., I, 120.
5 7 Ibid., I, 120.
58Ibid., I, 120. It is interesting to note that 
Gladstone held a very low view of the constitutional prac­
tice which required that the government dissolve the House 
of Commons and go through the throes of an election if it 
could not get its legislation through the Lords. He des­
cribed it as follows:
"A marvellous conception I On such a dissolution, if 
the country disapproved of the conduct of its represen­
tatives, it would cashier them: but, if it disapproved
of the conduct of the Peers, it would simply have to 
see them resume their place of power to employ it to 
the best of their ability as opportunity might serve, 
in thwarting the desires of the country expressed 
through its representatives." Ibid., I, 104.
e g
The Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 4th 
ser., Vol. 21 (5 Feb.-5 Mar., 1894), cols. 1146-52.
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few years, under the leadership of Sir Henry Campbell- 
Bannerman, to renew this campaign. The presumptuousness of 
the Lords in rejecting Liberal measures after 1906 is in­
credible in light of the fact that the Liberals had a work­
ing majority in the House of Commons of 350 members, the 
strongest position any Party had enjoyed since the Reform 
Bill of 1832.^^ "It is plainly intolerable," Campbell- 
Bannerman stated, "that a second Chamber should, while one 
party . . .  is in power, be its willing servant, and when 
that party has received unmistakable and emphatic condemna­
tion by the country, be able itself to neutralise and thwart 
and distort the policy the electors have shown they ap­
prove."®^ It was obvious, he concluded, that the House of
62Lords had become "a mere annexe of the Unionist Party."
The event which spurred the Liberals to final action 
was the rejection of their budget in 1909. Whether the 
Lords possessed the constitutional authority to reject the 
budget was highly questionable. Lloyd George, however, had 
injected into it a number of measures designed to attain a 
moderate redistribution of the national income. This, in 
addition to the various social reforms which the Liberals 
had enacted, was too much for the Conservatives. Fearing
fi 0Fyfe, The British Liberal Party, p. 167.
6*The Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 4th 
ser.. Vol. 167 (Dec. 11-21, 1907), cols. 1739-40.
®^Ibid., 4th ser., Vol. 176 (June 14-26, 1907), col.
916.
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the consequences for their own social and economic position
they determined to use the Lords to maintain the status 
63quo. The fear and bitterness which Liberal policies en­
gendered in Conservatives during these years reverberated 
through social as well as political life. The American am­
bassador, Walter Hines Page, described their reaction as 
follows:
You see their fear of an on-sweeping democracy in their 
social treatment of party opponents. A Tory lady told 
me with tears that she could no longer invite her 
Liberal friends to her house: "I have lost them— they
are robbing us, you k n o w . "64
It was obviously impossible for the Liberals to govern 
effectively if the House of Lords could force them into an 
election when they so desired. The Liberals therefore, in 
the midst of bitter political dispute, enacted the Parlia­
ment Bill, which finally abolished the Lords' absolute veto. 
It left to them however, the power to delay most legislation 
for a period of two years. This was a rather conservative 
measure compared to the six-month suspensive veto which 
Campbell-Bannerman had proposed in 1907,65 and it would prove 
disastrous to the success of the Third Home Rule Bill. How­
ever, it meant that the Conservatives could no longer block 
Liberal legislation permanently. At least they could no
63Hobson, The Crisis of Liberalism: New Issues of
Democracy, pp. x-xi.
®^Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter 
H. Page (3 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page
& Company, 1926), I, 145.
65Spender, Life of Campbell-Bannerman, II, 357.
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longer do so within the existing constitutional framework.
The only channel left to them was extra-legal. It was in
fact rebellion against the government. It was civil war;
and the Conservatives were not deterred by this prospect.
On the contrary they proceeded to prepare for it, justifying
their actions on the grounds that the government had become
6 6a "revolutionary committee." The rationale for this 
charge lay in the assumption that the Liberals had curtailed 
the power of the Lords by illegal means, by threatening to 
create a large number of new peers. Though the practice of 
creating new peers was not common, it was certainly not 
illegal, as Conservatives in moments of calm must very well 
have known. They were incensed, however, by the fact that 
they had at last lost the power to control legislation, to 
control the nature of the social order; and they were haunted 
by the knowledge that the Liberals, in alliance with Labor 
and the Irish Nationalists, would be able to enact legisla­
tion, and particularly Home Rule for Ireland, despite their 
opposition. Behind the scarcasm and humor there was a good 
deal of truth in Lloyd George's famous characterization of 
Conservative attitudes. "At the back of the Tory mind," he 
said,
you find this: Tories firmly believe that Providence
has singled them out to govern this land. They think 
that they are the governing classes, and that if they 
are not governing there must be something wrong. In 
1906 they were turned out of power. They thought it
66Blake, Unrepentent Tory, p. 130.
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was just a temporary visitation. . . . But when a second 
election came with the same result and a third election 
came and Radicals were still in power, the Tories be­
came troubled. They saw Radical bills go through Par­
liament and, what was still worse, they found Tories 
were expected to obey them as if they were common 
people. ® 7
During the Home Rule era the possibility of. a demo­
cratic political system came into existence in England for 
the first time. It was the product of various factors. 
Although philosophic commitment played a part, it also 
received a strong impetus from the interplay of party 
politics and the desire of one party or the other to appeal 
to the interests of a particular social group. In 1867 the 
Conservatives made a bid for the urban worker's support; 
in 1884 the Liberals made a similar pitch for the votes 
of the rural worker. Despite the opportunism involved in 
the advent of democracy, the practical consequences for 
the reform of society were the same. Entirely new elec­
toral classes could now exercise the franchise, they had 
the opportunity to elect their own members to Parliament, 
to frame legislation that would actualize their own ideas.
The value, efficacy, and equity of that legislation would be 
determined by the majority of the people, not as previously 
by the members of the upper and upper middle classes.
Theories of social justice which were based on the privileges 
or egocentric aspirations of a particular class and designed
67"Mr. Lloyd George and His Critics: Speech at
the National Liberal Club," The Times, July 2, 1913, p. 13.
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to maintain in a largely unaltered form the privileges and 
the position of that class would presumably be no longer 
accepted. The old economic laws which justified the in­
violability of property and laissez-faire were abandoned.
The Liberal Party in particular, though also to some extent 
the Tory social imperialists, accepted the theory that gov­
ernment could rightly intervene to secure a more equitable 
distribution of the national income. There was, as John 
Maynard Keynes pointed out, "no 'compact1 conferring per-
6 8petual rights on those who Have or on those who Acquire."
If the majority wished to maintain the existing social 
order, they were perfectly free to do so. Should they 
choose, on the other hand, to restructure society in a less 
inegalitarian way, they also had the right— and the legal 
political power— to do that.
Consciousness of this important fact explains why 
many Conservatives acquiesced reluctantly in the democrat­
ization of the political system. While accepting the various 
political reforms, they took consolation in the fact that 
they still possessed one seemingly impregnable barrier 
against unacceptable social change. That barrier was the 
House of Lords. But when the Liberals removed this last 
defense many Conservatives became extremely apprehensive. 
Their decision to resort to civil war revealed conclusively 
that they had not, in the final analysis, fully accepted the
g o
Keynes, The End of Laissez-faire, p. 39.
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underlying principles of democracy.
The Liberals, on the other hand, though often pro­
ceeding doubtfully, reluctantly, and against internal fac­
tional opposition, had nevertheless proceeded to adopt and 
extend political and social reforms. When the various demo­
cratically oriented measures which they enacted during this 
period are juxtaposed, it is possible to see the extent and 
direction in which both Liberalism and society were being 
transformed. Liberal legislation not only aimed at creating 
greater cultural and material opportunity and equity for the 
working class but also struck down aristocratic privilege in 
many areas. It was the Liberals, for example, who began the 
reforms in education which led to free and compulsory ele­
mentary education for all children. It was they who init­
iated the programs of free school meals and free medical in­
spection. It was they who enacted the Workingmen's Compen­
sation Act, the Old-Age Pensions Act, sickness insurance, 
unemployment insurance, a graduated inheritance tax, and a 
more steeply graduated income tax. It was they who dis­
established such privileged bodies as the Anglican Church in 
Ireland and in Wales, they who abolished the religious tests 
at Oxford and Cambridge, who struck down the purchase of 
commissions in the army, and who opened the civil service to 
all citizens through competitive examination. It was they 
finally who abolished the power of the House of Lords to 
permanently veto legislation and thwart the will of the 
newly created democracy.
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This is not to imply that the Conservatives did not 
also play a role in the advancement of political and social 
reforms or that the motives of the Liberals were always pure. 
Certainly the interplay of party politics, political expedi­
ency, and the pressures of various interests were significant 
factors. However, since the Liberal Party contained within 
it a working class element, it was imperative that it adopt 
certain policies that would appeal to their interests and 
win their continued support. Conservatives attempted to win 
working class support too, but they relied more on the ap­
peal of imperialism— and opposition to the Irish— promising 
improved social conditions as a result of a successful 
imperial policy. Consequently the number of effective 
social reforms which they enacted during all their years in 
office was rather limited.
The question arises as to why, if the Liberals were 
pursuing such seemingly enlightened policies, the Party won 
only one general election decisively after 1880, why it was 
almost constantly out of office between 1886 and 1906, why 
it lost so much support in the two elections of 1910, and 
why it declined so disastrously after World War I. It is 
not required by the purpose of this chapter to explain why 
the Liberal Party declined. Its function is to describe 
what the nature of Liberalism was during this period in 
order to explain, elucidate, and make understandable its 
policies and attitudes toward Ireland, to reveal the similar­
ities and contrasts between those policies and attitudes and
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those of the Conservatives, and to clarify the causes there­
of. However, it will be useful to draw from this description 
some brief conclusions as to why the Liberal Party may have
declined. Two principal factors seem to stand out: One was
the nature and objectives of the Party itself; the other was
the nature and sentiments of the British electorate and the
existence and policies of the Conservative and Labor Parties.
It was an important factor that after 1886 the 
Liberal Party was caught between two conflicting pressures.
It embodied elements of two classes, with largely anti­
thetical objectives. On the right it included a rather con­
servative element representative of the middle class. This 
group was often reluctant to make concessions to working 
class opinion. It was generally opposed to extensive social 
reform. It tended to act as a brake on the Party, to with­
draw from it entirely, as Lord Rosebery did, or to join the 
Conservatives, as many did after World War I, the most 
notable example being Winston Churchill. On the left, on 
the other hand, were the Lib-Labs, a small group represen­
tative of some segments of working class opinion. This 
group persistently confronted the Party with a demand for 
social reform and for labor legislation. The Liberals there­
fore were attempting to represent elements of two different 
classes, the entrepreneurs and the workers. To the extent 
that the goals of these two classes conflicted, the Party 
was forced to compromise and to temporize.
In addition to this difficulty the Liberals were
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confronted with the competition of two political parties-- 
the Conservatives on the right, and the rising Labor Party 
on the left. These two parties posed an insurmountable 
problem for them. As Liberalism became more reformist- 
oriented, the Party found that it could never represent the 
entrepreneurs as convincingly as the Conservatives. In 
addition the generally cosmopolitan and democratic spirit 
of the Liberals prevented them from out-maneuvering the 
Conservatives on foreign and imperial policy. In an age of 
militaristic and imperial aggressiveness, in an age of war 
scares and arms races, of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism and its 
concomitant contempt for the Irish, the Liberals were 
largely identified in the public mind as the Party of weak­
ness and retreat. It was impossible for them to get to the 
right of the Conservatives on these issues. The famous 
jingoistic jingle of the 1870s, the mafficking of Mafeking 
night, the bellicosity of the slogan, "We want eight, and 
we won't wait"— all reveal that the Liberals could never 
outdo the Conservatives in appealing to these sentiments. It 
is noteworthy that in the one election which the Liberals 
won decisively after 1880, that of 1906, this racist and 
jingoistic spirit may in fact have worked in their favor.
D. C. Somervell states that because of the opposition to the 
importation of cheap Chinese labor into the Transvaal "the 
most effective Liberal poster" in the election of 1906 "was 
a hideous yellow Chinese face." "Whether this poster," 
Somervell concludes, "won votes for Liberalism because we
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hated Chinamen or because we hated the enslavement of China-
69men, is far from clear."
If the Liberals could not outbid the Conservatives 
on the right, they had a similar problem with the Labor 
Party on the left. This Party had arisen to fill -a political 
vacuum. After the franchise was extended in 1867 and 1884 
a new group of voters demanded representation. Either the 
Conservative or the Liberal Party would have to alter its 
makeup, philosophy, and policies if it wished to garner the 
support of these new electoral classes. Both parties made 
a bid for this support. The Conservatives combined national­
ism and imperialism with the promise of full employment, 
higher living standards, and even some collectivist social 
reform— if their imperialist policies were successful. The 
Liberals also made occasional bids to appeal to imperialist 
sentiment, but their principal weapon was the actual enact­
ment of social and labor legislation. However, they could 
never represent the goals of the workers as credibly or as 
forcefully as the Labor Party. Caught therefore between
these two forces, they lost ground on both sides, and in
70the end sank to the level of a third and minor party.
69Somervell, English Thought, p. 190.
70In a recent study of the Liberal Party in the period 
1906-1914 Peter Rowland finds that the decline of the Party 
was not at all obvious on the eve of World War I and con­
cludes that the indications were— had the war not occurred—  
that in a general election held in 1915 the Liberals would 
probably again have emerged victorious. See Peter Rowland, 
The Last Liberal Governments (2 vols.; London: Cresset
Press, 1968-1971).
CHAPTER VI
DIVERSITY AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE PERCEPTION 
OF LIBERAL ATTITUDES TOWARD IRELAND
Our neglect [of the Irish] has been infamous. ^
— John Morley
Ireland has always been governed, not by Irishmen or 
for Irishmen, but by Englishmen for the bastard Anglo- 
Irish. . . .  «
— Sir William Harcourt
What weighs upon my mind is this— that when the 
future historian speaks of the greatness of this Empire, 
and traces the manner in which it has grown through suc­
cessive generations, he will say that in that history 
there was one chapter of disgrace, and that that was the 
treatment of Ireland. _
--W. E. Gladstone
In our analysis of the Conservative self-image we saw 
that in every commendable area of human endeavor the Con­
servatives viewed themselves as highly superior to the 
Irish. There was no important area of achievement in which 
they saw the Irish as surpassing or even remotely approach­
ing the level of accomplishment which they, and the English 
people in general, had attained. In fact the Irish were
Hlorley, Recollections, I, 178.
2 Gardiner, Life of Sir William Harcourt, II, 151.
^Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 
3d ser., Vol. 288 (May 12-June 10, 1884), col. 607.
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considered to be so far behind in cultural and mental develp- 
ment that it was idle to look for points of comparison.
This lowly image of the Irish and the correspondingly ele­
vated Conservative image of themselves formed one of the 
essential bases of Conservative justification for their 
domination and rule of Ireland. It was on this foundation 
that Conservatives built the proposition that they were per­
forming there a selfless and charitable civilizing mission.
Given the composition, philosophy, and objectives of 
the Liberal Party it is not surprising to find that until 
the era of the Second Reform Bill there was very little dif­
ference between the attitude and policies of the two polit­
ical parties toward Ireland. To be sure it is possible to 
retreat into the history of Anglo-Irish relations and find 
isolated criticisms of British behavior, such, for example, 
as Charles James Fox's famous assertion that "we ought not 
to presume to legislate for a nation in whose feelings and 
affections, wants and interests, opinions and prejudices, 
we have no sympathy. " 4 But such criticisms were the product 
of isolated voices crying in a hostile wilderness, and as 
such they were largely ignored until Liberalism during the 
Home Rule era began to undergo the transformation which is 
described in the preceding chapter. As long as the Whigs 
dominated the Liberal Party the attitude and policies of 
that Party toward Ireland differed little from those of the
4Quoted in Fyfe, The British Liberal Party, p. 85.
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Conservatives. The Whig self-image was certainly not less 
flattering than its Conservative counterpart; and the Whig 
and Conservative images of the Irish were likewise indis­
tinguishable.
It was this similarity not only in their attitude 
toward Ireland but in their approach to social problems which 
gradually drew the Whigs closer to the Conservatives until 
they eventually fused in the Conservative, or Unionist,
Party. The withdrawal of the Whigs, and with them the Rad­
ical Unionists, left the Liberal Party a less heterogeneous 
and factionalized entity— especially on Irish issues. It 
did not, however, become a homogeneous unit because there 
still remained within it a division between the Gladstonians 
who generally opposed the new jingoistic imperialism and the 
Liberal imperialists who tended to support it. The most 
prominant member of this group was Lord Rosebery. He had 
been the Queen's personal choice for foreign secretary in 
1892 and on Gladstone's retirement in 1894 he took over the 
leadership of the Party. He was supported by such prominant 
Liberals as the future prime minister Herbert Asquith, by 
Sir Edward Grey, and by R. B. Haldane. While Rosebery re­
mained a staunch advocate of the new imperialism and eventu­
ally withdrew from the Liberal Party because of its social 
and imperial policies, his followers did not adhere to these 
policies with the same degree of inflexibility. After the 
Boer War in fact many of Rosebery's most prominant supporters 
quietly discarded the more aggressive aspects of their
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imperialism. Asquith, Grey, and Haldane were all members of 
the Liberal governments that granted union to the states of 
South Africa and undertook various reforms for India, in an 
attempt to evolve democratic and self-governing institutions 
there.
Nor did Rosebery's followers support him in his op­
position to Home Rule. As leader of the Liberal Party in 
1894 Rosebery had stated in the House of Lords that until 
a majority of the English people, as distinct from the 
Scottish, Welsh, and Irish, had given their approval to Home 
Rule that measure should not be enacted. Rosebery practic­
ally isolated himself on this issue. Neither Asquith, Grey, 
nor Haldane explicitly supported his position, and, as in 
the case of the South African and Indian reforms, these three 
men were leading members of the government that enacted the 
third Home Rule Bill. Nor is it right to assume that the 
Liberals had abandoned Home Rule after 1894 and that they 
re-adopted it in 1910 only because they needed Nationalist 
support in the House of Commons if they wished to remain in 
office. Most of them had in fact made no secret of the 
point that Home Rule was still a part of their program. In 
addition it was fully consistent with the policies they were 
pursuing in South Africa and India. In fact the Liberals 
had not waited until 1910 to advance a measure of self- 
government for Ireland. In 1907, when they had an over­
whelming majority in the House of Commons, and had no need 
of Irish support, they proposed an evolutionary measure of
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self-government which Redmond at first accepted, then my­
steriously rejected.^ It is true to say, however, that Home 
Rule ceased to play in British politics the conspicuous role 
it played prior to 1894. But this was not because Liberals 
were opposed to it. It was simply because they were not in 
office, and consequently Home Rule was not a practical 
problem. The fact is that in 1886 Gladstone pinned Home 
Rule to the banner of the Liberal Party and thereafter it 
was never removed. By that date a new attitude toward 
English rule in Ireland had been adopted by most Liberals 
and this continued henceforth to be the predominant moti­
vating influence on the Liberal posture toward that country.
The adoption of the view that the Liberals harbored 
serious prejudices against the Irish, and that the law and 
administration they maintained in Ireland were geared pri­
marily to the ambitions and objectives of the Anglo-Irish 
class and to the aims of British imperialism, was primarily 
a development of the period 1868-1886. As a number of 
Liberals came to recognize and acknowledge the pervasion 
among themselves of deep-seated anti-Irish prejudices, they 
proceeded to re-evaluate the mental and moral makeup of the 
Irish and their self-governing capacities. The developments
e
There are conflicting reports as to why Redmond 
rejected this offer. For two differing interpretations see 
Leon dBroin, The Chief Secretary: Augustine Birrell in
Ireland (London: Chatto & Windus, 1969), pp. 14-15 and
Denis Gwynn, The Life of John Redmond (London: George G.
Harrap & Co., 1932), pp. 137-48.
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which brought about a major readjustment in the Liberal 
posture toward Ireland were twofold: One was the extension
of the franchise in 1867 and 1384, along with the enactment 
of the Ballot Act, which revealed that Irish sentiment was 
overwhelmingly in favor of Home Rule; the other was the 
constant charge by a small group of Liberals that British 
policies in Ireland were unjust and that they should be 
reformed. By the mid-1880s therefore a new Liberal posture 
toward Ireland had emerged, and since this remained reason­
ably constant thereafter, it is predominantly with the 
nature and growth of this new outlook as it developed in 
the period 1868-1886 that this chapter will deal.
One of the most conspicuous points about the trans­
formation of Liberal attitudes toward Ireland was the fact 
that it was the achievement of a mere handful of dedicated 
men. What is more surprising, even ironic, is the fact that 
some of those who contributed most to the formation of this 
new outlook later became vehement anti-Home Rulers. The 
most outstanding political name in this group was that of 
John Bright. Among those Radicals who broke with Gladstone 
in 1886, he was almost unique; for while most of them were 
enthusiastic adherents of the new imperialism, Bright's 
entire career had been molded in an older tradition. His 
long record of support for the policy of pacifistic cosmo­
politanism was seemingly incompatible with the aggressive­
ness, emotionalism, and militarism inherent in the new im­
perialism. And yet despite this, Bright succumbed to an
217
emotionalism not unlike that which characterized late nine­
teenth-century jingoism. His attitude toward Ireland became 
highly charged with nationalism and with the self-righteous­
ness to which he was always rather susceptible. He developed 
an impregnable conviction that England had the right to 
legislate for and administer Ireland in all matters, and an 
unshakable faith that for Ireland such legislation and ad­
ministration could only be, all in all, beneficial. This 
attitude was even more puzzling in light of the fact that 
he had long been among the vanguard of those Liberals who 
had criticized English rule in Ireland for its many injustices. 
In the early attempts to create a more sympathetic approach 
to Irish problems Bright was among the few men who undertook 
and maintained this task against overwhelming and bitter 
opposition. He denounced English policies as predominantly 
class oriented, condemning both their ends and their methods.
It is perhaps safe to say that few men did more than Bright 
to make Liberals aware of the inequity of the social system 
they sanctioned in Ireland and to mold in them a new and 
more accurate concept of the consequences of English legis­
lative and administrative behavior there. In fact until 
Gladstone joined this campaign in 1868 Bright waged it am- 
most single-handedly.  ^ Englishmen, he persistently reiter­
ated in Parliament and on the public platform, had almost
®R. Barry O'Brien, John Bright: A Monograph (London:
Smith, Elder & Co., 1910), p. 1.
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invariably ruled Ireland by the methods of coercion and
extraordinary law, methods made necessary by the desire to
maintain English dominion and the supremacy of a particular
class. "The sword," he stated,
has scarcely ever been out of the hand of the governing 
power in Ireland. And if a fair, simple, and unadorned 
narrative were given of the transactions of this Par­
liament with Ireland, with regard to its different 
enactments— coercive restrictions, suspensions of the 
Habeas Corpus Act, and so forth— it would form a narra­
tive which would really astonish the world and would 
greatly discredit us. . . . Many victims have perished 
on the scaffold in Ireland, and . . . the fields of 
Ireland have been more than once drenched with the 
blood of her people.?
If the Irish were engaged, or seemed to be engaged, 
in perennial insurrection and agrarian crime, this, in 
Bright's view, was a product of the social conditions which 
Englishmen had created. Ireland "is a country," he stated, 
"where there has been, for generations past, a general sense 
of wrong, out of which has grown a chronic state of in-
g
surrection. . . . "  He characterized English behavior in 
Ireland as despotic, comparable only to the practices of 
the despots who ruled in the countries of Eastern Europe, 
men whose autocratic temper and system of government English­
men usually looked upon with contempt. Ireland, he said, 
constitutes
a miserable and humiliating picture. . . . Bear in mind 
that I am not speaking of Poland suffering under the
7
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 
3d ser., Vol. 191 (Mar. 23-May 8 , 1868), col. 651.
Q
R. Barry O'Brien, John Bright; A Monograph, p. 2.
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conquest of Russia. . . . I am not speaking about 
Hungary, or of Venice as she was under the rule of 
Austria,or of the Greeks under the dominion of the 
Turk, but I am speaking of Ireland— part of the United 
Kingdom— part of that which boasts itself to be the 
most civilized and the most Christian nation in the 
world.9
Besides attempting to enlighten Englishmen about the 
nature of their rule in Ireland, Bright also tried to make 
them aware of the enormous prejudices they harbored toward 
the Irish people. He condemned the religious prejudice 
which underlay the opposition to the disestablishment of 
the Anglican Church in that predominantly Catholic country.
He asserted that the English have shown, with respect to 
this issue, "very little statesmanship and very much neg­
lect. . . .  I think we ought to take shame to ourselves," 
he observed, "and . . . try to get rid of some of our anti­
quated prejudices on this matter, and look at it as men 
. . . whose vision is not impaired by the passionate con­
dition of things which in this country has so often prevailed 
with regard to this q u e s t i o n . W h a t  Englishmen must do 
is discard their prejudices and adopt a new posture— one 
"which is liberal and generous and just. . . . "**■
And yet despite these enlightened sentiments it was 
Bright who in 1881 urged Gladstone to denounce Parnell
9 Ibid., p. 2 .
^ Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons)
3d ser., Vol. 191 (Mar. 23-May 8 , 1868), col. 652.
11Ibid., 3d ser., Vol. 250 (Feb. 5-28, 1880), col.
870.
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publicly when the latter sought through a system of boycotts
12to attain some relief for Irish tenants. It was he who
finally convinced the Radical Unionists in 1886 to vote
against Gladstone's Home Rule Dill.^ As he grew older
Bright became increasingly conservative. James L. Sturgis
writes that "his last years in public life were a real 
14tragedy." He had become "Conservative in all but name,"
and yet he was unable to bring himself to join formally "the
15other side of the House." A supporter of national autonomy
for the continental minorities, he could not concede that
the case of Ireland was analagous. So opposed was he to any
move that might weaken the political union of Great Britain
and Ireland that he actually took up the defense of certain
traditional aristocratic institutions as a barrier against
it. Gladstone's proposal to grant self-government to the
Irish, Sturgis writes, "soured Bright so much" that he
resorted to "defending many aspects of politics for which
16his previous approval would have been unthinkable." The 
climax of this transition occurred in 1887 when he spoke
12James L. Sturgis, John Bright and the Empire 
(London: Athlone Press, 1969), p. 170.
^Morley, Life of Gladstone, III, 336.
14Sturgis, John Bright and the Empire, p. 175.
1 5 Ibid., p. 175.
16Ibid., p. 175.
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admiringly of the "enormous influence" of the House of 
17Lords, an act which seems to have been in complete dishar­
mony with his entire previous political career.
Why did Bright and the Radical Unionists, who gen­
erally saw themselves as the leading advocates of democracy, 
and at times had been the most outspoken critics of Whig 
and Conservative policies in Ireland, suddenly become so 
hostile to Irish demands? The answer in part may well lie 
in the word "demands." It is important to note that the 
Radical Unionists assumed an extremely patronizing posture 
toward the Irish. This would seem to have conflicted with 
their democratic principles, insofar as those principles 
meant more than simply votes for Englishmen. Having adopted 
the ethnocentric mantle of imperialism, and having come to 
place the requirements of an English export market in Ireland 
above the self-governing aspirations of the Irish people, 
they proceeded to tailor, or perhaps sacrifice, their demo­
cratic and reformist policies to their imperialist objec­
tives. This chauvinistic impulse helped convince them that 
British rule in Ireland was essentially just. They there­
fore came to resent Irish demands and the coercive and un­
lawful means that were used to secure them. R. C. K. Ensor 
writes that in general the Radical Unionists believed that 
justice was being done in Ireland, and they felt that the 
resort to boycotts and agrarian crime was consequently
17Ibid., p. 175.
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unnecessary and was compromising "England's reputation for 
18fair dealing." Moreover, since they were "intensely
patriotic," they resented Irish actions "as an affront to 
19England." They looked upon Irish demands as a rather
impertinent challenge, a challenge which evoked in. them "a
20peculiar kind of patriotic impulse." This patriotism was 
extremely nationalistic. It was one of the essential ingredi­
ents in the new aggressive imperialism, an imperialism which 
combined a high degree of national self-exaltation with a 
correspondingly inverse opinion of the nature and capabil­
ities of the Irish.
Not all Englishmen, however, succumbed to the seem­
ingly magnetic appeal of the various self-adulative, ego­
centric, and aggressive forces embodied in the new imperial­
ism. A number of Liberals, following perhaps in the "Little 
England" tradition, and in that set by Gladstone in the 
1870s, nurtured serious reservations about the aggressiveness 
of British imperialism as it revealed itself in such events 
as the Fashoda crisis and the Boer War. In so doing they 
developed a highly critical view of certain aspects of 
British imperialist activities, as was evidenced, for ex­
ample, by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Lloyd George
18 "Some Political and Economic Interactions in Later 
Victorian England," Transactions of the Royal Historical 
Society, 4th ser., Vol. XXXI (1949), p. 27.
1 9 Ibid., p. 27.
20Ibid., p. 27.
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during the Boer War. As early as 1868 Sir William Harcourt
had criticized the oppressiveness of English administration
in Ireland. "England," he wrote, "has already enough and
21too much of the blood of Ireland on its hands." Although
Harcourt called for a new dispensation, this was not immedi­
ately inaugurated. The leader of the Liberal Party,
William Gladstone, was in complete sympathy with Harcourt's 
statement, but as long as he was unwilling or unable, for 
political reasons, to defy the intransigent Whig element in 
the Party it was impossible for him to pursue these ideas 
fully. In the early 1880s therefore the Whigs were able to
draw Gladstone into a policy of coercion in Ireland very
22much against his sympathies and inclination.
A number of Liberals bitterly criticized this renewed 
resort to coercion. They condemned English behavior as 
autocratic and arbitrary. When Gladstone warned the Nation­
alist M.P.s in 1881 that he would not tolerate their support 
of the Land League, and then proceeded to incarcerate a 
number of them, including Parnell, he aroused vociferous 
and indignant opposition from a small but important element
in his own Party. The Liberal M.P. Joseph Cowen character-
23ized British behavior as uncivilized. It was "in principle
21Quoted in Gardiner, Life of Harcourt, I, 180-81.
22Fyfe, The British Liberal Party, p. 85, and Slesser, 
A History of the Liberal Party, p. 116.
23Quoted in Davitt, The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland,
p. 334.
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and spirit," he stated, no different from that which had
"filled" French jails during the Second Empire, making them
a "chamber of horrors," and which is "now darkening the high-
24ways that lead to Siberian mines." Henry Labouchere took
25a similar view. The "eviction of tenants who could not
possibly pay their rents through no fault of their own," he
26declared, "was palpable injustice."
But the man who perhaps held the bleakest view of 
Liberal attitudes and policies toward Ireland was John 
Morley. In the attempt to reveal to Liberals the real na­
ture of their conduct Morley was the successor to John 
Bright. Writing in the Pall Mall Gazette and the Fortnightly 
Review he constantly attacked the self-righteousness of 
Liberal behavior. The moral certitude and aura of infal­
libility which permeated the attitude of most Liberals and 
which made possible the perpetual employment of coercion and 
the suspension of ordinary law infuriated him. He could not 
understand how so many Liberals could hold such a lofty 
image of themselves and why they were unable to see them­
selves and their administration of Ireland as they actually 
were. Their tone, he wrote, "makes me boil. Parnell ought 
to be hung— transported— blown from a gun— anything you
2 4 Ibid., p. 334.
25Thorold, The Life of Henry Labouchere, pp. 151-52.
26Ibid., p. 152.
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27please1 Thxs sort of insane rage hardens my heart."
While travelling in Ireland in 1882 he found that officials
were utterly peremptory in their conduct toward the Irish,
that the display of authority was often more important to
them than the protection of the innocent, and that they were
usually unconcerned as to whether the men they arrested were
guilty. Such matters, he was told, were not important "so
2 8long as somebody or other was arrested." Morley believed 
that in the long run the prime objective of British policy 
should be to win the sympathy and support of the Irish 
people. He disagreed with those Liberals who felt that this 
could be achieved only through the exercise of arbitrary 
authority. In an article in the Fortnightly Review in 18 81 
he wrote:
England . . . had and still has a given thing to do, a 
given problem to solve. Her task is not merely to pre­
serve law and order, . . . but to lay the foundations 
of good and settled government, and one of the first 
conditions of securing this is to conciliate the Irish 
population. To do this it is above all things indis­
pensable to make that population believe that our sym­
pathies are on their side. The Irish never have 
believed this; they have had no very great reason to 
believe it; and the Coercion Act29 is the worst possible 
argument for making them believe it. It is in the eyes 
of the Irish the regular and accepted symbol of our 
sympathy, not with them, but with those whom justly or
27Morley, Recollections, I, 174.
2 8 Ibid., I, 181.
29This act, suspending habeas corpus and ordinary law 
in Ireland, had been passed in 1881. Such acts, usually 
running for a specified period, were legion in the nine­
teenth century.
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not they regard as their oppressors. It always has 
been thus; we cannot be surprised if it still wears in 
their eyes its old and hated c o l o u r s . 30
It is obvious that for a number of years before the 
Liberal Party split occurred in 1886 a widening gulf emerged 
between those Liberals who perceived themselves as striving 
charitably, industriously, and dutifully to bring justice, 
order, and prosperity to a people who were steeped in 
ingratitude and agrarian crime, and those who visualized 
the English as imposing autocratically a ruthlessly unjust 
social system on the Irish people in order to protect and 
maintain an alien landowning class and the authority of 
British imperial rule. Gladstone seemed to share the per­
ception and attitudes of the latter group. He seemed to 
indicate this when he assumed the premiership for the first 
time in 1868 by stating specifically that his mission was 
to pacify Ireland, and by proceeding during that first 
administration to address himself to the two predominant 
Irish grievances— the church and the land. When he resumed 
office in 1880 he found that his previous land reforms had 
been insufficient, that further reform was required, and 
that in addition the Irish demand for Home Rule had become 
more formidable with the rise of the Nationalist Party. 
Moreover, agrarian crime in Ireland had seriously increased. 
Gladstone thus was caught between the Whigs on one side
John Morley, "England and Ireland," The Fort 
nightly Review, XXXV (April 1, 1881), 412.
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who demanded strong coercion and strict adherence to the 
law, and Liberals such as Morley and Labouchere on the other 
who demanded the redress of Irish grievances and a policy of 
conciliation. Confronted with these conflicting alternatives, 
Gladstone, concerned with the problem of placating both 
groups and holding the Party together, decided to enact 
elements of both programs— to pursue further land reforms 
but to follow a policy of coercion at the same time, to 
appease the left and the right of his Party. It would ap­
pear that his own sympathies, however, were opposed to the 
coercive, autocratic, and arbitrary system of government 
which was demanded by the right wing of the Liberal Party.
In 1882, therefore, he abandoned it and arranged to have 
Parnell and other Nationalist M.P.s released from prison, 
an act that forced his chief secretary in Ireland, W. E. 
Forster, to resign in protest.
In attempting to abandon the practice of extreme 
coercion Gladstone was in fact rejecting his own previous 
policies. He had adopted coercion less out of conviction 
than for political and Party expediency, and his decision 
to abandon it raised a storm of protest not only from Con­
servatives but among the right wing of his own Party.
Agrarian crime in Ireland was widely resented among the 
English electorate, who generally preferred a vigorous 
policy of law enforcement, and tended, under the influence 
of Whig and Conservative propaganda, to associate con­
cessions with weakness. It was one of the misfortunes of
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Gladstone's administration that no sooner had he dropped the 
policy of coercion, released Parnell and his colleagues from 
jail, and accepted the resignation of his coercionist chief 
secretary, than his new chief secretary, Lord Frederick 
Cavendish, and his undersecretary were assassinated. Under 
these conditions it would have been extremely difficult and 
certainly politically unpopular to pursue a policy of con­
ciliation, so that coercion was once more adopted despite 
the continuing opposition of the Liberal conciliationists.
During his second administration therefore Gladstone 
pursued a twofold policy in Ireland. On the one hand he 
continued the reformist measures he had adopted during his 
first administration, though on a far too inadequate basis, 
while at the same time, and more out of political and Party 
expediency than conviction, he undertook a policy of co­
ercion. From the time when he first became prime minister 
in 1868 until he retired in 1894 his prime objective was the 
pacification and conciliation of Ireland. He did not be­
lieve that the source of Irish discontent lay in Irish 
nature and that only by a policy of coercion could the Irish 
be made to obey the law. As early as the 1860s he revealed 
that he held a much less exalted view of British behavior 
in Ireland than most of his Liberal colleagues. "You cannot 
look at Ireland" he stated, "and say that the state of 
feeling there is for the honour and the advantage of the
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United Kingdom." The English people, he complained,
neither knew how bad the condition of Ireland was, nor did
"they feel as they ought how disgraceful" it was "to them- 
32selves." In 1870 he condemned English conduct in still
more trenchant terms. "To this great country," he said,
"the state of Ireland after seven hundred years of our
tutelage, is in my opinion . . .  an intolerable disgrace.
,,33
• • •
In his criticism of English conduct, and in his quest
for a new approach, Gladstone received strong support from
a small but dedicated and articulate group of Liberals.
Many of them came to recognize the existence and the extent
of British religious and ethnic prejudice toward Ireland and
of the influence of this on British policies and on Anglo-
Irish relations. John Morley declared that "religious
passion and the prejudice of race" were the most harmful
forces motivating Englishmen in their relations with Ireland,
and if they were to do justice to that country they must
34recognize and overcome these prejudices. In 1869 Gladstone 
took the first important step in this direction when he won 
the support of the Liberal Party for the disestablishment 
of the Anglican Church in Ireland. He took the second step
^Quoted in Fyfe, The British Liberal Party, p. 62.
32Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish Nation, p. 110.
33Ibid., p. 85.
34Morley, Life of Gladstone, II, 246.
230
the following year when he enacted the first of his land
bills in an attempt to reduce some of the evils of the Irish
social system, which, John Morley pointed out, "was infected
35with grievous injustice."
In 1884 a degree of equity was introduced into the 
Irish electoral system when the third Reform Bill was ap­
plied to Ireland on the same basis as England. This removed 
some serious Irish political grievances that had existed 
since 1867 when the British had refused to establish the 
franchise in Ireland on the same basis as England. In 1884 
there were still many, especially among the Conservatives, 
the Anglo-Irish, and the Ulster Protestants, who opposed the 
extension of the franchise to Ireland on the same terms as 
the rest of the United Kingdom. The Anglo-Irish in partic­
ular dissented, arguing that this would reduce their polit­
ical power in relation to Irish nationalists. Most Liberals, 
however, were unmoved by these arguments. The fact that the 
Anglo-Irish would lose political power was not in their view 
justification for disfranchizing a large number of the Irish 
people. The Anglo-Irish, wrote John Morley, "had held Ire­
land in the hollow of their hands for generation upon genera- 
36tion." It was they who had created the deep antipathy 
between the Irish and the English. And it was they who were
33Morley, "England and Ireland," The Fortnightly 
Review, XXXV (April 1, 1881), 408.
36Morley, Life of Gladstone, III, 141.
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responsible "for the odious and dishonouring failure, so
patent before all the world, to effect a true incorporation
37of their country in a united realm." The fact that the 
Anglo-Irish would lose political power did not justify with­
holding "civil rights" from the great majority of the people. 
"What sort of reason was that," he asked, "why the principle 
of exclusion and ascendancy which had worked such mischief 
in the past, should be persisted in for a long and indefinite 
future?"38
The old Liberal view that Englishmen were purveyors of
justice and progress in Ireland was slowly breaking down.
Lending his name and his pen to the list of those who had
begun to deny its validity was Matthew Arnold. For too long,
Arnold argued, Englishmen have treated the "native Irish"
39with "contempt and tyranny." For too long they have treat-
40ed them as a "race of bigoted savages." Englishmen are
prone to speak of "Ireland's lower civilization resisting
41the higher civilization of England." But Englishmen,
Arnold stated, ought rather to question the quality of their 
own civilization. They ought to make sure that it was not
37Ibid., II, 141.
38Ibid., III, 141.
39Matthew Arnold, Irish Essays and Others (London: 
Smith, Elder, & Co., 1882), p. 43.
40Ibid., p. 43.
4^Ibid., p. 43.
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only "higher," but "high enough to exercise attraction."
They should carefully examine their own perception of them­
selves and their attitude toward the Irish. "In order to 
attach Ireland to us," he explained, . . .
English people have not only to do something different 
from what they have done hitherto, they have also to 
be something different. . . . As a whole, as a community, 
they have to acquire a larger and sweeter temper, a 
larger and more lucid mind.43
In short they have to overcome their various anti-Irish
prejudices in order to recognize that the "traditional,
44existing, social arrangements" in Ireland were unjust.
They must come to see their administration of Ireland as it
actually was. They must redress the grievances of the Irish
people. And they must cease to support the Anglo-Irish in
45their inflexible opposition to reform.
The old complacent, exalted, and self-congratulatory 
Liberal self-image began slowly to erode under the impact of 
these attacks. The picture of Liberal generosity and self­
less government in behalf of the Irish for their improvement 
and enrichment was gradually, though often reluctantly,
42Ibid., p. 57.
42Ibid., p. vi.
44Ibid., p. xiii.
4^Ibid., p. xiii. Despite his severe criticisms of 
English policy in Ireland and its failure thus far to solve 
the injustices of the Irish social system, Arnold felt that 
Englishmen could eventually be persuaded to redress these 
grievances, and on this basis he opposed Home Rule.
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dismissed. A new image slowly emerged alongside it. The 
component elements of this image were almost antithetical to 
those which comprised the old one. Herbert Gladstone indi­
cated how some Liberals were coming to view their historical 
treatment of the Irish when he charged that for centuries 
they had subjected them to "invasions, massacres, plantations,
Protestantism, . . . destruction of promising manufacturers,
46[and] evictions of rack-rented tenants. . . . "  They have
victimized them with "social and racial" prejudice and with
47arbitrary government.
Those Liberals who began to reject the old postures, 
and who for convenience, may be called Gladstonian Liberals 
because of their general agreement with Gladstone's attitude 
and policies toward Ireland, began to feel that in the final 
analysis Ireland was ruled by England very much as a colonial 
possession. They reached the conclusion that the Irish 
ought to have control, insofar as this was compatible with 
imperial supremacy, over the making of Irish laws and over 
Irish administration. As long as the legislative union of 
Ireland and Britain existed in its current form, the Irish 
could not exercise such control. It is true that they could 
influence legislation and Irish administrative practices to 
some extent, especially if they held the balance between the
46Viscount Gladstone, After Thirty Years (London: 
Macmillan and Co., 1929), p. 264.
47Ibid., p. 264.
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two major parties in the House of Commons. But this happened 
only twice during the Home Rule era, in 1886 and in the 
period 1910-1914. Even then, however, they were still con­
fronted with the overwhelmingly Tory and anti-Irish House 
of Lords which crushed Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1893 
and rejected Asquith's in three successive sessions from 
1912 to 1914. Ireland had in the House of Lords a contingent 
of 28 representative peers who were elected almost exclu­
sively by the Anglo-Irish class. Bills designed to eradicate 
Irish injustices, wrote John Morley, were "effectively con­
trolled by the peerage, without a single representative
among them, direct or indirect, of the vast mass of the
48population of Ireland." It is only necessary to look at 
the deplorable state of Ireland throughout the nineteenth 
century to realize that the Irish had little influence in 
either legislating for, or administering, their own country.
In an article in the Fortnightly Review in 1881 
Morley denounced the methods by which England continued to 
rule Ireland autocratically despite the fact that super­
ficially the Irish seemed to have an equitable role in the 
making of law and in the system of responsible government.
"Our grand source of Irish unrest," he wrote,
and of the incessant and intolerable friction in Irish 
affairs, is that there have been no administrative 
changes to match the political changes. We have grad­
ually admitted larger and larger masses of the Irish
48John Morley, Recollections, (2 vols.; New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1971), I, 173.
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people to political power, but the system of Parliament 
of Westminster, and of centralized administration at 
the Castle in Dublin, has prevented them from using
this power for any of the purposes which its possessors
may happen to desire. We mock the Irish people with an
invitation freely to exercise political rights, but we 
have never remodelled the legislature and executive 
machinery in such a way as to make their rights a 
political reality.49
Gladstone too had begun to discern what he considered
to be an inconsistency between Parliamentary representation
for the Irish and their simultaneous exclusion from a mean-
50ingful self-governing role. England, he stated, must 
rectify "the hopeless contradiction" which gives the Nation­
alists a "Parliamentary representation, hardly effective 
for anything but mischief without the local institutions of
self-government which it pre-supposes and on which alone it
51can have a sound and healthy basis." Gladstone, thus, 
having denied the justice of the established church, then 
the land system, was finally proceeding to deny the justice 
of the political system. As early as 1881 he began to ques­
tion the Liberal opposition to Irish self-government and 
find merit in some of the objectives of Home Rule. It "has 
for one of its aims," he stated, "local government— an 
excellent thing to which I would affix no limits except the
49Morley, "Conciliation with Ireland," The Fortnightly 
Review, XXXVI (July 1, 1881), 17.
^®Morley, Life of Gladstone, III, 58-59.
51Ibid., III, 58-59.
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52supremacy of the imperial parliament." Gladstone, how­
ever, nurtured certain forebodings about the possibility of 
passing such a measure, forebodings which, as events were 
to prove, were only too justified. "I have a fear," he 
wrote, "that when the time for action comes, which will not 
be in my time, many Liberals may perhaps hang back and may 
cause further trouble. " 53 Despite this he continued to 
criticize the British system of ruling Ireland. England, he 
wrote to the Queen in May 1885, "continually maintains and 
presents in Ireland the idea of Government as a thing 
'foreign' and not indigenous; and even good laws are not
likely to be loved when the administration of them is not in 
54native hands."
Gladstonian Liberals were adopting the view that the 
Irish had a right to self-government. This was based on two 
principal factors: One was the view that distinct national­
ities, having reached a certain degree of maturity, and hav­
ing expressed a clear and overwhelming demand for national 
autonomy, had a right to have those wishes recognized. The
5 2 Ibid., III, 57-58.
53Ibid., II, 58. There is a certain interesting 
ambivalence in this statement. Gladstone states that action 
on Home Rule will not come in his time, and yet he expresses 
fear that when the time for action does come "many Liberals 
may hang back and may cause further trouble." It is diffi­
cult to believe that this seemingly sincere expression of 
fear could have come from a man who genuinely believed he 
would never be confronted with the problem of enacting this 
measure.
54Buckle, The Letters of Queen Victoria, 2d ser..
Vol. Ill, p. 653.
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other was the concept that when such a demand was overwhelm­
ingly and insistently expressed, imperial rule could only 
be maintained through a system of government, judicial pro­
cedure, and law enforcement that were a violation of certain 
Liberal principles. Condemning the system of coercion in 
Ireland, for example, John Morley wrote, "You cannot have 
Liberalism in England without its application to Ireland. " 55 
Under these conditions the rule of Ireland by the applica­
tion of extraordinary law was contrary to those Liberal 
principles, as certain Liberals understood then, and so also 
was the practice of governing in opposition to the will of 
the Irish people as constitutionally and overwhelmingly ex­
pressed in their elected representatives. Gladstone even 
went so far as to assert that as long as Irish opinion was 
ignored in the ruling of Ireland, the Irish were not bound 
by the decisions reached.
Until we have seriously responsible bodies to deal with 
us in Ireland [he wrote], every plan we frame comes to 
Irishmen, say what we may, as an English plan. As such 
it is probably condemned. At best it is a one-sided 
bargain, which binds us, not them. . . .56
The implication of these views seemed to be that if the Irish 
refused to recognize the validity of the law they were com­
pletely justified in doing so. This is precisely what the 
republicans of 1916 and 1919 did. The latter set up their 
own legislative and administrative organs and proceeded on
5 5Morley, "England and Ireland," The Fortnightly 
Review XXXV (April 1, 1881), 418.
5 5Morley, Life of Gladstone, III, 58.
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the assumption that Britain had no jurisdiction in Ireland.
The leaders on both occasions, like the American colonists
of 1776, issued a unilateral declaration of independence; and
like them they were immediately confronted with a display of 
57armed might. The right to independence was of course a 
principle that Gladstone had not conceded. What he proposed 
was autonomy in domestic or non-imperial affairs. The Irish 
republicans therefore of 1916 and 1919 were taking a step 
which Gladstone's ideas, as incorporated in his two Home 
Rule bills, did not explicitly justify.
From the 1880s onward the force and prestige of Glad­
stone's leadership gave tremendous impetus to his ideas on 
Ireland. His point of view won a slow, but steadily widen­
ing reception among the majority of Liberals. They gradually 
rejected the old assumption that English administration was 
just, and acknowledged that most Irish crime had its roots 
in Irish social conditions. "The agrarian outrages," Lord
Eversley wrote, "had their origin in the agrarian diffi- 
58culty." John Morley went even further, condemning English 
administration of Ireland as rigidly inflexible, and justify­
ing violence as the only means by which the Irish could hope
57In using this analogy it is not intended to imply 
that the Irish were the colonial equivalent of the American 
colonists. The latter were indeed colonists; the Irish 
were not. In Ireland the colonists were the Anglo-Irish and 
the Ulster Protestants.
CQ
Lord Eversley, Gladstone and Ireland; The Irish 
Policy of Parliament from 1850-1894 (London: Methuen & Co.,
1912), p. 182.
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to achieve meaningful reform. "Even in her most gracious
moments," he wrote, "England has always been harsh and
59narrow to Ireland." Englishmen have never addressed them­
selves to Irish grievances except under the threat of 
physical coercion. Every reform in Ireland has about it the 
"association of force, of grudging assent, of unworthy vin­
dictiveness, of yielding only to compulsion. 1,60 The often 
reiterated view therefore that "the Irish will never gain 
anything by violence" was simply "not true. The Irish know 
better. They know that they have never gained anything with­
out violence."®^
This was an extremely critical judgment of English 
rule in Ireland. It was an assertion that such rule had 
driven the Irish into criminal activity as the only method 
by which they could achieve meaningful reform. Morley re­
jected outright the old self-serving Liberal charge that the 
Irish were inherently incapable of living according to law.
If you want him [the Irishman] to respect the laws 
[he warned his English critics] you will have first to 
persuade him that they are made for his benefit and not 
for yours. You will have to give him grounds for be­
lieving that when the laws were being made, his wishes 
and interests have been consulted, and the voices of 
his representatives listened to.62
RO
Morley, "England and Ireland," The Fortnightly 
Review XXXV (April 1, 1881) , 413.
6 0 Ibid., p. 413.
6 lIbid., p. 414.
62Ibid., p. 413.
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This, however, was usually not the case. Laws for Ireland 
were generally made by Englishmen, with the Irish seldom 
being consulted. Years later Morley recalled the pre­
dominant British attitude toward Ireland in those stormy 
years prior to 1886. It was "almost a point of honour in
those days," he stated, "for British cabinets to make Irish
63
laws out of their own head."
This practice forced the Irish in desperation to 
undertake a policy of obstruction in the House of Commons 
in order to prevent the passage of what they considered to 
be unjust legislation. The pursuit of this tactic, and the 
bitterness and delay which it caused, was often construed 
as further proof that the Irish were unfit for self-govern­
ment. Few Englishmen concluded, as did Sir Ivor Jennings,
64that most Irish legislation deserved to be obstructed.
Even among Gladstonian Liberals, only a handful of them, 
prior to 1886, proved capable of comprehending this. To do 
so involved the development of a new perspective, a more 
accurate and critical degree of self-perception, and the 
espousal of various new principles and attitudes. A few 
outstanding Liberals pioneered this path and in the end, 
though not without struggle, they carried most of their 
colleagues with them.
^^Morley, Life of Gladstone, II, 292..
64Sir Ivor Jennings, Party Politics, Vol. II: The
Growth of Parties, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1961), 179.
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By 1886 therefore most Liberals had abandoned the view 
that Britain should continue to govern Ireland according to 
its own ideas whether the Irish opposed or approved. This 
new approach was founded basically on certain principles 
which Liberals espoused regarding the rights and demands of 
what they considered tp be mature nationalities. It was 
therefore also based to some extent on a new image of the 
nature of the Irish and their ability for equitable law­
making and political administration. There were still many 
Liberals, even among the followers of Gladstone, who be­
lieved that a gap existed between the capabilities of the 
English and the Irish in these areas. But they no longer 
believed that the Irish were still incapable of reasonably 
impartial government. They no longer visualized them as 
inordinately backward and immature in cultural and biological 
terms, and since this was the case they could see no valid 
reason why England should continute to legislate for Ireland 
in domestic matters. In fact, as has already been pointed 
out, many of them reached the self-condemnatory conclusion 
that historically English legislation had not been directed 
toward the general good of Irish society but toward the 
benefit and protection of a privileged class. They came to 
see themselves as the supporters of an extremely oppressive 
system. They accepted the view that the "law in Ireland" 
was in many cases "an accomplice of unjust dealing" and that
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it operated "in connivance with oppression." If the Irish
have vices, Morley charged, English misgovernment has "di-
6 6rectly engendered" them. This was a strange accusation, 
especially to the ears of Whigs and Conservatives, who con­
tinued to think of themselves as the source of whatever 
degree of civilization existed in Ireland. Most Gladstonian 
Liberals were evolving an extremely critical view of the 
treatment Britain had accorded the Irish, a view epitomized 
in part by the following statement: "We have imposed bad
laws upon them; we have persecuted their religion down to 
times when persecution elsewhere had gone out of fashion; 
. . .  we have cowed them by the sword and corrupted them by 
gold.”
To most Gladstonian Liberals the question of whether 
English laws were or were not good was no longer a meaningful 
issue. That point had become irrelevant. The important fact 
was that the overwhelming majority of the Irish expressed in 
a thoroughly constitutional way through their elected repre­
sentatives a desire for their own legislature and executive 
with jurisdiction in domestic matters. Such a demand, Glad­
stone argued, expressed in such a way, and by such a people, 
could not on any acceptable moral or political grounds be 
denied. "I do not," he told the House of Commons,
^Morley, "Conciliation with Ireland," The Fortnightly 
Review XXXVI (July 1, 1881), 8.
66Ibid., p. 8.
67Ibid., p. 8.
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deny the general good intentions of Parliament on a 
variety of great and conspicuous occasions, and its 
desire to pass good laws for Ireland. But let me say 
that, in order to work out the purposes of Government, 
there is something more in this world occasionally 
required than even the passing of good laws. . . .
The passing of many good laws is not enough in cases 
where the strong permanent instincts of the people, 
their distinctive marks of character, the situation 
and history of the country, require not only that these 
laws should be good, but that they should proceed from 
a congenial and native source, and besides being good 
laws should be their own laws. . . . 68
Gladstone's declaration that the laws of Ireland 
should spring from a "native source" was an epochal step 
not only in the history of the Liberal Party but in the 
history of Anglo-Irish relations. Prior to this Liberals 
generally had assumed that the making of Irish law at West­
minster, and the administration of Ireland by British poli­
ticians, was not only just but should be satisfactory to 
the Irish. They assumed that Englishmen would always rule 
Ireland fairly, and they could not understand why the Irish 
should be dissatisfied with this practice. In the late 
nineteenth century, however, some Liberals began to feel that 
these assumptions were no longer tenable. Conditions in 
Ireland forced them to conclude that that country was dis­
astrously misgoverned. This in turn led them to undertake 
a series of reforms to mitigate Irish religious, social, and 
economic inequities. Slowly they realized that the English 
harbored deep religious, cultural, and even racial prejudices
g o
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 
3d ser., Vol. 304 (Mar. 26-Apr.. 16, 1886), cols. 1080-81.
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toward the Irish, which not only forced them to govern Ire­
land in accordance with English principles and interests, 
but largely in behalf of the Anglo-Irish class. They 
realized that most of the important judicial and administra­
tive organs of the country were in the hands of this class 
and that the Irish were relegated to a subordinate and 
largely impotent role. They began to recognize that they 
had been in error when they assumed that Ireland was justly 
ruled. Their former perception of their own attitudes and 
objectives, and their custom of governing Ireland in accord­
ance with Liberal precepts while rejecting Irish suggestions, 
they began to visualize as arrogant and self-serving. The 
Irish, they now argued, had a right to govern themselves ac­
cording to their own ideas. This was the position taken by 
Gladstone and accepted by the bulk of the Liberal Party who 
followed him and supported the various bills for Irish self- 
government which he and his successors initiated during and 
after 1886.
One of the recurring problems which arose during the 
long debate over Home Rule was the question of whether the 
Irish had a right to self-governing institutions on the basis 
of national distinctiveness, national maturity, and national 
aspirations. Unionists generally took the view that they 
did not. They argued that the United Kingdom constituted a 
natural geographic unit, and implied thereby that it also 
formed a natural political unit. The Irish, they maintained, 
merely formed a minor ethnic group within that total
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structure. Furthermore, the Unionists argued, Ireland it- 
self was not composed of a single ethnic group but of two 
principal ethnic groups. If Home Rule Liberals were basing 
the Irish claim to self-government on the principle of na­
tional homogeneity, no such homogeneity existed. The Irish, 
they maintained, were no more a national minority within the 
existing United Kingdom than the Ulster Protestants or Anglo- 
Irish would be within a self-governing Ireland. If, they 
argued, the Irish had a right to self-government so also did 
the Protestants of Ulster.
Gladstone and his successors countered this argument 
by asserting that the most populous ethnic group in a dis­
tinct geographic entity had the right to decide the destiny 
of the whole. To this. Unionists merely replied that in the 
northeastern part of Ireland which, they maintained, was a 
distinct geographic entity, the major ethnic group was the 
Ulster Protestants, and therefore they should decide the 
future of that area. Gladstone was willing to recognize 
that this argument had certain merits, and he was willing to 
consider proposals to deal with the aspirations of the Ulster 
Protestants, but he did not believe that their rights neces­
sitated the withholding of Home Rule from Ireland as a 
69whole. Later, Gladstone's successors, during the struggle
69Gladstone did, however, ask the Ulster Protestants 
to present a statement of their objectives. See The Speeches 
and Public Addresses of the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, ed. 
by A. W. Hutton and H. J. Cohen (10 vols.; London: Methuen
and Company, 1892-1894), IX, 1-125.
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over the third Home Rule Bill, when it became apparent that 
the Ulster Protestants were prepared to fight rather than 
live under a Catholic-dominated government, decided to di­
vide Ireland into two states. This was an effort to permit 
the major ethnic group in each geographic region to deter­
mine the future of each area. It was also, however, the 
ultimate consequence of British colonialism, and as such 
many Irishmen refused to recognize the legitimacy of it, and 
many still do.
Unionists repeatedly charged that the concession of 
Home Rule to Ireland would lead to the complete dissolution 
of the union, that Ireland would eventually break away and 
establish an independent and sovereign state. They asserted 
that Ireland was essential to British national defense, and 
they maintained that the granting of Home Rule would be the 
first step toward complete Irish independence. They were 
wrong, however, in assuming that Gladstone's willingness to 
submit to the aspirations of Irish national sentiment in­
cluded the recognition that the Irish had a right to establish 
an independent state. His concession of a degree of self- 
government in certain internal affairs was not based on, nor 
did it concede, the right of absolute national self-determin­
ation. It did not depend on the recognition of an abstract 
principle that the Irish national will pre-empted all other 
considerations. It was based primarily on the conviction 
that when a mature national group revealed by extensive and 
persistent opposition to the existing mode of government.
247
and by an overwhelming demonstration by the majority, that 
they desired a new form of government, political wisdom and 
morality required that those objectives be conceded. Thus 
when the Liberals pursued a policy of Home Rule for Ireland, 
when they granted responsible and federal government to the 
states of South Africa, when they approved the Morley-Minto 
reforms for India they were not acting exclusively on the 
basis of an abstract principle but in response to an urgent, 
persistent, and overwhelming demand.
In the case of Ireland the Liberal Party was not 
confronted with a serious demand for complete sovereignty 
until after World War I. Prior to that time Home Rule 
Liberals were convinced that Ireland would wish to remain 
a part of the United Kingdom, especially if timely self- 
governing concessions were made. The point of discussion 
among them, therefore, was never whether the Irish had the 
right to establish an independent state, but what degree of 
autonomy they could safely be permitted, what powers could 
be delegated to them, and what must be retained by West­
minster. It is interesting, even ironic, to note that the 
origins of this concept of reserved and transferred powers, 
and the principle of responsible government built upon it, 
go back to an Anglo-Irishman, William Warren Baldwin, who 
settled in Upper Canada in the late eighteenth century and 
whose ideas came to form not only the basis of the Durham 
Report but also the essential foundation of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations. From the time when Gladstone
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introduced his first Home Rule Bill, his opponents repeatedly 
attacked the principle of reserved and transferred powers, 
stating that it was impossible to define successfully the 
limits of each. Consequently, as time went by, and the 
House of Lords blocked repeated Liberal efforts to enact 
Home Rule, there emerged in Ireland a more extreme movement 
which would settle for nothing short of a sovereign republic. 
After the martyrdom of their leaders in 1916 the republicans 
steadily won popular support, and in 1918 completely over­
shadowed the Nationalist Party— the Party of Butt, Parnell, 
and Redmond— and its policy of Home Rule. It was this group 
that confronted Lloyd George in the period 1919-1921. He 
was the first English statesman in this period who had to 
deal with a formidable Irish republican movement. Previous 
prime ministers had had to contend with the problem of merely 
reforming on a federal basis the political structure of the 
United Kingdom. He was confronted with the question of 
severing it completely. This he would not consider. He 
thought of himself as in a position similar to that of 
Lincoln at the time of the American Civil War. He believed 
it his duty to hold the United Kingdom together at any cost 
just as Lincoln had held the United States together. Lloyd 
George had immense admiration for this American statesman. 
Lincoln "had not shrunk from employing force to secure unity," 
he stated, "though at the time he was reproached for violat­
ing democratic principle and he would not shrink from
Lloyd George constantly reiterated this point of view, 
and far from conceding that the Irish had the right to es­
tablish a republic if they so desired, he refused as late
71as June 1921 even to grant them Dominion status; - though 
it must be admitted that this would have been a degree of 
self-government far in excess of that incorporated in any of 
the various Home Rule bills. His hope, which was consistent 
with previous Liberal positions regarding self-government 
for Ireland, was to reach a settlement whereby that country 
would assume a federalist position within the United King­
dom, a position similar to that of Natal within the Union of
72South Africa or of Quebec within the Dominion of Canada.
It is true that two months later he significantly altered
his position, being willing to go "the whole length of
73Dominion Home Rule." But that concession was not based 
so much on an admission that the Irish possessed such rights 
as on the exigencies of an increasingly difficult political 
situation.
Ever since 1886 when the Gladstonian Liberals declared
7 0 C. P. Scott, The Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928,
p. 406.
71Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances
Stevenson, ed. by A. J. P. Taylor (London: Hutchinson,
1971), p. 221.
7 2 Ibid., p. 2 2 1 .
7 3C. P. Scott, The Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911-1928,
p. 399.
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that in accordance with their political principles the Irish 
had a right to national self-government Liberal rule in 
Ireland became not only difficult but somewhat anomalous. 
Liberals were, in a sense, intruders ruling where they did 
not have the right to do so. Ireland, in their view, should 
be free to govern itself in domestic affairs, and Englishmen, 
by continuing to rule it, were usurping Irish rights. As 
Stephen Gwynn pointed out, Liberals were "governing a 
country which by Liberal principles ought to be self-govern­
ing. Every Liberal administration from 1885 on stood self­
condemned as a stop-gap; and this inherent weakness was
multiplied manifold after Home Rule was put on the Statute 
74Book" in 1914. The last Liberal Irish chief secretaries—  
John Morley in 1886 and from 1892 to 1895, James Bryce from 
1905 to 1907, and Augustine Birrell from 1907 to 1916— all 
governed with sympathy, patience, and tolerance. Birrell's 
task was the most difficult of all, for he held office in a 
period when the Ulster Volunteers, the Irish Volunteers, and 
the Citizen Army were arming and drilling throughout Ireland. 
After the Easter Rising his policies were condemned and he 
was forced to resign while the administration of Ireland 
was handed over to those who were not restricted by what 
J. L. Hammond called the principle of "morality between
7^Stephen Gwynn, "A Great Irish Official," The 
Contemporary Review, CXXIII (June 1923), 729.
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nations. " 7 5
When the military command in Ireland executed the 
leaders of the Easter Rebellion, those men who sought to 
solve the Anglo-Irish problem as the American colonists of 
1776 had solved the Anglo-American one, they drove' Ireland 
into the arms of the republicans. From this point onward 
the popularity of Sinn Fein mushroomed while that of the 
Nationalist Party rapidly declined. Like the Liberal Party, 
with which its policies had long been linked, it suffered 
an irreparable defeat in the election of 1918. Irish 
opinion had clearly gone over to the support of the republi­
cans, to the physical force party— to the men who sought an 
independent Ireland rather than a federal United Kingdom.
In the 1870s and 1880s Parnell had been able to unite the 
physical force party with the constitutional one and retain 
control of both. Redmond tried to repeat this feat during 
World War I, but in the end he was unable to succeed.
The policy of repression which the Coalition pursued 
after 1919 must be seen therefore in a new light. A new 
set of circumstances had arisen. Lloyd George was now deal­
ing with republicans, men who had rejected the constitutional 
approach to the solution of the Irish problem, who had uni­
laterally declared Ireland's independence from England and 
the British empire, and who had set up their own parliament 
and government in Dublin. Lloyd George was not fighting
75Francis W. Hirst, Gilbert Murray, and J. L. Hammond, 
Liberalism and the Empire (London: R. B. Johnson, 1900),
p. 167.
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against the policy of Home Rule; he was fighting against 
unilateralism, republicanism, and complete Irish independ­
ence. In addition, though he was nominally a Liberal, he 
headed a Coalition that was dominated by Conservatives, men 
who had been the traditional hard liners as far as Ireland 
was concerned. If he was to protect his political future 
he would have to tread carefully on the Irish issue. He 
would certainly not be able to pursue a weak or timid policy. 
And Lloyd George, shrewd politician that he was, certainly 
did not intend to be accused of weakness.
The rather brutal policy of reprisals which British
forces practiced in Ireland must be seen in light of these
facts. It is hardly surprising to find the Asquith Liberals
condemning this policy as bordering on the barbaric. "Things
are being done in Ireland," Asquith asserted, "which would
disgrace the blackest annals of the lowest despotism in 
76Europe." It is true of course that Asquith was now in 
opposition to Lloyd George, and doubtless welcomed the oppor­
tunity to attack him. But it should also be remembered that 
the defense of the Irish was not a popular position among 
the English electorate. Nor was the implied attack on the 
British military forces. This does not mean that political 
expediency played no part in Asquith's motives. On the 
other hand there is no reason to assume that he was in­
sincere in his criticism of Coalition tactics. In fact such
76Quoted in A. J. P. Taylor, English History, 1914- 
1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 155.
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criticism was in keeping with his previous conduct toward
Ireland. The refusal to accept or tolerate a policy of
ruthless repression had been a part of the Liberal tradition
since at least 1886. In the 1870s Gladstone had come out of
retirement to condemn the Armenian massacres. In 1882 he
attempted to terminate Forster's policy of extreme coercion
in Ireland. And during the Boer War his successor, Campbell-
Bannerman, denounced British tactics in South Africa as "the
77methods of barbarism."
In the 1870s and 1880s a small number of Liberals 
urged Englishmen to re-examine their attitudes toward the 
Irish. They asked them to recognize that they harbored wide­
spread and deep-seated anti-Irish prejudices. They urged 
them to develop an awareness of the fact that they possessed
a strong "dislike" for "the history, the political claims,
78the religion," and the "temperament" of the Irish. If 
these prejudices were recognized, the development of a new, 
just, and conciliatory policy toward Ireland would be pos­
sible. It was the existence of such antipathy, John Morley 
wrote, that made the passage of Home Rule so difficult. "The
Giant mass of secular English prejudice against Ireland," he
79wrote, "frowned like a mountain chain across the track."
77Spender, Life of Campbell-Bannerman, II, 8-9.
7 8
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79Ibid., III, 308.
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A similar view was expressed by Gladstone during de­
bate on the first Home Rule Bill. In response to Whig and 
Conservative pleas that he and his supporters stand by 
British traditions, he asked,
What traditions? By the Irish traditions? Go into the 
length and breadth of the world, ransack the literature 
of all countries, find, if you can, a single voice, a 
single book . . .  in which the conduct of England to­
wards Ireland is anywhere treated except with profound 
and bitter condemnation. Are these the traditions by 
which we are exhorted to stand? No; they are a sad 
exception to the glory of our country. They are a 
broad and black blot upon the pages of its his­
tory. . . .80
In 1905 another Liberal leader, Campbell-Bannerman, com­
plained of the stultifying effect of British prejudice toward 
the Irish. Though freely admitting that he supported the 
cause of Home Rule, he found that certain social groups 
considered the mention of this subject to be highly dis­
tasteful. "I am not afraid of the Irish question," he ex­
plained. "But, of course, if you move in the smartest 
circles, golfing and bridging, you must make it clear that,
though you retain your eccentric and unfortunate taste for
81pitch, you are not going to defile your hands with it."
And again, near the end of the Anglo-Irish struggle in 1921, 
Lloyd George's secretary, Thomas Jones, contemplating the 
historical course of English conduct toward Ireland,
0 Q
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 
3d ser., Vol. 306 (May 25-June 19, 1886), col. 1239.
81Spender, Life of Campbell-Bannerman, II, 180.
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commented: "It is a melancholy story and one from which
82the English not unnaturally turn their eyes."
From the time in 1868 when Gladstone declared that 
his mission was to pacify Ireland a growing number of Lib­
erals became increasingly critical of British policies.
They gradually rejected the view that these were designed 
to bring the best possible conditions to the largest 
possible number of Irish people. They concluded that 
British policy, Conservative and Liberal, was a narrow and 
one-sided attempt to maintain the social and economic status 
quo, a status quo which favored British interests and the 
small, landowning Anglo-Irish class. They gradually re­
jected the old postures and the old policies which for so 
long had been considered just. The disestablishment of the 
Anglican Church, the initiation of innovative land laws, 
the introduction of the secret ballot, the extension of the 
franchise, and the repeated efforts to grant the Irish self- 
government— all of these indicate the rejection of the old 
self-satisfied and self-righteous Liberal approach to the 
Irish and to Irish problems and the emergence of a new one.
As has previously been pointed out, there were many Liberals 
who could not follow this new path. By 1886 most of these 
had withdrawn from the Liberal Party—  and it was essentially 
on Irish issues that they did so. After this date therefore
82Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. Ill: 1918-
1925, ed. by Keith Middlemas (London: Oxford University
Press, 1971), pp. xvii-xviii.
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the Liberal Party remained a fairly homogeneous unit as far 
as Irish policy was concerned. It is true that a small 
number of Liberals remaining within the Party were reluctant 
to follow Gladstone's policies with respect to Ireland.
This group, however, was not large. It was led by' Lord 
Rosebery, and when his political fortunes declined rapidly 
after the Boer War most of his following tended to maintain 
a strategic silence with respect to his Irish policies. In 
addition, with the exception of Rosebery, this group was 
not particularly opposed to Home Rule. It had really no 
strong convictions either for or against it; and for 
political reasons preferred to remain silent on this issue 
when circumstances permitted because of English electoral 
opposition to it.
Gladstonian Liberals found it extremely difficult to 
penetrate and overcome traditional British antipathy toward 
the Irish. Their charges that the English were prejudiced 
and their policies unjust were generally unwelcome to 
Englishmen. The view that the British people were generous 
rulers, laboring long, hard, and charitably to aid, uplift, 
and civilize a backward and ungrateful people was much more ac­
ceptable. To be characterized as a people who had engaged 
in "centuries of wrong" toward Ireland, as having ruled that 
country for the benefit of England and the Anglo-Irish class 
at the expense of the great mass of the Irish people, was 
not likely to win enthusiastic support. In addition the 
widespread imperial chauvinism among the English people
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during this period, coupled with Irish opposition to most 
imperial activities, made it more difficult to persuade the 
English people that the Irish were loyal, and could there­
fore be entrusted with a modicum of self-government. The 
Liberals never succeeded in this task. They looked upon 
British imperialism in Ireland in a way that most Englishmen 
did not, and apparently could not. Consequently, no 
groundswell of popular support or enthusiasm for the Irish 
cause ever developed in England. And when the Coalition 
finally conceded Dominion status to Ireland in 1921 there 
was no widespread rejoicing in England that justice had at 
last been done. The general mood toward Ireland was a 
mixture of apathy and antipathy.
CHAPTER VII
THE QUEST FOR A NEW LIBERAL IMAGE 
OF IRELAND
When we blame the Irish for being untruthful, shifty, 
insincere, we ought to bear in mind that they have only been 
emancipated from . . . odious and degrading bondage for a
generation or two. ^
— John Morley
You, sir, possibly have not been brought closely in 
contact with the Irish leaders. I have; and more practical, 
sensible, I may indeed say, more moderate men, when not
under the influence of temporary excitement, I never came
across. . . .  I have indeed been greatly struck with their 
largeness and broadness of view. . . .  2
— Henry Labouchere
One of the striking factors about the Liberal image 
of Ireland is that, unlike the Conservative image, which was 
largely fixed throughout the Home Rule period, the Liberal 
image, like Liberalism itself, underwent a major transforma­
tion. This occurred largely during the period 1868-1886, 
and remained reasonably fixed thereafter. During these 
years the majority of Liberals adopted a new image of the 
Irish and of Irish rights. They attempted to discredit
^John Morley, "England and Ireland," The Fortnightly 
Review, XXXV (April 1, 1881), 417.
2
The Times, Jan. 4, 1886, p. 10.
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and discard the old concept and replace it with a new and 
more favorable one. In this they encountered extreme dif­
ficulties, for the task of persuading the British people, 
who had long been accustomed to look upon the Irish as a 
markedly inferior and unattractive race, that they had been 
mistaken, and that they should henceforth treat them as an 
appreciably endowed racial group which had for centuries 
been wrongfully oppressed and wilfully debarred from cultural 
and social development by English and Anglo-Irish misgovern- 
ment, was of Herculean proportions. Nor was it made easier 
by the fact that certain elements within the Liberal Party 
refused to adopt this new interpretation. As has previously 
been pointed out, most of the Whigs and Radical Unionists 
clung doggedly to the old postures. And while some members 
of the latter group seemed at times willing to contemplate 
a more sympathetic approach toward the Irish prior to Glad­
stone's decision to enact Home Rule in 1886, they were hence­
forth driven by their opposition to this policy to assume an 
even more hostile and inflexible attitude toward them. These 
two major factions refused to alter their image of the Irish, 
and consequently they withdrew from the Liberal Party en­
tirely, and thereafter cooperated with the Conservatives.
The withdrawal of these two groups left the Liberal 
Party a reasonably homogeneous unit as far as Ireland and 
Irish issues were concerned. It is true that certain of the 
Liberals who remained within the Liberal Party, in particular 
the Liberal imperialists, did not feel that any major
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political injustices requiring urgent resolution existed in 
Ireland. It should be understood, however, that most of 
the Liberal imperialists did not subscribe to the lowly and 
hostile image of the Irish which prevailed among the Union­
ists. If they did not experience, as Gladstone and some of 
his followers did, a strong moral obligation to right certain 
Irish wrongs, they at least did not attempt to explain social 
conditions in Ireland on the basis of inordinate defects in 
Irish character. Nor did they exploit anti-Irish prejudice 
in Britain in order to win elections. The worst that can 
perhaps be said of them is that after the retirement of 
Gladstone in 1894 they preferred, for electoral expediency, 
to refer to the Irish issue as little as possible.
It is apparent therefore that prior to 1886 the 
Liberal Party was highly factionalized. After the 1886 
rupture, and the withdrawal of the Whigs and Radical Union­
ists, the remaining Liberals were reasonably united— especially 
on Irish issues. From 1886 onward the Liberal Party was, in 
relation to Ireland, a fairly homogeneous unit. By the 
Liberal image of Ireland therefore is meant essentially the 
image which predominated among those Liberals who remained 
within the Party after 1886. Since, however, this chapter 
will deal largely with the emergence of a new Liberal image 
in the period 1868-1886, and since the Whigs and Radical 
Unionists formed a part of the Liberal Party until the latter 
date, it will be necessary to use clear terminological labels 
to refer to these various Liberal groups. Prior to 1886
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therefore, and at any point thereafter where confusion might 
occur, those Liberals who espoused the new attitude toward 
Ireland will be referred to interchangeably as Gladstonian 
or Home Rule Liberals in order to distinguish them clearly 
from other Liberal factions, such as the Whigs and Radical 
Unionists.
The latter two groups continued to adhere to the tra­
ditional British image of the Irish. It had long been the 
habit among Englishmen of both major political parties to 
look upon the Irish as a backward, unaccomplished, and gen­
erally unattractive people. This image had been created in 
two principal ways. One of these was the direct, essentially 
professional, contact between the Irish and those Britons 
and their descendents who settled in Ireland. The other was 
direct English contact with Irish workers who poured into 
English cities in search of work and who usually crowded to­
gether in deplorable slum and ghetto conditions.^ The 
latter development occurred primarily with the advent and 
growth of the industrial revolution. The uprootedness, in­
security, fear, and hostility which industrialization and 
its concomitant, urbanization, brought to masses of English 
workers were aggravated and intensified by the influx of Irish 
laborers who merely increased the competition for jobs and 
the supply of manpower, thereby reducing the immediate
^K. S. Inglis, Churches and the Working Classes in 
Victorian England (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963),
p. 1 2 0 .
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possibility of improving working and living standards.^ In 
addition the Irish, with their un-English accents, were 
easily identifiable as an alien group. This, coupled with 
their adherence to the Catholic religion, made them a par­
ticularly unattractive element in English society. It was 
easy therefore for English workers to vent their fears and 
frustrations on them. An explanation had to be found for 
the state of English working class conditions. And while 
attacks on automated machines offered some outlet for the 
release of pent-up feelings, these were in the final analysis 
inanimate objects and could serve only a limited function.
The urge to find a human scapegoat was never far from the 
surface, and since the Irish were the only large alien group 
existing in England, they became the obvious victim of this 
impulse. It was knowledge of this latent dislike of the 
Irish which impelled Joseph Chamberlain to note in 1882 that 
"nothing would be easier . . . than to get up in every large 
town an anti-Irish agitation almost as formidable as the 
anti-Jewish agitation in Russia." And it was the existence 
of such anti-Irish and anti-Catholic prejudice that led Lord 
Randolph Churchill to make his famous pronouncement that if 
Gladstone "went for Home Rule, the Orange card would be the
^John Archer Jackson, The Irish in Britain {London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 162.
c
Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, I, 352.
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6one to play."
This perception of the Irish was constantly reinforced
by the assertions of the Anglo-Irish. Often closely connected
or associated with aristocratic society in England# the
Anglo-Irish had easy entree to the press and to the public
opinion-making organs generally. Popular magazine articles,
the works of literature, the historical accounts of Ireland
read in England were generally either the production of, or
7
were strongly influenced by, the Anglo-Irish. Their 
attitude toward the Irish often tended to be more contemptu­
ous, unsympathetic, and less yielding than that of their 
English counterparts. This resulted from a number of 
reasons. Perhaps the most important of these was the fact 
that they possessed large amounts of property in Ireland, 
and they depended largely on the income from this for their 
existence. The attacks on that property by the Irish, the 
difficulties of collecting rent, the ugly evictions, all 
contributed to an uneasy sense of uncertainty and insecurity. 
In addition the Anglo-Irish were generally convinced that if 
the Irish were to gain control of the law-making machinery 
and the power of government, such as would be the case under 
a system of Home Rule, they would legislate and govern in 
such a way that their ownership of property and the income
**W. S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, II,
28-29, 59.
7
The most influential historical studies of Ireland 
in this period were probably those of Froude, Goldwin Smith, 
and W. E. H. Lecky.
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derived from it would be seriously jeopardized. For this 
reason the Anglo-Irish thought of the nationalists as in­
capable of fair and equitable government. They looked upon 
them as unashamedly class-oriented. In an effort to maintain 
their own position in Ireland, they fought a long,- communally 
divisive campaign. To prevent the inauguration of reform 
and self-government they depicted the Irish in deeply dis­
paraging terms. By this well-executed tactic they were able 
to maintain a widespread hostility toward them. This was 
not difficult, since most Englishmen held a rather unattrac­
tive view of them in any case. It was the overwhelming force 
and pervasiveness of this traditional attitude that the 
Gladstonian Liberals had to overcome when they undertook to 
advance a new policy toward Ireland in the late nineteenth 
century. Gladstone was well aware of the power of the op­
position he had to contend with, especially the power of most 
of society's leading influential elements. "I do not," he 
stated,
disguise for myself . . . the strength of the combination 
that is opposed to us. . . . They have nearly the whole 
of the wealth of the country; they have nearly the whole 
of the high stations of the country; they have most of 
the elements of social strength that abound among them; 
they have with these all the influence that belongs to 
wealth, rank, and station in this country. . . .8
The problem confronting Gladstonian Liberals was 
gigantic. It was nothing less than the re-education and
O
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 
3d ser., Vol. 322 (Feb. 9-Mar. 1, 1880), col. 776.
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re-orientation of the English people. This task was not made 
easier by the fact that until this time they themselves had 
largely subscribed to the traditional view of the Irish. 
Gladstone, in his first two administrations, employed a set 
of laws and methods of judicial procedure in Ireland which 
would have been unthinkable in England. By pursuing the 
path of extraordinary law, he inadvertently contributed to 
the prevalent concept that the Irish were so criminally and 
anarchically constituted that it was difficult, if not im­
possible, to rule them by ordinary law. He had of course
the right to alter his policies if he so wished, but the
political inexpediency of doing so was very great. Since the
Conservatives were able to charge that his commitment to 
Home Rule came only after the elections of 1885, they were 
able to convey the impression that because the Nationalists 
held the balance of power in the House of Commons Gladstone 
was willing to dissolve the union merely to win their support 
and attain office. This was of course not true, for Glad­
stone had been adopting a more sympathetic approach to the 
Irish and Irish problems ever since 1868, and he had declared
his belief in the justice and efficacy of some form of self-
9government for Ireland as early as 1881. But while m  the
^See "Mr. Gladstone in the City," The Times, Oct. 14, 
1881, p. 8; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 
3d ser., Vol. 266 (Feb. 7-Mar. 2, 1882), cols. 260-66; and 
W. S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, II, 29. Gladstone 
was aware of the dangerously divisive consequences that the 
attempt to enact Home Rule would have and so he offered to 
support the Conservatives in 1885 if they would propose it.
They refused, and Gladstone then proposed it himself,
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period 1868-1886 he was personally making the transition 
from the old traditional derogatory image to a new and more 
encomiastic one, he failed to carry the English people with 
him. In fact the only hope of persuading the majority of 
them to adopt this new outlook was to undertake a concen­
trated and consistent campaign to reconstruct and rehabili­
tate the public image of the Irish, and this Gladstone failed 
to do.
One significant consequence of this was that the 
English people were not immediately able to adopt this new 
interpretation. The old view was too deeply ingrained to be 
easily removed. In addition they could observe the Irish 
daily at work throughout England performing the lowest and 
most menial tasks of unskilled labor. They could see them 
clannishly band together to engage in private conversation. 
They could observe them indulge in forms of social activities 
and entertainment peculiar to themselves.^"® They were aware 
that they belonged to the Catholic Church, a church which 
they associated with superstition, iconolatry obscurantism, 
and the stifling of freedom. They identified submission to
stating that he was prepared to advance it without any sup­
port whatever. "This was one of the great Imperial occas­
ions," he stated, "which call for such resolutions." In ad­
dition, the fact that he proposed to exclude the Irish from 
Westminster should seriously weaken the argument that his 
prime objective was to garner Irish support for the Liberal 
Party. See The Prime Ministers* Papers; W. E. Gladstone, 
Vol. I: Autobiographica, pp. 108-11; Cecil, Life of Salis-
bury. III, 280-81; and Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour, I,
93-95.
^®Jackson, The Irish in Britain, pp. 128-33.
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the Pope with disloyalty to the Crown. In the press they 
could read of rick-burning in Ireland, of the maiming of 
animals, the killing of landlords and their agents. It was 
difficult to convince the English electorate that these 
people were much like themselves. And yet these were the 
facts which Gladstonian Liberals had to combat when they 
undertook to grant the Irish Home Rule and to rehabilitate 
the view of them that prevailed in England. It was an ex­
tremely formidable undertaking, made even more difficult by 
the fact that certain of the charges made against the Irish 
were actually true. It was true, for example, that they 
often lived in mud cabins in Ireland and in extremely over­
crowded and unsanitary slum and ghetto conditions in 
England.^ It was true that they had little professional
training, that they were usually equipped only for unskilled 
12occupations. And it was true that they often got drunk on 
Saturdays and attended a despised church on Sundays. Many 
English workers, too, suffered similar material and social 
deprivation. But in the social and occupational stratifica­
tion of English society English workers could see around 
them large numbers of their fellow-countrymen who had 
achieved various advanced levels of professional, social, 
and cultural success. To them, this was clear proof that 
Englishmen possessed advanced mental attributes. Under
11Ibid., pp. 40-71.
12Ibid., 96-110.
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certain conditions those Englishmen whose economic, social, 
and cultural state was little better than that of the Irish 
could share vicariously in the success and achievements of 
their fellow-countrymen. When they contemplated the Irish, 
on the other hand, they perceived a people mired exclusively 
and irretrievably in the lowest strata of society. They saw 
only unskilled laborers and slum-dwellers, so that their 
image became fixed,by these facts.
Under these conditions it was quite useless for Home 
Rule Liberals to inform Englishmen that the characteristics 
of the Irish were much like their own, that they had similar 
objectives and similar talents, that they were law-abiding 
and loyal. Throughout the 1880s English newspapers were 
filled with stories of agrarian outrage and murder in Ireland. 
There was the assassination of the chief secretary and his 
under secretary in the early 1880s, there was the long series 
of articles on "Parnellism and Crime” in the mid-18 80s, and 
there was the seeming deceit and immorality of the Parnell 
liaison with Mrs. O'Shea at the end of the decade. For one 
brief moment in 1889, after the vindication of Parnell by the 
Special Commission, it appeared as if the new and more sym­
pathetic Gladstonian view of the Irish might triumph. But 
then came the O'Shea divorce case, followed by the bitter 
leadership feud and rupture of the Nationalist Party, lend­
ing renewed vigor to the old attitude and dealing a severe
13blow to the Gladstonian cause. Once more Gladstonian 
13Gladstone felt that these developments destroyed
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Liberals were forced to fight against the impression created 
by the press that the Nationalist leader was dishonest, 
deceitful, and immoral. The entire episode was portrayed 
by the anti-Home Rule forces as further evidence of the 
treacherous and untrustworthy nature of the Irish. The in­
volvement of such a leading political figure in a divorce 
case was certainly atypical in late Victorian England; and 
for that very reason the impact of the event was much more 
striking. Two examples of the press accounts of the affair 
will reveal the relentless effort to portray Parnell in dis­
paraging terms. The Times, having failed in its previous 
effort to destroy his respectability, was awarded another 
opportunity. It wrote: "Domestic treachery, systematic and
long-continued deception, the whole squalid apparatus of 
letters written with the intent of misleading, houses taken 
under false names, disguises and aliases, secret visits, and
sudden flights make up a story of dull and ignoble in-
14fidelity. . . . "  The Annual Register was no more sympa­
thetic. "The outcome," it wrote,
. . . was to show that for years Mr. Parnell had resorted 
to every device and subterfuge to conceal from the man 
he continued to call his friend the dishonour he had 
inflicted upon him. The facts as substantiated revealed 
a course of conduct more than usually base, and proved 
Mr. Parnell to be wholly without sense of honour or 
truthfulness.
his hopes of winning the necessary majority to push Home Rule 
through the House of Lords. The Prime Ministers* Papers:
W. E. Gladstone, Vol. I: Autobiographica, pp. 114-15.
14The Times, Nov. 18, 1890, p. 9.
*^*The Annual Register for 1890, p. 232.
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By such methods Gladstonian Liberals were constantly 
forced onto the defensive. They were repeatedly maneuvered 
into a position whereby they were unable to present their 
image of the Irish in positive terms. This was perhaps 
unavoidably inherent in the fact that they were forced to 
deny the validity of the traditional British image of the 
Irish. They were compelled to argue that it was the product 
of a series of prejudices, and that far from reflecting the 
real nature of the Irish, it revealed merely how most Britons 
preferred to visualize them. Any attempt therefore to view 
the Irish in a fresh light required that the English, as a 
first step, fashion a realistic perception of themselves. It 
necessitated a recognition by Englishmen that they nurtured 
a number of anti-Irish prejudices. It demanded an awareness 
of the fact that government in Ireland had often wilfully 
prevented economic and social development. This is the 
approach which Gladstonian Liberals took in the late nine­
teenth century. They were willing to recognize the validity 
of the traditional image of the Irish at many points. For 
example, they agreed that the Irish often violated the law. 
They conceded that they were often rebellious and disloyal. 
But they maintained that such actions were justified by the 
nature of the law, by the existence of an unjust social 
system, and by the mode of government.^
16See Morley, "England and Ireland," The Fortnightly 
Review, XXXV (April 1, 1881), 412, 418, and his Life of 
Gladstone, II, 292.
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This was an essential aspect of the argument which 
Gladstonian Liberals tried to present to the English people. 
That the Irish had many faults they were willing to acknow­
ledge. But those faults were not nearly so multitudinous, 
nor were they so peculiarly Irish, as Englishmen often be­
lieved. Home Rule Liberals argued that in essential char­
acteristics the Irish were not very different from the 
English. The basic cause of dissent and disorder in Ireland, 
and of Irish hostility toward England, stemmed from the fact 
that the English government gave repeated and overwhelming 
support to the objectives of the Anglo-Irish. If England 
would address itself decisively to the grievances of the 
Irish people, much of the disorder and the hostility toward 
England would disappear. Gladstonian Liberals, therefore, 
viewed Ireland very differently from the Whigs, Conservatives, 
and Radical Unionists. They saw in that country a host of 
grievances, including the system of legislating and governing 
from Westminster. These, they argued, had been created by 
the English and the Anglo-Irish, without reference to the 
wishes of the Irish people. Ireland, they concluded, was a 
land of many injustices, and they undertook the gigantic 
task of removing them.
It is interesting to compare the attitude of the Home 
Rule Liberals toward the various nationalist movements 
throughout Europe with their attitude toward the Irish.
Their policy had been that each national group, qua national 
group, had the right, if they so desired, to national
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autonomy. In addition England had granted self-government 
in important internal, or domestic matters to the states of 
South Africa, to Canada, to Australia and New Zealand. Glad­
stonian Liberals placed Ireland in the same category as the 
various European national groups, whether resident in Europe 
or in various parts of the empire. Since they, plus many 
Whigs and Conservatives, had supported self-government for 
these groups, they could not understand on what grounds 
similar concessions could be withheld from the Irish. It 
could only be, Gladstone concluded, on the basis that they 
were sub-human. "The Irish people," he charged
are to be deliberately . . . depressed below the standard 
level of mankind. . . .  We have made it our mission . . . 
to carry our freedom, so far as we were able to do so, 
throughout the world. We have given it . . .  to the 
members of our own race wherever situated. . . .  In 
giving free Institutions to the Colonies you had to deal 
with one Colony the majority of the inhabitants in which 
were convicts, or the children of convicts. . . . But 
you have not limited your benefactions to our own race. 
You went to Canada and found there a mass of Frenchmen. 
Responsible government was conceded to that country, al­
though the number of Frenchmen in it exceeded the number 
of Englishmen. You captured the Cape, and found there a 
sturdy race of Dutchmen— the most persistent and in­
tractable of human beings. You treated these Dutchmen 
in the same way. . . . But one exception is to be per­
manently maintained, and at your own shores you are to 
have an island to which you are to deny the same free 
Institutions. . . . Your opposition to the concession 
of a Parliament to Ireland is always founded on the 
supposition that the Irish people, if they have power 
put into their hand, will always use it wrongly; and you 
deny to them not the name of men, but the proper conse­
quences of the acknowledgement of that name. But then, 
say some, . . . "we do not deny them to be human. They 
are only too human." What is the meaning of that? In 
what are they too human? They are too human to have any 
common sense; they are too human to have any sense of 
justice; they are too human to have any perception of 
their interest. . . .
^ The Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 4th 
ser., Vol. II (April 11-May 3, 1893), cols. 1004-05.
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Gladstone refused to accept the argument that the
Irish were unfit for self-government. He looked upon this as
the postulate of English prejudice. There was, he felt, no
reason to make such an assumption. On the contrary, there
were many examples of estimable Irish aptitudes. Furthermore,
how was it logically possible to condemn the Irish on racial
grounds without at the same time implying the denunciation of
the Welsh and many of the Scots? For these two groups were
also largely Celtic, and were so considered by Englishmen.
It was perhaps feasible to differentiate plausibly between
the Irish, Welsh, and Scots on national grounds, but to do so
18racially seemed impossible. A few Englishmen even repudi­
ated the assumption that England was predominantly Anglo- 
Saxon. This was the case with Ernest Barker who held, on the 
contrary/that England could be more justifiably described as 
Anglo-Celtic. Still the Unionists habitually and pejoratively 
referred to Ireland, Scotland, and Wales as the Celtic fringe 
and often derided the fact that the Liberals received pro-
19portionately greater electoral support there than in England. 
The Scottish and Welsh preference for the Liberal Party, how­
ever, was not occasioned by any particular sympathy for Irish 
Home Rule, but by the fact that the Liberals were generally
18W. E. Gladstone, The Irish Question (Authorized 
ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1886), p. 33.
19Direct Liberal electoral support largely ended in 
Ireland with the rise of the Nationalist Party. Except for 
one brief and conspicuous lapse in 1885, however, the Na­
tionalists usually supported the Liberals.
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assumed to be more sympathetic to their particular aims.
Gladstonian Liberals looked upon the racial and na­
tional makeup of the United Kingdom very differently from the 
Unionists. While they agreed that it was composed of two
major racial groups, they also maintained that it consisted
20of four distinct, and politically equal, nationalities.
This assumption of national political equality is important 
because in 1894 Lord Salisbury seemed to reject it. In that 
year he pronounced in the House of Lords that until a majority 
of the electorate in England— as distinct from Ireland, Scot­
land, and Wales— declared its support for Home Rule that
21policy could not be enacted. This theory gave England a
special and unique constitutional position. Whether Salisbury
intended this doctrine to apply to all legislative matters,
to all organic or constitutional matters, or merely to this
22one issue he never made clear. One of the major difficul­
ties for the solution of the Irish problem was that these 
nationalities and racial groups were not geographically com­
partmentalized. Ireland, for example, was made up of native 
Irish, Anglo-Irish, and Ulster Scots. Most Home Rule Liberals
20Gladstone, The Irish Question, p. 33.
21The anti-Horne Rule Liberal imperialist Lord Rose­
bery expressed his approval of this theory, thereby causing 
suspicion and resentment among the Nationalists. The Parli­
amentary Debates (House of Lords), 4th ser., Vol. 22 (Mar.
12-Apr. 9, 1894), col. 32.
22For Salisbury's views on this matter see Ibid., 
cols. 22-24.
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saw no major racial or cultural difference between these 
groups, and were therefore willing to grant the Irish self- 
government. It is true, as has been pointed out, that they 
visualized the Irish as occupying the lowest social and occupa­
tional position in the United Kingdom, as existing largely in 
mud cabins or other forms of slum housing, but they did not 
consider this to be the result of natural, or biological, 
factors. The condition of the Irish was, in their view, a 
product of the historical political system. The Irish had 
long been excluded from the paths of opportunity and training.
Once these were opened up, Gladstonian Liberals argued, the
23Irish would reveal commendable aptitudes.
If the Irish seemed rebellious, anarchic, and revolu­
tionary, this was basically because they were locked into an 
oppressive social system. If the conditions of land tenure 
were reformed so that the tenant would gain economic security, 
agrarian crimes and disturbances would vanish. Most land­
owners, of course, denied the truth of these allegations. The 
fault, they argued, did not lie in the system of landholding 
or in the price of rents. It lay in the Irish themselves.
It was their view that if the tenants cultivated the fields 
industriously, if they handled their incomes intelligently, 
if they avoided the excessive consumption of alcoholic drinks, 
their material circumstances would be adequate. Gladstonian
This theme was constantly reiterated during the 
debates on the first and second Home Rule Bills.
276
Liberals, however, were not persuaded by these arguments.
They were not convinced that the Irish were peculiarly less 
efficient and less industrious than individuals elsewhere. 
They did not believe that the root cause of their difficul­
ties lay in laziness, ignorance, and alcohol. On t.he con­
trary they accepted the argument advanced by the Nationalists
that the real problem lay in the inequity of the social and
24political system. This is how they visualized the situa­
tion in Ireland, and this explains why they undertook a 
series of revolutionary land reforms and the policy of Home 
Rule. In this matter they were finally vindicated, for as 
the grievances which in the late nineteenth century caused 
so many crimes, so many imprisonments, and so much bitter­
ness, were finally eradicated the Irish countryside became a
25place of peace and order.
From about 1870 onward, therefore, certain Liberals 
took an increasingly critical attitude toward the great 
estate owners of Ireland. They charged them with responsi­
bility for the conditions which prevailed in the three south­
ern provinces. Only in Ulster did a situation exist whereby 
the tenant was assured a reasonable degree of security. Hence
24In a recent revisionist interpretation of tenant 
problems Barbara Lewis Solow argues that these did not result 
from the landholding system. See Barbara Lewis Solow, The 
Land Question and the Irish Economy, 1870-1903 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1971).
25In this respect it is interesting to note that from 
about 1913 onward disorder in Ireland tended to originate in 
urban rather than rural areas.
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much of the agrarian crime that permeated other parts of 
Ireland was unknown in the north. This was often interpreted 
by the Conservatives, Whigs, and Radical Unionists as proof 
that the Irish were very different from Anglo-Saxons and that 
they were peculiarly susceptible to crime. Rejecting this 
argument, Home Rule Liberals criticized the landlords for 
being almost completely indifferent in the conditions and 
welfare of the country. Many of them took little interest in 
their estates or in the economic development of Ireland.
They employed agents to manage their properties and collect 
rents while they themselves spent much of their time else­
where, often in England. This was true of such famous English 
noblemen as Lord Derby, Lord Hartington, and Lord Lansdowne, 
who owned vast estates in Ireland. Lansdowne's Irish property 
alone totalled 121,349 acres, being the second largest estate
in Ireland; and the income from it amounted to more than
26£32,000 a year. It is perhaps hardly surprising that these 
men were among the first to oppose Gladstone's Irish policies.
One of the problems was that most landlords showed 
very little interest in the economic development of Ireland. 
The agrarian problem might well have been less acute had the 
competition for land been curtailed by the development of 
industry. But since large portions of the profits earned in 
Ireland were siphoned off and spent in England, Irish indus­
trial development was extremely limited. Had these profits
2 6Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography, p. 497.
278
been reinvested in the development of Irish industry, a por­
tion of the surplus agricultural labor force would have found 
industrial employment, thereby relieving the pressure on land. 
English statesmen, however, often concerned themselves more 
with the search for schemes of emigration to remove the sur­
plus labor force from Ireland than the question of developing
27Irish industry. A number of Liberals came to look upon the
28great estate owners as "detestable tyrants" who mercilessly
29exploited the tenants. In the 1870s and 1880s, however, 
when the economic conflict between landlords and tenants was 
at its peak, certain Liberals who were growing more sympa­
thetic to Irish complaints began to wonder if in fact the 
Irish were not more prone to violence than Englishmen. How­
ever, as the various land laws brought to the tenant a 
greater degree of material security, agrarian violence sub­
sided, reinforcing among most of them a greater confidence in 
the law-abiding propensities of the Irish.
It was not an easy matter for men long steeped in a
27As late as 1886 Lord Salisbury, opposing Gladstone's 
land act of that year, suggested that the money be used 
instead to ship a million Irishmen out of the country. See 
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), 3d ser.,
Vol. 304 (Mar. 26-Apr. 21, 1886), cols. 1820-22.
2 8Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, I, 343.
29Morley, Recollections, I, 334; and Wilfred Scawen 
Blunt, My Diaries; Being a Personal Narrative of Events, 
1888-1914 (2 vols.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1923), II,
59.
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certain set of attitudes, conditioned in a particular school, 
trained to observe a specific set of values, to suddenly 
change and respect that which they had formerly been taught 
to detest. And yet this was to a large extent what certain 
Liberals undertook in the period 1868-1886. The disestablish­
ment of the Episcopal Church in Ireland did not in itself 
require any surrender of principle or conscience on the part 
of most Liberals. Establishment of a particular church was 
not an issue to which they were generally committed. However, 
behind the disestablishment and disendowment of the Episcopal 
Church lay the implication of a broader principle. This 
involved the status of the Catholic Church. Since all de­
nominations in Ireland henceforth occupied an equal legal and 
constitutional position, did this mean that Catholicism was 
at last raised from its trough of disrespectability? This 
seemed to be implied in the act of disestablishment. And yet 
it might be argued that the Liberals still looked with a cer­
tain degree of disdain on the Catholic Church, because truly 
equal treatment demanded that, as the church of the majority, 
it be established in Ireland, just as the church of the 
majority was established in England and Scotland. However, 
the refusal to do so was not as discriminatory as it appears 
on the surface, for the Liberal Party, as the representative 
of the Nonconformists, had an important element within it that 
wished to see the disestablishment of all churches. Not that 
there was any particular desire on the part of Irish Catholics 
to have their Church established. The removal of the
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Episcopal Church from its favored status was a sufficient 
victory for most of them.
However, there was still in Britain a widespread 
no-popery prejudice,which was, as D. C. Somervell states,
"an ancient inheritance of Englishmen."30 Catholic emancipa­
tion in the early part of the century had not erased this 
attitude; and in this period it may have gained a renewed 
lease on life through the writings of James Anthony Froude.33, 
The extension of the franchise did not immediately democratize 
English working class thought on this question. The Liberals
still had to proceed carefully in their Irish policy in order
32to prevent a "Protestant anti-Irish reaction." John Bright
may have mirrored the essence of this sentiment accurately
when, in opposition to Home Rule, he informed Gladstone in
1886 that he could not "consent to a measure which is so
offensive to the whole protestant population of Ireland, and
to the whole sentiment of the province of Ulster so far as
33its loyal and protestant people are concerned." Most 
Liberals, however, were discarding these habits of thought.
They refused to regard the Irish as of incorrigible intel­
lectual capacity simply because they subscribed to Catholic
30Somervell, English Thought in the Nineteenth Cen­
tury, pp. 148-49.
31Ibid., pp. 148-49.
32Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill,
p. 111.
33Morley, Life of Gladstone, III, 327.
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theology. None of the Liberal Irish chief secretaries from
1886 onward adopted the old condescending attitude. John
Morley in particular despised the narrowness of outlook which
was responsible for the blatant discrimination against Irish
Catholics. In his memoirs he points out that when he assumed
the chief secretaryship in 1892 almost the entire magistracy
34of Ireland was Protestant. He immediately set out to 
correct this anomaly. During his tenure of office he ap­
pointed "637 county justices over the heads of lieutenants of
35counties; 554 of them Catholic; 83 Protestants." There 
could be little doubt of Morley's attitude toward Irish 
Catholics. He notes with regret that, despite his achieve­
ment, at the end of his term of office Protestants still out-
3 6numbered Catholics on the bench by more than two to one.
Sir Ivor Jennings makes an interesting observation on the
attitude of many English people toward Catholicism. He writes
that as late as the 1920s most parents still felt that if
their son, "who had just gone up to Cambridge, turned Labour
it was as unfortunate as if he had turned Roman Catholic.
.37
• • •
In their attitude toward the Ulster Protestants Glad­
stonian Liberals were somewhat ambivalent. Most of them could
34Morley, Recollections, I, 341.
35Ibid., I, 341.
36Ibid., I, 341.
37Jennings, Party Politics, II, 283.
282
see no impelling reason why they should refuse to live under 
a Home Rule government. This fact is highly important, for 
it reveals that they saw no major distinction between the 
Ulster Protestants and Irish Catholics. Their feeling was 
that the Ulster Protestants held a view of Irish Catholics 
that had its roots in the religious attitudes of the seven­
teenth century. They still pictured them— and themselves—  
in the light of that age. They still saw themselves as a 
small colony surrounded by a hostile host. Since most Lib­
erals were steadily altering their image of the Irish, they
could not understand why Ulster Protestants refused to alter 
38theirs. But for them the transformation was not as easy as 
it was for Englishmen. The latter lived in a country where 
Catholics comprised a very small minority. There was little
38It should be pointed out that a small number of 
Ulster Protestants did of course change their impression of 
Irish Catholics, Sir Roger Casement being perhaps the most 
outstanding example in this period. Another, who became 
extremely indignant at the tendency among Englishmen to look 
upon Irish Catholics with contempt, was the Ulster Protestant 
playwright St. John Ervine. In an extremely critical study 
of Sir Edward Carson he wrote:
"The first of many illusions held about Ireland by 
English people which must be dispelled is that there 
are two nations in Ireland: one, the minority, resident
in Ulster and composed of Protestants, all of whom are 
thrifty, industrious, sober, honest, intelligent, brave 
and highly enlightened; the other, the majority, resi­
dent in the remaining provinces and composed of Catholics, 
all of whom are spendthrift, lazy, drunken, corrupt, 
ignorant, often cowardly and invariably supersititious."
St. John G. Irvine, Sir Edward Carson and the Ulster Movement 
(Dublin: Maunsel and Co., 1915), pp. 16-17. It should be
pointed out that Ervine later became extremely critical of 
Irish Catholics and admiring of Ulster Protestants. See his 
Craigavon: Ulsterman (London: Allen and Unwin, 1949).
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reason for them to feel any significant threat to their 
religious or political institutions. The position of the 
Ulster Protestants was very different. They resided in a 
land where Catholics predominated. Ever since they first 
settled in Ulster in significant numbers relations between 
them and their Catholic neighbors were, with only minor 
exceptions, marked by suspicion and periodic violence. The 
bitter conflicts of the seventeenth century formed the very 
core and foundation of Ulster Protestant traditions. Vic­
tories gained over Catholics became the occasion for annual 
celebrations. The Orange Order, founded in 1795, was 
dedicated to the maintenance of these traditions. "The very 
name of Orangeman," Archbishop Whately stated, "is a sign
chosen on purpose to keep up the memory of a civil war which
39every friend of humanity would wish to bury in oblivion."
Most Gladstonian Liberals therefore viewed the Ulster 
Protestants as an extremely militant group. This does not 
mean that they were willing to force them to live under a 
Nationalist-dominated government. Although they were con­
vinced that the Ulster Protestants had nothing to fear from 
Home Rule, they still felt that they could not coerce them 
into a course to which they were opposed. Since the Ulster 
Protestants preferred to remain within the existing political 
structure of the United Kingdom, and since they formed a 
majority of the population in a unitary geographic region,
39Quoted in Morley, Recollections, I, 223.
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the logic of Liberal principles regarding the rights of mature
national groups seemed to assure them the opportunity to do
so. Ironically it was partly on these principles that the
Conservatives were willing to support an Ulster rebellion in
the period 1912-1914. It was certainly discomforting for
Liberals to be confronted with a potential rebellion justified
by their own ideas. When the king asked Asquith in September
1913 if he did not consider the threat to coerce Ulster
"un-English and contrary to all Liberal and democratic
principles," the prime minister found it difficult to marshal
40a satisfactory answer. The fact that he was unable to do 
so revealed his emerging belief that the Ulster Protestants 
should be permitted to determine their own future. Once the 
Liberals had conceded this point the partition of Ireland be­
came inevitable. From this time forward it was merely a 
matter of how this objective could best be accomplished.
Throughout the Home Rule era a number of Liberals, in 
their attitude toward the Irish, seemed to be caught between 
the pressures of two opposing forces. There was, on the one 
hand, the desire to follow the new path pioneered by Glad­
stone and a number of his close associates. Those who 
followed the Gladstonian lead tended to look upon the Irish 
as people who were not very different from themselves. They 
attempted to justify Irish behavior— agrarian outrage, the 
agitation for self-government— as the product of longstanding
40
Nicolson, King George the Fifth, p. 232.
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grievances. There was, on the other hand, motivating a number 
of Liberals, a latent force which seemed to press them in the 
opposite direction. In many cases this force was never far 
from the surface, and any insistent or unusual demand by the 
Irish would arouse in them an indignant and impatient response. 
It would seem as if they genuinely wished to adopt a sympa­
thetic, democratic, and egalitarian attitude toward the Irish, 
but their cultural conditioning was such that they were still 
easily irritated by certain facets of Irish behavior. The 
antagonistic posture that had prevailed in England for so 
long continued at times to dominate their responses. They 
were in fact molded by two opposing traditions, and in periods 
of stress the old attitudes would often re-emerge.
In this respect it is interesting to note that the 
Liberals seemed to make no distinction between Nationalists 
who were Anglo-Irish and Protestant and those who were not. 
Since most Nationalists were in fact native Irish and 
Catholic, and since most unionists were Protestant and of 
British ancestry, the Liberals tended to think of all Na­
tionalists as Irish— or Celtic--and all unionists as Anglo- 
Saxon. This assumption and the dualistic attitude which 
permeated Liberal behavior toward the Irish can be observed 
in Gladstone, who until 1886 vacillated between the policies 
of coercion and conciliation. There was certainly a good
deal of ambivalence in the attitude which found him condemn-
41ing and imprisoning Parnell in 1881 as an anarchist, and 
^Eversley, Gladstone and Ireland, p. 170.
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which later led him to invite the Nationalist leader to spend
a weekend at Hawarden. On the one hand, he could describe
Parnell as a man who had "made himself pre-eminent in his
42attempt to destroy the law," and on the other he could ex­
press a desire to discover Parnell's view of certain proposed 
land law reforms. "What I should like to know," he wrote to
R. Barry O'Brien, "is Parnell's estimate of them; for that is
43a man of remarkable insight." Even Henry Labouchere could 
not escape this ambivalence. An avid supporter of Irish 
causes, Labouchere sympathized with most objectives of the 
Nationalist Party. As much perhaps as anyone in late nine­
teenth century British politics he deprecated the notion of 
Irish inferiority. And yet when he was irritated with 
Parnell, as he was in the autumn of 1885, he could attribute 
to him certain of those characteristics which composed the 
English stereotype. "My own experience of Parnell," he 
wrote, "is that he never makes a bargain without intending to 
get out of it, and that he has either a natural love of
treachery, or considers that promises are not binding when
44made to a Saxon. . . . "  (My italics). At various times 
certain Liberals had to guard against this latent urge to 
criticize the Irish in racial terms. It was extremely easy 
for them to slip into this habit. "There is," Lloyd George
42Ibid., p. 170.
43O'Brien, John Bright; A Monograph, p. 91.
44Thorold, The Life of Henry Labouchere, pp. 237-38.
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stated in April 1921, "a hard side to the Irish nature. They
45are greedy beyond any other part of the United Kingdom,"
And a few months later when the Irish balked at a settlement 
that would obligate them to take an oath of allegiance to the 
king Lloyd George became quite exasperated. The Boers had 
taken it, he stated. Why should the Irish refuse? "The 
fact was the Boers were a finer people.
It may perhaps be useful at this point, at the risk 
of digressing, to add a word in explanation of the behavior 
of Lloyd George and the Coalition Liberals after World War I. 
Lloyd George's willingness to pursue a policy of ruthless 
repression was in part a product of the dualism that existed 
in the Liberal attitude toward the Irish. It was also a 
result of the fact that very different forces were at work 
following the war. The old Nationalist Party had practically 
disappeared. The people being coerced were much more extreme 
in their demands and in their methods, and much less respect­
ful of the forms of English constitutional processes. In 
England, many people had become hardened by the horrors of 
the war; and these attitudes were not assuaged by the policies
^Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. Ill: 1918-1925, p. 61.
46Diaries of C. P. Scott, p. 407. The most difficult 
problem to resolve during the "Treaty" negotiations of 1921 
was this question of the oath of allegiance, with the Irish 
insisting on their right to establish a republic. De Valera 
tried to circumvent this problem by using a Gaelic term for 
republic, but since Lloyd George also knew something of the 
Celtic tongue this route to a solution proved difficult. It 
was rather wittily suggested at the time that a way out of 
the deadlock might be found by calling the new state the 
Royal Irish Republic.
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and practices of the Coalition. The rather aggressive and 
hostile attitude which it adopted toward Germany was not 
conducive to sympathy, patience, and understanding toward the 
Irish. Besides, the behavior of the Irish during the war had 
not in general endeared them to most Englishmen. They had 
not only revolted when England was engaged in a life and 
death struggle with Germany, but they had refused to submit 
themselves to the policy of conscription.
Liberal attitudes toward the Irish therefore were 
influenced by various new factors during and following World 
War I. The Liberal Party itself of course split into two 
competing and rather antagonistic factions. One branch, 
headed by Lloyd George, sought to insure its political future 
in an alliance with the Conservatives, much as the Whigs and 
Radical Unionists had done in the 1880s, though for different 
reasons. These Coalition Liberals adopted a rather antag­
onistic attitude toward the Irish. They felt that they had 
been disloyal to England during the war, that they had in­
creased her difficulties immensely by rebelling in 1916, that 
they had refused to serve with the same enthusiasm as the
47Ulster Protestants, and that they actually hated England.
Lloyd George adhered strongly to these views and was quite
prepared to "govern Ireland with the sword." He had, in the
opinion of C. P. Scott, "surrendered to the most extreme
48anti-Irish hatred." It may be relevant to point out that 
47Diaries of C. P. Scott, p. 377.
48Ibid., p. 377.
289
the Coalition Liberals were not alone in adopting this at­
titude. Even some leading members of the Labor Party succumb­
ed to the extreme anti-Irish mood that enveloped England after 
World War I. John Ward resorted to the old traditional custom 
of finding in the Irish those characteristics which he dis­
approved. Denouncing resistance to conscription, he asserted
that "the first organized opposition to compulsory military
49service began in Ireland." It was the Irish who had 
created "that ugly and menacing figure of pacifism, the con­
scientious objector."^  J. H. Thomas stated in November 1920 
that very few English workers sympathized with the Irish or 
their cause. The prevalent mood among them was that the 
government was far too tolerant of them, and that it should 
employ whatever means were necessary to bring them to sub­
mission. In short it should "wipe 'em out."^
It is interesting to observe the behavior of Lloyd 
George in the years immediately following World War I, when 
he headed the Coalition government. He, who on occasion had
49Ward, "The Army and Ireland," The Nineteenth Century 
and After, LXXXIX, No. 527 (Jan. 1921), p. 4.
50Ibid., p. 4.
51D. G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles:
British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918- 
1922 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), p. 71. The Labor Party
was split on the Irish issue but officially it supported the 
principles of Home Rule. It appointed a committee to visit 
Ireland to investigate the state of the country. The 
committee's report denounced the policies of the Coalition.
See the Report of the British Labour Commission to Ireland.
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led the fight against repression in the past, was now the
staunchest practitioner of it. He had been relentless in
his condemnation of British policies during the Boer War. He
was now equally relentless in his application of repression
in Ireland. He exhibited few qualms about the use of physical
force against the Irish. During the war he had been ready
and willing to pour troops, "armoured-cars and aeroplanes"
52into Ireland to impose conscription. C. P. Scott was
shocked at the casual attitude Lloyd George took toward
violence and bloodshed in Ireland. He informed him that if
he was going in for that sort of thing— repression, "rioting,
53bloodshed"— he at least "hoped there would be no executions."
To this Lloyd George agreed, "and said he had already given
instructions to that effect. There were to be no judicial
trials and punishments. If men were to be shot they were to
be put up against a wall and shot on the spot, as happened in
54the Paris Commune." Scott was shocked at the fact that 
Lloyd George "did not seem to realize that to shoot prisoners 
on the spot would be simply to execute them without trial or
52Dianes of C. P. Scott, p. 342.
53Ibid., p. 342.
54Ibid., p. 342. There are one or two interesting 
points about this statement which may present a significant 
clue to an understanding of Lloyd George. One is the fact 
that the analogy of the Paris Commune should spring to his 
mind. The other is that he seems to identify with the men 
who suppressed it.
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55on the verdict of a drum-head court martial." His attitude 
toward the Irish of course, had long been the subject of 
suspicion among Nationalist members of Parliament. When C.
P. Scott once suggested him for the Irish chief secretary­
ship, John Dillon "repudiated the suggestion as utterly out
C  fZ
of the question," describing him as "a slippery snake."
There prevailed, therefore, throughout the Home Rule 
era a standard and stereotyped image of the Irish, and even 
those who generally attempted to avoid this stereotype could 
find themselves resorting to it in times of irritation. It 
was obviously difficult for Englishmen who had been condi­
tioned in part by this image to escape from it entirely.
The following disucssion in 1886 between Gladstone and Sir 
William Harcourt affords an example of this problem:
W. V. H. [Sir William Harcourt] mentioned the "loyal" 
Irish. The word seemed to stir Gladstone's wrath ex­
tremely, and he said sarcastically, "Was there ever 
such a noble race as that I What a beautiful word 
'loyalist.' How much they have done for their country. 
You say that the Nationalists care for nothing but 
money, but have not the loyalists the same tastes?"
W. V. H. replied, "Certainly, the only difference is 
that where you can buy a Nationalist for £5 you must 
pay £6 for a loyalist." Turning to Lady Airlie, W. V. H. 
said, "I once asked your father . . . what was the 
smallest sum he had ever paid for a vote in the House 
of Commons, and he replied that he had once bought an
Irish member for £5 on the morning of the Derby." Glad­
stone said, "You think Ireland is a little hell on 
earth." W. V. H. said, "Yes, I think the only mistake 
Cromwell ever made was when he offered them the alterna­
tive of Connaught. . . ."57
55Ibid., p. 342. 
56Ibid., p. 207.
57Gardiner, The Life of Sir William Harcourt, I,
559-60.
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Harcourt's reasoning process was not unusual. He had found 
among the Irish a number of men who were willing on certain 
occasions to sell their Parliamentary vote, and from this he 
drew the conclusion that the Irish were generally corrupt 
and that Cromwell had perhaps been too lenient with them.
It is unlikely that Harcourt was basing his assessment of the 
Irish on this one incident alone. This was merely the event 
which on a particular occasion came most readily to mind 
when he contemplated them. If necessary, he could doubtless 
have marshalled a host of other examples equally derogatory. 
This was one of the unfortunate consequences of the wide­
spread stereotyped image of the Irish that predominated in 
England. It was extremely difficult, even for the most sym­
pathetic Liberals, to escape entirely from its influence.
The tendency to see in the Irish certain preconceived char­
acteristics was qxtremely strong. A long list of these char­
acteristics was set forth by the German historian Theodor 
Mommsen. Mommsen had not made a first hand study of the 
Irish and his impression of them therefore is valuable as an 
example of the image to be derived from persuing British 
sources. In his famous History of Rome Mommsen pauses long 
enough to make the following observation:
In the accounts of the ancients as to the Celts on the 
Loire and the Seine we find almost every one of the 
characteristic traits which we are accustomed to recog­
nize as marking the Irish. Every feature re-appears: 
the laziness in the culture of the fields; the delight 
in tippling and brawling; the ostentation; . . . the 
droll humour; . . . the hearty delight in singing and 
reciting the deeds of past ages, and the most decided 
talent for rhetoric and poetry; the curiosity— no trader
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was allowed to pass until he had told in open street 
what he knew, or what he did not know, in the shape of 
news— and the extravagant credulity which acted on such 
accounts; . . . the childlike piety, which sees in the 
priest a father and asks for his counsel in all things; 
the unsurpassed fervour of national feeling, and the 
closeness with which those who are fellow-countrymen 
cling together almost like one family in opposition to 
strangers; the inclination to rise in revolt under the 
first chance-leader that presents himself and to form 
bands, but at the same time the incapacity to preserve 
the self-reliant courage equally remote from presump­
tion and from pusillanimity, to perceive the right time 
for waiting and for striking a blow, to attain or even 
barely to tolerate any organization, any sort of fixed 
military or political discipline. It is, and remains, 
at all times and all places, the same indolent and 
poetical, irresolute and fervid, inquisitive, credu­
lous, amiable, clever, but— in a political point of 
view— thoroughly useless nation. . . .58
The fact that Mommsen, trained to sift the evidence, 
to detect bias and prejudice, to describe entities as they 
actually were, could be so thoroughly ensnared by this 
stereotyped picture reveals perhaps the magnetic and wide­
spread influence of racial thinking in this period. If the 
trained historian could not escape from it, the possibility 
of less analytical mortals doing so was presumably not 
great. Moreover, Mommsen had conceivably no ulterior reason 
for espousing this image. Unless he wished to maintain the 
general superiority of the Germanic peoples over the Celtic, 
his acceptance of it could only be based on the seeming 
plausibility of his sources. It is true perhaps that a num­
ber of the traits he attributed to the Irish were accurate 
descriptions of some of them. But that they were the
C O
Theodor Mommsen, The History of Rome, trans. by 
William Purdie Dickson (5 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1908), V, 99-100.
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predominant and generally exclusive characteristics of an 
entire people, and that they were presumably genetically 
and immutably transmitted, so that the Irish had remained 
and would continue to remain "at all times and all places, 
the same" is highly questionable.
Mommsen's acceptance of this description is revealing. 
It shows, to some extent, the attraction it held for many 
people. It offers an opportunity to gauge the magnitude of 
the force which Gladstonian Liberals had to combat in their 
effort to change English attitudes toward the Irish. In 
addition it helps explain why certain Liberals themselves 
succumbed to this characterization. Its influence was such 
that when under intense irritation they could slip back into 
traditional responses. Their attitude toward the Irish, 
therefore, contained a certain ambivalence. At times they 
would eulogize them unstintingly; on other occasions they 
would denounce them in typical traditional epithets.
By the end of the 1880s, however, most Gladstonian 
Liberals had largely abandoned their most extreme anti-Irish 
prejudices. The old tendency to lapse, in moments of irrita­
tion, into blanket denunications of the Irish gave way to a 
more stable and more positive approach. This is not to say 
that certain Gladstonian Liberals did not continue to fluc­
tuate in their attitude toward the Irish. They did. But 
from the late 1880s until the end of World War I there was 
more emphasis on their merits rather than their shortcomings. 
It is possible to observe this new approach in Liberal
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behavior toward the Nationalist members of Parliament. Where­
as during the 1870s and early 1880s Liberals, with few ex­
ceptions, had repeatedly denounced Nationalist M.P.s in the 
most critical terms, after this period they were often able 
to find words of praise for them. While prior to the mid- 
1880s they generally tended to think of them as aiming to 
destroy the functioning ability of the House of Commons, 
after that time they periodically described them as masters 
of Parliamentary debate and legislative understanding. The 
eulogistic exaggeration which permeates some of their remarks 
was an understandable reaction to the general English em­
phasis on Irish shortcomings. A few examples of these will 
illustrate the general trend. Speaking of Parnell's rapid 
development after entering the House of Commons, Lord 
Eversley wrote:
He speedily developed debating power of a very excep­
tional and unexpected kind. He showed great faculties 
of searching criticism and lucid statement, and great 
ability in rapidly cramming himself with facts suf­
ficient to enable him to take part in detailed crit­
icism. 59
Gladstone lavished unlimited praise on Parnell. He main­
tained that he possessed exceptional skill in the oratorical 
art of saying exactly what he intended to say, "not any 
more nor less."®® In this respect he compared him with 
Palmerston. Parnell and Palmerston, he told Arthur Balfour,
59Eversley, Life of Gladstone, p. 73.
®®Morley, Recollections, I, 241.
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"were the only two men he had ever known who had been able 
to get up and say exactly what they wanted without adding a 
single unnecessary word."6  ^ After Parnell had spent a week­
end at Hawarden in 1889 Gladstone said of him: "Nothing
could be more satisfactory than his conversation." "He is
certainly one of the very best people to deal with that I
62have ever known. . . . "  But the peak of Gladstone's
encomium was reached when he declared with the emphasis of
repetition that Parnell was "a political genius— a genius— a
63genius of most uncommon order."
Similar laudations were bestowed on other Nationalist 
politicians. Thomas Sexton won acclamations from many Glad­
stonian Liberals. Of his speech against the Coercion Bill 
of 1881 Lord Eversley wrote:
I had rarely listened to a more reasoned, eloquent, 
and cogent speech. There was no reiteration, and 
scarcely a word was redundant. It was a presage of 
many speeches of the same quality from Mr. Sexton, 
which gained him so . . . high a reputation in the 
House.
Eversley felt that of all the speeches delivered in favor of 
the first Home Rule Bill Sexton's was one of the few that 
"stood out in marked superiority."65 Herbert Gladstone
61Newton, Retrospection, p. 37.
62Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish Nation, pp. 603-05.
63Morley, Recollections, I, 236.
64Eversley, Life of Gladstone, p. 139.
65Ibid., p. 305.
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thought that "Sexton's speeches . . . were perfectly phrased
6 6and admirably reasoned." And once when speaking of the
great rapier-like debating skill of Arthur Balfour, John
Morley sought a comparison for him. Of the several hundred
men who sat in the House of Commons Morley passed them over
and selected Thomas Sexton, who, he said "for fine point and
67edge" was Balfour's "nearest rival."
The Irish Nationalists, thus, were increasingly com­
mended by Gladstonian Liberals for their understanding and 
eloquence. In addition to Parnell and Sexton, others singled 
out for special commendation were Michael Davitt, John
6 8Redmond, T. M. Healy, John Dillon, and Thomas Power O'Connor.
Herbert Gladstone was amazed at the number of "exceptionally
69good debaters" which this small Party contained. Harold 
Spender, commenting on Michael Davitt's first oration in the 
House of Commons, described it as "one of the most remarkable 
maiden speeches ever made in the House." "I hope,” he added, 
that it "marks the opening of . . .  a great Parliamentary 
career."^ Spender had similar praise for John Redmond's
6 6Viscount Gladstone, After Thirty Years, p. 181.
67Morley, Recollections, I, 226.
68Viscount Gladstone, After Thirty Years, pp. 180-81.
69Ibid., pp. 180-81.
70Harold Spender, The Story of the Home Rule Parlia­
ment (Reprinted, with additions and alterations from The 
Westminster Gazette. Westminster Popular No. 3, 1893), 
p. 20.
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speech on the second Home Rule Bill. Contrasting it with
that of the Conservative M. P. Henry Chaplin, he wrote:
After an appeal to Sir Robert Peel, Providence, the 
Empire, the civilised world, and a great many other 
Unionist favourites, Mr. Chaplin gave way to Mr. Redmond. 
Mr. Redmond's was in every way a remarkable speech—  
whether for its breadth of view, its moderation or its 
wealth of quotation. . . .
It is obvious that many Liberals had abandoned the 
most extreme aspects of the old traditional image of the 
Irish. Though it was still possible on occasion for some of 
them to succumb to the feeling of contempt that had long been 
associated with thoughts of them, most Liberals had generally 
rejected that attitude. They often replaced disparagement 
with commendation. At times they praised the Irish as ex­
travagantly as they had once denounced them. "They were,"
J. L. Hammond stated, "among the best speakers in the House
72of Commons. . . . "  Winston Churchill, himself not without 
some claim to eloquence, perhaps rendered the most encom­
passing verdict when he declared that the Irish were a
73"nation preternaturally eloquent." Churchill's description 
contains an obvious touch of hyperbole. However, it reveals 
in emphatic terms the new attitude which Gladstonian Liberals
71Ibid., p. 22. It is worth noting that R. C. K.
Ensor believed this speech by Redmond to be superior to all 
others delivered on the Second Home Rule Bill. See his 
England, 1870-1914, p. 211.
72Hammond, Gladstone and the Irish Nation, p. 735.
73W. S, Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, I, 87.
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adopted toward the Irish. It was based on an attempt to 
see them in a new and more realistic light. It was the pro­
duct in the early stages of a very few men, among whom 
William Gladstone, John Morley, and Henry Labouchere were the 
most prominant and most persistent. But having once been 
established, having once supplanted the old traditional im­
pression, it continued thereafter to play an important role 
in the motivation of most Liberals. It can perhaps be 
finally summarized in a statement by Herbert Gladstone. 
Writing many years later, when self-government for Ireland 
had been attained, and the Irish Nationalists had long since 
ceased to stir forensic turmoil at Westminster, Gladstone, 
looking back nostalgically, wondered whether their with­
drawal had been an entirely positive gain for England. 
Through all the vicissitudes of debate, he recalled, there 
was always "an inexhaustible fund of Irish humour which 
softened animosities and was often irresistible. The re­
moval of 'the boys' has certainly not been an unqualified 
gain."74
It is of course possible to find in these statements 
an attitude of condescending tolerance, which indicates that 
even those Liberals who were most sympathetic toward the 
Irish, still did not accept them on a thoroughly equal basis. 
This is doubtless a product of the fact that the long habit 
among Englishmen of thinking of themselves as superior to
74Viscount Gladstone, After Thirty Years, p. 180.
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the Irish was not easy to discard. The transition from a 
prejudiced or racist position to a non-racist one is often 
a difficult process; and is also in many cases an evolution­
ary one. Given the extreme racist dogmas which existed in 
England in this period, which seemed to be supported by the 
various scientific developments, to say nothing of such 
influential groups as the Fabians, it is easy to understand 
not only why the Liberals were not really able to accept the 
Irish on a truly equal basis but why they seemed to adopt a 
rather dualistic attitude toward them. For Liberals this 
was a period of transition, a period of flux, highlighted 
by the fact that while the most extreme anti-Irish prejudices 
were abandoned, they had not been replaced with a completely 
egalitarian attitude. The Liberals therefore, while they 
began the transition from a racist toward a non-racist po­
sition vis-a-vis the Irish, never quite completed this 
process,so that their attitude remained a fluctuating com­
pound of uneasy affection, paternalistic tolerance, and at 
times even a kind of good-natured contempt.
PART IV 
EPILOGUE
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CHAPTER VIII
THE LEGACY OF BRITISH COLONIALISM
The situation [in Ulster] has been made by you 
[England] and demands an act of repentance. You are the 
obstacle not Ulster.
— Gavan Duffy
Stubborn, irritating, determined Ulster existed; no 
one had to create it.
— Terence O'Neill
It was one of the major weaknesses of the British 
efforts to rule Ireland that until the late nineteenth cen­
tury British politicians were unable to look upon the Irish 
with any degree of admiration or affection. They visualized 
them as a race of people who were distinctly different from 
the British and who were distinctly inferior to them. They 
harbored extreme anti-Irish prejudices which were manifested 
in a predominant attitude of scorn and contempt. The Irish 
were depicted as lazy, lethargic, ignorant, and unintelli­
gent; as deceitful and treacherous. They were considered to 
be morally dissolute, religiously slavish, and politically 
tyrannical. They were depicted as criminal and anarchic, as
^Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 129.
2
Terence O'Neill, Ulster at the Crossroads (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 166-67.
302
303
disloyal and treasonous, as incapable of living in a lawful 
and orderly way. They were thought of as being unable to 
appreciate or respect the liberties or autonomy of the in­
dividual. In short they were considered to be extremely 
backward and unattractive, to be morally, culturally, and 
racially inferior to the British.
British politicians had a large repertoire of mental 
and behavioral characteristics which they attributed to the 
Irish— practically all of which were extremely derogatory. 
These were precisely the kinds of characteristics which they 
ascribed to the various Negro peoples throughout the empire. 
And just as they argued that in the case of the black peoples 
these characteristics were genetically produced, so also 
did they explain the nature of the Irish. The latter, they 
maintained, were the product of a gene pool which was very 
different from that which had produced the Anglo-Saxons. 
Inferior genes caused inferior character, inferior culture, 
inferior intellect. Precisely as the various Negro peoples 
throughout the empire were incapable of efficient and equit­
able self-government, so also were the Irish. It was argued 
therefore that Britain must continue to rule Ireland in 
order to maintain a state of law, to civilize the Irish, and 
to protect the Anglo-Irish and Ulster Protestants. Despite 
the obvious fact that British politicians by and large de­
tested and despised the Irish, they insisted that they were 
performing a charitable mission— they were ruling Ireland 
for the benefit of the Irish. This extremely derogatory
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image of the Irish people was offered as justification for 
the atrocious social conditions in which they existed and for 
the autocratic and repressive nature of British rule.
The first important steps toward the transformation 
of this attitude came with the advent of Gladstone to the 
premiership in 1868. During the next two decades he and a 
small number of Liberals gradually pioneered a new approach 
to the Irish and to Irish problems. They slowly rejected 
the most extreme aspects of the old stereotyped image and 
adopted the view that in important respects the Irish were 
not very different from the British. They developed an 
awareness of some of the prejudices which the British people 
felt toward them. They realized that Ireland was
governed in a partisan and disastrous way, and they concluded 
that the ills from which the Irish suffered did not stem 
primarily from their racial nature but from the nature of 
British government. Having thus adopted this new image of 
British conduct in Ireland, and of the nature of the Irish, 
the Liberal Party, under Gladstone, undertook to grant 
them a degree of self-government. Thus the image of the 
Irish which was held by each party, and also the perception 
which each held of British behavior toward them, had a 
strong impact on the composition and course of British policy. 
The Gladstonian Liberal decision to submit to the various 
Irish demands, including self-government, was based on their 
perception of British policy and Irish nature, together with 
a conviction that Home Rule for the Irish would strengthen
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the bonds between them and the British rather than weaken 
them. By the same token the Unionist refusal to grant such 
demands was predicated also on their rather different at­
titude toward British behavior in Ireland, on their image 
of Irish nature, and on their concept of the consequences of 
Home Rule for the future of the United Kingdom and the 
British empire.
The nature of racial prejudice is such that the racist 
finds it extremely difficult to recognize its existence in 
himself and to emancipate himself from it. The character­
istics which Englishmen tended to attribute to the Irish were and are 
typical racist stereotypes. The Irish were repeatedly des­
cribed as a race of people who were distinctly different 
from the British. Difference in skin color is not necessary 
to the existence of these prejudices. Liam de Paor's recent 
assertion that in Northern Ireland "Catholics are Blacks who
happen to have white skins" describes this condition per-
3
fectly. It would not be an exaggeration therefore to con­
clude that throughout the Home Rule period most Englishmen, 
and in particular the Unionists, looked upon and treated the 
Irish as "Blacks” who happened to have white skins. This 
attitude and the policies it gave rise to had immense conse­
quences for the course of Anglo-Irish relations, for the 
solution that was finally imposed on Ireland, and for the
3
Liam de Paor, Divided Ulster (Harmondsworth,
Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 13.
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intercommunal prejudice and antagonism which has continued 
to plague the course of Northern Ireland history since 1921. 
The latter factor has perhaps been the most vicious legacy 
of British imperialism in Ireland. It derives not only from 
the British racist attitude toward the Irish, but from the 
policies that this attitude gave rise to. Before proceeding 
therefore to examine this heritage of British imperialism, 
it will be useful briefly to summarize British policies dur­
ing the Home Rule era in order to clarify the chain of de­
velopment.
It was one of the towering strengths of Gladstone, 
and the few Liberals who pioneered the new approach to the 
Irish and the Irish question, that they were able to rise 
to some extent above the general racist mood that prevailed 
in England and to perceive in truer perspective the nature 
of their own attitudes, the depths of some of their own 
prejudices, and not only admit these, but understand that if 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland were to be 
long maintained British policy toward Ireland would have to 
be erected on a foundation of affection, respect, and con­
ciliation rather than antipathy, contempt, and coercion. 
Gladstone realized that the nature of Irish objectives was 
such that failure to concede them might in the end lead to 
complete separation of England and Ireland. More importantly 
he saw that if the two major political parties opposed each 
other on this issue deep antipathy between England and Ire­
land would inevitably ensue, for the Irish issue would become
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a political football to be kicked about in Parliament, in 
the press, and on the public platform for mere electoral 
expediency. It was for this reason that in December 1885 
he offered to support the Conservatives in Parliament if they 
would propose a Home Rule Bill. The irony of thi& is that 
the Conservatives visualized Gladstone as being engaged in 
precisely the kind of politics he was trying to avoid. They 
concluded that he announced his support of Home Rule merely 
to win Nationalist support in order to take office. They 
thereupon refused his offer, and the Irish question became 
henceforth a political issue which the Unionists exploited 
and aggravated in order to maintain the union and to win 
elections.
The Unionists realized that a large reservoir of 
hostility toward the Irish existed among the English elec­
torate and that they could tap this sentiment with political 
profit. They were aware that a policy of concession with 
the Irish was much less likely to succeed electorally than 
one of toughness. A policy of sympathetic resolution of 
Irish demands would merely be construed as weakness, and 
would stigmatize grievously the party associated with it.
For these reasons the Conservatives decided in January 1886 
to bring in yet another coercion bill for Ireland, realizing 
fully that on this issue the government would be defeated, 
but accepting, indeed welcoming, this event because it would 
cast them as the party which did not shrink from strong 
measures against the Irish. No clearer statement of these
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views could be found than the following words from Lord
Salisbury to Lord Randolph Churchill:
It is evident that the great majority of the Cabinet-- 
and, I believe, the great majority of the party— wish 
earnestly for a policy which will show that we do not 
shrink from the duty of government, and that we mean to 
stand by the Loyalists. The disaster I am afraid of is 
that we should be driven from office on some motion 
insisting on the necessity of a vigorous step, and our 
position in Opposition would then be very feeble and 
we should be much discredited. . . .  Do not let us take 
any line which will brand us in the eyes of our country­
men— or will enable our opponents to do so— as the 
timid party. . . . ^
Pursuit of these tactics forced the Conservatives to 
depict the Irish as enemies of law, order, and the British 
people. It led to attacks on the Irish and to appeals to 
anti-Irish prejudice among the British electorate. It made 
necessary the enactment by the Unionists of further coercive 
measures for Ireland in order to appear in the eyes of their 
supporters as the firm, no-nonsense party. The major weak­
ness of this policy of course was that it further aggravated 
the antipathy between Ireland and Great Britain. It was in 
fact an implicit admission that the union was not sufficient­
ly attractive to win the support of the Irish people. If 
the Irish wished to govern themselves, their supposition was 
that such government would be more beneficial than the exist­
ing one. The Conservative and Whig assumption that British 
rule in Ireland could only be maintained through a policy of 
firmness and toughness was a tacit admission that the bonds 
of union with Ireland were extremely tenuous. The contention
4
W. S. Churchill, Lord Randolph Churchill, II, 37.
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of the Home Rule Liberals that only through conciliation and
respect for the wishes of the Irish people could the empire
5m  Ireland be maintained seems much more realistic. Free 
consent of the Irish was the only meaningful basis for the 
continuance of the British link. It may in the end have been 
impossible to maintain the union in any case, for the impulse 
of nationalism or of economic interests may have forced the 
Irish eventually to seek the status of an independent state. 
It is reasonably certain, however, that a policy based on 
forceful maintenance of the union, coupled with the exploita­
tion of anti-Irish prejudice in England, could in the end 
result only in hostility between the two peoples and the 
emergence of an unbridgeable gulf between them. Had England 
granted Home Rule to Ireland in 1886, or indeed in 1893, it 
is difficult to see how the Irish republican movement could 
have emerged with such support, and the tragedies of the 
Easter Rising, the Anglo-Irish conflict of 1919-1921, the 
subsequent Civil War, and perhaps also the bitter sectarian 
prejudice and discrimination which has marked the history of 
Northern Ireland,might well have been avoided. Consequently 
the "Treaty" signed in December 1921 was not produced in a
^On this point one is reminded of the verdict of 
such men as John Masters, E. M. Forster, and George Orwell 
with respect to the British attitude toward India. As 
Allen Greenberger points out, it was the view of these 
men that India "deserved to be and was lost because of a 
lack of affection for the Indians." Greenberger, The 
British Image of India, p. 190.
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spirit of harmony and mutual respect, but in an atmosphere 
of bitterness, distrust, and recrimination. When self- 
government for Ireland was finally conceded it did not, as 
Gladstone had hoped, become the basis for a new, stronger, 
and more enduring union. It in fact signalled the. end of 
the union. As A. J. P. Taylor pointed out, "a terrible 
chapter in British history was closed.
But if one chapter in this story was closed, a new 
and sequential one, also "terrible," was about to unfold.
The consequences of British colonialism in Ireland had not 
yet run their explosive course. The Ulster Protestants and 
native Irish would continue to engage in the bitter sectarian 
and ethnic strife that has periodically marked the history 
of Ulster since the seventeenth century. It was the view of 
most Englishmen that the division of Ireland into two separ­
ate states was the only acceptable solution to the Irish 
problem. This does not necessarily mean that it was the 
only workable solution. It is true that a majority of the 
people in the northeastern counties of Ireland were of 
British ancestry and were utterly opposed to being ruled from 
Dublin. British statesmen therefore concluded that these 
people could not be asked to live under a government to 
which they were opposed. However, they were deluded by 
thinking that the difficulty would be resolved by the par­
tition of Ireland; for whichever solution was adopted, there
^English History, 1914-1945, p. 159.
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was going to be a large irredentist minority seeking reuni­
fication with what it considered to be its mother country.
If the Ulster Protestants were placed under a Dublin govern­
ment, they were prepared to fight to retain their previous 
status within the United Kingdom. If, on the other hand, 
a large native Irish, or Catholic, minority was placed under 
Ulster Protestant rule, they also were prepared to fight to 
gain reunification with the rest of Ireland.
Throughout the Home Rule era the Nationalist Party, 
and later the Sinn Fein Party, constantly maintained that 
the Ulster problem had been created by the British and was 
continually exploited by them. They argued that if the 
British would cease to support and exploit Ulster, the 
latter would be willing to accept Home Rule.^ What the Na­
tionalists and Sinn Feiners were asking was that England 
grant them a measure of self-government for all of Ireland, 
and that Ulster, when left to her own devices, would accept 
her fate. Of Ireland's thirty-two counties, there were only 
four in which the Ulster Protestants could muster a majority, 
and the Nationalists and Sinn Feiners felt that such a small
Q
area could not hope to hold out for long. If they proceeded
^Jones, Whitehall Diary, III, 88, 90, 93, 128, 129, 
and 131.
O
These four counties, all in the northeast, were 
Antrim, Armagh, Down, and Londonderry. The term Londonderry 
is British and was adopted in the seventeenth century. 
Formerly the name was Derry and is still widely and de­
liberately used by Irish Catholics. The term Londonderry 
is, for similar reasons, preferred among many Ulster Pro­
testants.
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to establish their own government, as the Ulster Unionist 
leaders repeatedly threatened to do, such government, when 
unrecognized by either Dublin or London, could not possibly 
exist for long. What would actually have happened had 
England acted in accordance with the demands of the Nation­
alists and Sinn Feiners can now never be known, but the 
difficulty for Englishmen was that they had worked themselves 
into a position from which they could not extricate them­
selves without appearing to violate their former promises 
and abandon the Ulster Protestants. This was the case not 
only with the Unionists but with the Liberals as well, for 
in 1914 they had conceded that the wishes of the Ulster Pro­
testants must be recognized. It had taken the Liberals much 
longer than the Unionists to arrive at this position, and 
their acceptance of it was almost wholly ascribable to 
Unionist pressure. Had the Unionists not taken up the cause 
of Ulster in 1886, had they not maintained that Ulster would 
be right to fight against Home Rule, and that they would 
support her in that struggle, the partition of Ireland might 
never have become a reality. For those who supported the 
Ulster Protestants did not, by and large, do so because they 
wished to see Ulster excluded from the jurisdiction of a 
Home Rule government. They did so in an effort to defeat 
Home Rule entirely.
This is another of the tragic aspects of British 
policy in Ireland. Hoping to prevent the enactment of Home 
Rule, the Unionists not only exploited latent anti-Irish
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prejudice in England, they also aggravated the anti-Irish 
hostility that existed among the Anglo-Irish and the Ulster 
Protestants. By so doing they intensified and kept alive 
the religious and ethnic consciousness of these two groups, 
thereby delaying the evolution of harmony between them and 
the native Irish. By accentuating the British origins of 
the Anglo-Irish and Ulster Protestants they helped prevent 
in them the development of a sense of being Irish, with a 
devotion to Ireland and a patriotism that found its object 
in Ireland rather than across the Irish Sea. One of the 
major consequences of this policy was the partition of Ire­
land in 1921. An additional result was the fact that the 
Ulster Protestants had developed such strong antipathies 
toward the native Irish that any attempt to establish a de­
gree of cooperation between them, such as was undertaken by 
those British statesmen who attempted to establish a Council 
of Ireland in 1921, with the aim of developing a degree of 
harmony and cooperation between the two states, found the 
task impossible. The purpose of this Council was to attempt 
to deal with matters of common interest between the two Irish 
governments, but the reluctance of the Ulster Protestants 
to associate in any way with the Free State for fear of 
losing their separate status made the success of the Council
9
of Ireland impossible.
9
It is interesting to note that in the new British 
settlement for Northern Ireland, undertaken recently by 
the Heath government, a Council of Ireland is to be re­
established.
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The division of Ireland into two separate states in 
1921 was, as has been pointed out, one of the most conspicu­
ous and most rancorous legacies of British colonialism in 
Ireland. One of these states, officially called Northern 
Ireland, comprises the six northeastern counties. ’ The other, 
whose official name was the Irish Free State, is comparative­
ly large, being composed of twenty-six counties.^ Both 
states were given a bicameral legislature, responsible ex­
ecutive, and governor, who of course was the representative 
of the British Crown. The Free State was given dominion 
status and powers along the same lines as Canada. Northern 
Ireland, on the other hand, was given less power. Even 
though it had its own legislature and government at Stormont, 
it was also given representation in the Westminster House of 
Commons. It was permitted to send thirteen members there.
One of these represented the Queen's University in Belfast, 
an anachronistic seat which was finally abolished by the 
Labor Party in 1948. Of these Northern Ireland seats, the 
Unionists, who at Westminster accept the Conservative whip, 
have usually held about ten, giving an almost constant and 
reliable bloc of support to the Conservative Party. On the 
basis of population the Northern Ireland representation at 
Westminster should have been much larger, but because
^Since 1921 southern Ireland has undergone three 
official changes of name. From 1921 to 1937 it was called 
the Irish Free State; from 1937 to 1949 its official name 
was Eire; and since 1949 it has been called the Republic of 
Ireland.
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Northern Ireland was given the authority to legislate on 
many local matters, its representation at Westminster was 
arbitrarily reduced to thirteen (now twelve) members.
It is ironic that Northern Ireland, which throughout 
the Home Rule era wanted no part of Home Rule, was in fact 
the only region of Ireland which was given it. What the 
Ulster Protestants wanted was the retention of the union as 
it existed prior to 192 0. Carson had organized a provisional 
government for Ulster during the struggle over the third 
Home Rule Bill in order to defeat Home Rule entirely; and 
when dominion status was granted to the Irish Free State in 
1921, he bitterly denounced the Conservatives, in particular 
F. E. Smith, for abandoning the cause of the union for which 
they had once been prepared to resort to civil war. Carson's 
bitterness stemmed in part from the fact that he viewed the 
two governments in Ireland and the Council that was to co­
ordinate certain activities between them as the first step 
toward the submergence of Ulster in an all-Ireland govern­
ment. This was certainly the view of his closest associate 
in Ulster, James Craig, who later conceded, when prime min­
ister of Northern Ireland, that the reunification of Ireland 
was in the long run inevitable.
It is difficult to see why Craig should have been so 
convinced of this. It may simply have stemmed from the fact 
that in the early years of partition the idea of a small 
six-county state in northeastern Ireland was as novel and as 
startling to many Ulster Protestants as it was to the
316
Nationalists and Sinn Feiners. They may therefore have felt 
it somewhat incongruous, and concluded that it could not 
survive as a permanent structure. As time went by, however, 
and the state continued to exist, Ulster Protestants grew 
accustomed to it and began to insist on its permanence.
Even Craig himself, who had expressed his belief in the in­
evitability of reunification, did not in practice behave as 
though he was convinced of this. He did everything in his 
power to insure that it would survive, and his policies were 
followed by all Northern Ireland governments from 1921 until 
the abolition of the Northern Ireland Constitution by the 
London government in 1972. After half a century of turbulent 
existence the Northern Ireland Constitution and Parliament, 
the structure which Lloyd George had erected as a solution 
to the Irish problem, were abolished, and a period of direct 
rule of Northern Ireland from London was initiated. Northern 
Ireland, after fifty years of self-government, was in the 
throes of bitter communal and sectarian strife. Habeas 
Corpus was abolished. British soldiers, rushed into the 
state, were unable to maintain order. Barricades were thrown 
up, first by Catholics who blocked off their own ghettos to 
defend themselves from the police and from extreme anti- 
Catholic forces; later by Protestants, who in a retaliatory 
bid to force the government to dismantle the Catholic bar­
ricades and impose its writ on Catholic ghettos, erected 
their own barricades, blocking off Protestant areas. The 
result was the creation of numerous "no-go" areas, which
3X7
were patrolled by local citizens, and which were closed to 
all traffic except that which the patrols at the barricades 
agreed to admit. The political system had completely broken 
down. Members of the two communities, Catholic and Protes­
tant, after half a century of existence under a Northern 
Ireland government, were shooting each other in the streets. 
The Irish problem, which English statesmen thought they had 
solved in 1921, continued to haunt them, and the task of 
finding a lasting solution seemed as difficult in the 1970s 
as it had half a century earlier.
The question immediately arises as to why the conflict 
in Northern Ireland should have proved so durable? Why after 
half a century in which the two communities had ample time to 
learn to coexist did sectarian and communal prejudice still 
reign so triumphantly? The answer to this question has deep 
historical roots. The long-term underlying causes are to be 
found, of course, in British colonialism. It seems extremely 
amazing that the descendants of colonial people who were 
planted in Northern Ireland some three centuries ago should 
still think of themselves as a people distinct from, and 
superior to, the native Irish, and that they should have 
constructed a society in which Catholics and Protestants are 
segregated in many aspects of life. The descendents of the 
old colonial communities and their Catholic fellow citizens 
seem to be little closer to fusing into one harmonious com­
munity than at any time in the past. Religious denomination 
forms the great basic distinguishing factor between the two
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communities. It is religion, by and large, which determines 
the individual's politics. And it is largely his ethnic 
background which determines his religion. The native Irish 
tend to be Catholic and in favor of some sort of political 
link with the Republic of Ireland. The descendents of the 
colonists are almost entirely Protestant and are bitterly 
opposed to any political association with the Irish Republic.
With such seemingly irreconciliable polarization of 
political viewpoints and political objectives there has been 
no significant common ground on which the two communities 
could meet in an attempt to harmonize their differences.
They support what appear to be thoroughly antithetical poli­
tical ends. One seeks to retain its British identity; the 
other pursues fusion with the Republic of Ireland. One 
feels that its civil liberties and living standards can only 
be maintained by remaining a part of the United Kingdom; 
the other is convinced that its civil rights have been con­
stantly denied within that system. One has developed a 
rather strong and widespread abhorrence for the Republic of 
Ireland; the other, under the combined yoke of oppression 
and the impetus of nationalism, has developed a strong 
retributive sense which forces them to look to the reunifica­
tion of Ireland not so much as a panacea but as a means of 
avenging their oppressors, both British and Ulster Protestants, 
for the wrongs they feel have been imposed on them, and as 
the most conspicuous example of triumphant self-assertion.
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This means that the Northern Ireland state has been 
confronted throughout its history with political problems 
unlike those that confront most democratic countries. Be­
cause of the dichotomy between the objectives and sympathies 
of the two communities, the fundamental political problem 
and issue in Northern Ireland has been the existence of the 
state itself. Every other issue has been relegated to a 
secondary position. Since its inception Northern Ireland 
has had to face the potential disloyalty of approximately 
one-third of its population. Consequently political parties 
have developed around this basic constitutional issue. 
Support of, or opposition to, the state became the basis of 
party affiliation. Since those who supported the state were 
also largely Protestant and of Scottish or English extrac­
tion, while those who opposed it were largely Catholic and 
native Irish, the division of the two communities along 
political, religious, and ethnic lines was complete. "The 
Ulster community," as the reforming prime minister of the 
1960s, Terence O ’Neill, pointed out, "is a place in which 
two traditions meet— the Irish Catholic tradition and the 
British Protestant tradition. . . . "  Furthermore, adds 
O'Neill, "these religious traditions have been synonymous 
with political views."11
Under these conditions it has thus far proved im­
possible to create in Northern Ireland the respect for civil
110 ’Neill, Ulster at the Crossroads, p. 113.
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liberties and rights, and the kind of politics, that are 
usually identified with democratic states. This is not be­
cause the people are intellectually or temperamentally in­
capable of practising democracy. It is because of the nature 
of the communal and political polarization of the province. 
With the major political issue being the continued existence 
of the state, and with the principal opposition party seek­
ing the destruction of that state and the reunification of 
Ireland, it was difficult to develop an official, or loyal, 
opposition. Nor was it possible to concentrate political 
debate around the issues of political or social reform.
Since the prime objective of the major opposition party, the 
Nationalist Party, was the abolition of the state, it took 
extremely little interest in the question of social improve­
ment. It was not in fact until 1925 that the representatives 
of the Catholic community took their seats in the Northern 
Ireland Parliament. By abstention from Stormont they had 
hoped to deny recognition to the new state, and thereby help 
bring about its demise.
Unfortunately these tactics served only to reinforce 
among Protestants their conviction that the Catholics were 
out to destroy the state. It strengthened the siege men­
tality that had been a part of their experience since the 
seventeenth century. It made them even more fearful of the 
Catholic minority and the Catholic state that existed to the 
south of them. In addition they were not always completely 
convinced that the British would stand by them and would
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support them in their efforts to maintain their separate 
status. They felt that they had saved themselves from sub­
mergence in a Dublin government only by their own readiness 
and willingness to fight, and that in the future they must 
maintain a similar vigilance. Though they constantly pro­
fessed their loyalty to the British, they were extremely 
skeptical as to whether the British would always maintain a 
similar reciprocal loyalty toward them. They were often 
suspicious that perhaps in times of stress or emergency, 
such, for example, as during a period of war, the British 
might be willing to acquiesce in the reunification of Ireland 
as a quid pro quo for cooperation or alliance from the Irish 
Republic.
These various fears forced the Ulster Protestants to 
organize and administer the state in a blatantly discrimina­
tory manner. Based on the assumption that the Catholic com­
munity could never be persuaded to develop a loyalty to the 
state, the Protestants set out to exclude them from all 
important political, civil, and professional positions, 
either in government or in private business, and to force 
them into a position which would reduce their capacity to 
act as a serious threat. This has been the policy of most 
of the leading Protestant organizations and the majority of 
the Unionist Party throughout most of the period from 1921 
until advent of Terence O'Neill to the premiership in 1963. 
Since the representatives of the Catholic community could 
never hope to form a government in Northern Ireland, and
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indeed since they were perennially so outnumbered by the 
representatives of the Protestant community, the Unionists, 
that they could never really form a meaningful opposition,
the Protestants were certain that they could discriminate
against Catholics with impunity. They could do so, that is, 
as long as the British government chose to ignore the situa­
tion. However, with the widespread international emphasis
on civil rights that emerged during the 1960s, coupled with
the violent revolt that erupted in Northern Ireland, the 
Unionists were no longer able to conceal from the rest of the 
world the nature of their government and the society they 
had created. The British government was at last forced to 
intervene. They were forced to abolish the Northern Ireland 
government, Parliament, and Constitution completely and set 
about the process of constructing a new constitution and 
devising a new form of government for the state. Nothing 
could prove better than this act that the Unionist Party had 
failed to govern in an equitable way. After half a century 
of one-party rule the British government had had to assume 
direct administration of the province, an act which most 
Protestants bitterly opposed as a condemnation of their ad­
ministration.
It is rather ironic that the Ulster Protestants, who 
had repeatedly opposed Home Rule on the grounds that the 
Irish were incapable of fair and equitable government, and 
that they would deprive them of their civil liberties, were 
themselves condemned by the British in the 1960s on this very
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score. Moreover, it was nor only the Labor and Conservative 
Parties in Britain that condemned the Unionist mode of gov­
ernment in Northern Ireland, it was also condemned by a 
number of Ulster Protestants. "The troubles that broke out 
in Ulster in 1968," wrote the Ulster unionist Patrick Riddell, 
"were bad and the Protestant Ulstermen had brought them on
themselves through their own short-sightedness and prejudiced
12folly." The Prime Minister, Terence O'Neill, repeatedly 
warned his supporters that they could no longer hope to dis­
criminate against Catholics as they had done in the past, 
that Britain would no longer tolerate it. O'Neill himself 
tried to implement a program of moderate reforms; but caught, 
as he was, between the pressure of the civil rights movement 
on the left and utter resistance to any reforms by the right 
wing of the Protestant community, he was finally forced 
from office, and control of the Unionist Party passed to 
those who seemed to show a stronger opposition to reformist 
concessions. The pressure from the British, however, and 
the civil rights forces, proved inexorable, and after it had 
become apparent that the right wing of the Unionist Party 
made acceptable democratic rule impossible, the British gov­
ernment abolished the Constitution and assumed direct rule 
of the state. Half a century of exclusive Unionist govern­
ment had come to an end, and as it was born amidst a wave
12Patrick Riddell, Fire Over Ulster (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1970), p. 41.
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of communal hostility and killing, so also did it die.
How did the Unionists permit themselves to be maneuv­
ered into a position whereby they lost their Constitution 
and the power they completely monopolized? This stems es­
sentially from the factors already described— the siege 
mentality and the preoccupation with the existence of the 
state. But additional forces were involved. The most im­
portant of these was the fact that the Unionists created a 
kind of segregated institutional structure that conditioned 
Ulster Protestants to look upon themselves as superior to 
Catholics/ to believe that they must always keep the Catholics 
under control, and that any weakening of this policy, any 
concession to Catholic demands, would lead in the end to 
the submergence of Northern Ireland in the Irish Republic.
The creation of such an attitude virtually precluded the 
possibility of reform. It locked the Unionists into a 
system from which they could not escape if the necessity 
to do so should ever occur, as it did during the 1960s.
They had created a structure from which they could not free 
themselves. To look at the shape of that structure will 
help elucidate the nature of Unionist rule.
It should be remembered that the political boundaries 
of the Northern Ireland state have no historical roots. The 
construction of a political barrier around the six north­
eastern counties was a novel event in Irish history. During 
their opposition to Home Rule the Unionists had demanded 
separate treatment for Ulster. But Ulster comprised nine 
counties, not six; and it was an historic province. It
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should also be remembered that in demanding separate treat­
ment for Ulster the Unionists really hoped to defeat Home 
Rule for all of Ireland. That Ireland would actually be 
eventually divided into two states had not, at least for a 
very long time, occurred to them. But in demanding special 
consideration for Ulster the Unionists blurred the fact that 
almost half the population of that province was native Irish, 
Catholic, and nationalist. Indeed the thirty-five M.P.s which 
Ulster sent to Westminster were as evenly divided between 
the Unionists and Nationalists as was possible, with the 
Unionists usually holding eighteen seats and the Nationalists 
seventeen. In fact, during the period 1912-1914, when the 
Unionists were waging their greatest battle for exclusion of 
Ulster from Home Rule, the Nationalists actually held eigh­
teen of Ulster's thirty-five seats. Of Ulster's nine 
counties, five of them had Catholic majorities, while only 
four (Antrim, Armagh, Down, and Londonderry) had Protestant, 
or Unionist, majorities.
From the Buckingham Palace conference in 1914 until 
the final boundary agreement in 1925 a bitter debate ensued 
as to where Ireland should be partitioned. Since it was 
obvious that the loss of the complete province was not ac­
ceptable to the Nationalists, there was no alternative but 
to partition Ulster as well as Ireland. Nor indeed did the 
Unionists really want the entire province, for therein the 
population would have been so evenly divided between the two 
communities that it might have been difficult to maintain a
326
Unionist majority. Since the Protestants had a majority in 
only four counties it would seem that, in accordance with the 
principles of self-determination, or majority decision, the 
boundary of the Northern Ireland state should have been 
drawn around these four counties. But the Unionists would 
not accept this. They felt that this would have been an un­
acceptable act of disloyalty to their fellow-unionists who 
would have been abandoned to their fate under a Dublin gov­
ernment. They insisted therefore that they must be given 
the two counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh which possessed 
Nationalist, or Catholic, majorities. Since the statesmen 
who governed England after World War I were not deterred, 
at least as far as Ireland was concerned, by the violation 
of democratic principles, they proceeded to place the two 
counties of Tyrone and Fermanagh under Northern Ireland rule 
while resolving to set up a boundary commission to make a 
final decision on the issue.
The Irish representatives that negotiated the "Treaty"
in London in 1921 were given to understand that the boundary
of Northern Ireland would be so reduced that that state would
be unable to exist because of its economic unviability and
13would be forced to reunite with the rest of Ireland. The 
Northern Ireland state therefore began its career under 
threat of being whittled out of existence. The defensive or
13Report of the Irish Boundary Commission, 1925 
Introd. by Geoffrey Hand (Shannon, Ireland: Irish Univer-
sity Press, 1969), pp. xii-xiii.
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siege mentality which has marked the behavior of Ulster 
Unionists throughout the history of Northern Ireland was 
given justification for existence at the very founding of the 
state. Ulster Unionists therefore resolved to maintain a 
careful and constant vigilance to insure that they would 
never be forced under a Dublin government. They determined 
that they must retain control of as many levers of power 
as possible, that they must exclude the Catholic minority 
from power in any meaningful form wherever they could in 
order that the Northern Ireland state and civil and religious 
liberties, as Ulster Protestants understood them, would con­
tinue to exist.
One of the first important acts which the leaders of 
the new state were called upon to perform was the appointment 
of a delegate to represent Northern Ireland on the Boundary 
Commission. The Commission was to be composed of three 
members, one of whom was to be appointed by Northern Ireland, 
one by the Irish Free State, and one by the British govern­
ment. Northern Ireland, fearing a diminution of its terri­
tory, steadfastly refused to appoint a delegate to the Com­
mission. After this issue had dragged on for a number of 
years the British government undertook to appoint the North­
ern Ireland representative, and proceeded to do so. The 
Ulster Protestants, however, need not have feared the work 
of the Boundary Commission, for the South African judge, 
Richard Feetham, originally an Englishmen, whom the British 
government appointed chairman of the Commission, assumed
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from the start that there was to be no major transfer of
14territory from Northern Ireland to the Free State. Feetham 
in fact rejected the principle of self-determination, stating 
that the will of a majority of the people in a given region 
was not sufficient to warrant the transfer of such region to 
the Free State. Northern Ireland, he argued, was to remain 
economically viable, and in addition was to remain essen­
tially the same geographic entity as was created by the 
Government of Ireland Act of 1920. It is hardly surprising 
that the Commission came to a stormy end, with the Free State 
representative resigning. The final consequence was that no 
transfer of territory was made and Northern Ireland remained 
territorially the same, being composed of two counties and 
several other large border regions where the Catholics held 
a majority.
It would seem that such a situation would create the 
conditions whereby the Catholics would gain control of local 
government units in various areas. If it was true that 
Catholics could never, as long as voting took place along 
communal lines, gain control of the provincial government, 
this was certainly not true with respect to local government. 
Unless some method could be found to prevent it, the Cath­
olics, whom Protestants considered disloyal, would gain 
control of two county councils, the council of the city of 
Londonderry, the second largest city in the state, and a
14Ibid., pp. xii-xv
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number of urban district and rural district councils. The 
loss of governmental control of the city of Londonderry 
would be especially painful to Protestants because this 
city was the source of much Protestant tradition going all 
the way back to 1690 when it was besieged by the Catholics 
in support of James II, and when it made a heroic stand to 
hold out until relieved by the forces of William of Orange. 
But the Protestants did not intend to see it fall to
Catholic control; they were not so unimaginative and so un­
inventive that they could not find a way to circumvent the 
principles of majority rule. What they proceeded to do in
Londonderry, and in other local government areas, in order
to exclude Catholics from power has been the source of one 
of the deepest and most rancorous of Catholic grievances, 
and at the same time has laid the Protestant majority open 
to charges of blatant discrimination against the Catholic 
minority. A description of how the Protestants obtained 
control of the city of Londonderry, even though the Catholics 
held a distinct majority there, will serve as an example of 
what happened in other areas.
The Protestants resorted to a number of devices to 
gain control of the city. The first, and perhaps most im­
portant, was their decision to divide it into a number of 
constituencies or wards. The division of a city into wards 
is not in itself an undemocratic act, but when those wards 
were drawn in such a way that the minority, with a population 
comprising less than forty per cent of the total, would
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perenially retain a majority of the seats on the council, 
the case for gerrymandering was very strong. This is pre­
cisely what happened in Londonderry. The city was divided 
into three wards--two small ones with Protestant majorities, 
and one extremely large one with an overwhelming Catholic 
majority. The two small, Protestant-dominated wards were 
allotted a total of twelve council members; the one large 
Catholic-controlled constituency was granted eight represen­
tatives. The result therefore was that the Protestants had 
a majority of twelve to eight on the city council. The 
process of lumping most of the Catholics into one large ward 
and allotting them two-fifths of the total council represen­
tatives achieved and insured the desired goal of Protestant 
control.
This pattern was followed wherever necessary and 
possible throughout Northern Ireland to attain Protestant 
control of local government bodies. In some areas the 
Catholic majority was so overwhelming that it was simply 
impossible to wrest control from them. However, such in­
stances were not numerous, for the desire to exclude Catholics 
from positions of power and influence was very strong.
Where the gerrymandering of political boundaries did not 
suffice, Protestants adopted other techniques. Since 1918, 
elections in Ireland had been held on the basis of propor­
tional representation. The British government had estab­
lished this system in Ireland in 1918 on an experimental 
basis prior to its adoption or rejection for the entire
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United Kingdom. In 1922, however, the Northern Ireland gov­
ernment abolished the practice of proportional representation 
in local elections. In addition it instituted a third 
measure which caused even deeper and enduring hostility be­
tween the two communities. It completely abolished the 
principle of universal adult suffrage and resorted to the 
old nineteenth century British practice of household suffrage. 
In order to qualify to vote in local elections the individual 
had to be the owner or tenant of a dwelling-house. Such 
owner's or tenant's spouse was also given the franchise, but 
any adult sons or daughters residing in the house were dis­
qualified. Since Catholics generally had larger families 
than Protestants, the intent and actuality of this measure 
was to disfranchise a proportionately large number of 
Catholics. In addition the owner or tenant of land or busi­
ness premises with an annual valuation of at least £10 was 
also permitted to vote in the area in which such property 
was located. A further multiple franchise was awarded to 
corporations. For each £10 of evaluation, up to a maximum 
of £60, they were given one vote. Since in general Protes­
tants were wealthier than Catholics, the effect of these 
various devices was to disfrancise a large number of Catholic 
citizens and to increase the electoral power of Protestants. 
The magnitude of this multiple enfranchisement of non- 
property-owners and non-renters is revealed by the following 
figures. They are a comparison of the 1967 lists of electors 
for the Northern Ireland House of Commons and local government.
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For the House of Commons the number of electors was 933,724; 
for local government the number was 694,483. This shows a 
differential of more than one-third.
The reason why property should play a paramount role 
in local elections was never, as far as the Catholic com­
munity was concerned, satisfactorily explained. The Union­
ists stated straightforwardly that these property qualifica­
tions were adopted simply because they did not believe that 
the mere counting of heads was a sufficient basis for the 
selection of governments and that a basic determining factor 
ought to be, to some extent, the quantity of one's property. 
Since the possession of property was not a necessary factor 
in the qualification for the Westminster or Northern Ireland 
Parliamentary franchise, the Unionists were obviously caught 
in a logical difficulty. The wise policy would have been to 
equalize the franchise qualifications for all levels of 
government. This would have removed the inconsistency be­
tween them. But the Unionists would not consider abolishing 
the complex property qualifications on which the local gov­
ernment franchise was based, because this would have given 
Catholics control of local governments in a number of areas. 
On the other hand there was no necessity to apply these 
extreme conditions to the Northern Ireland Parliamentary 
franchise because this would have given the Unionists an 
even greater majority in a House where they usually held at 
least forty out of a total of fifty-two s e a t s . T h e
*5The Northern Ireland government possessed no juris­
diction over the Westminster franchise.
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Unionists, however, did abolish the system of proportional 
representation in the elections to the Northern Ireland 
House of Commons and they gave an additional vote to busi­
nesses with a minimum annual rentable value of £10, with the 
proviso that any elector could cast only one vote in a given 
constituency. Having done this, they felt assured that 
they would be able to retain control of government at the 
provincial level, and that the existence of the state could 
not be jeopardized from this source. There was no need 
therefore to apply the excessively complex local government 
franchise qualifications to provincial elections.
The principal force motivating the Unionists in all 
these intricate processes was, as has already been pointed 
out, the fear that Catholics might somehow gain sufficient 
power to threaten the continued existence of Northern Ire­
land as a part of the United Kingdom. The prime minister of 
Northern Ireland, James Craig, made this clear when he 
abolished proportional representation for the Northern Ire­
land Parliamentary elections. "At election times," he 
stated,
the people do not really understand what danger may 
result if they make a mistake when it comes to third, 
fourth, fifth or sixth preferences. By an actual 
mistake, they might wake up to find Northern Ireland 
in the perilous position of being submerged in a 
Dublin Parliament. What I hold is, if the Ulster 
people are ever going— and I pray they may not— into 
a Dublin Parliament, they should . . . not be led by 
any trick of a complicated electoral system. . . .1°
■^St. John Ervine, Craiqavon: Ulsterman (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1949), pp. 516-17.
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At both the provincial and local government levels 
the Unionists took steps to insure that they would retain 
control. There was every possibility that they would 
succeed in this as long as the Protestant community clung 
together. But the unfortunate result of such practice was 
to accentuate the importance of communal consciousness. It 
strengthened and perpetuated the old fear of subversion of 
the state by the Catholic minority. Protestants felt a 
constant urge to maintain a steady vigilance, and since such 
vigilance was necessarily directed against Catholics, it was 
unavoidable that the latter would be perpetuated as an enemy 
group. Contact and communication between the two communities 
were pared down to a minimum, and understanding and concilia­
tion were made correspondingly difficult. These and other 
factors led throughout much of the province to a withdrawal 
of each community into separate ghettos, each feeling itself 
to be the victim or potential victim of the objectives and 
practices of the other. Under such circumstances little 
effort was made by either community to attain a real under­
standing of the motives and grievances of the other. Con­
vinced that Catholics aimed to subvert the state, Protestants 
took every precaution to prevent the realization of this 
objective. In so doing the antipathy between the two com­
munities was further intensified and society became increas­
ingly segregated.
An excellent example of this can be seen in the 
growth of segregated rural and urban communities. In the
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rural areas of Ireland there had been some degree of segre­
gation since the seventeenth century, with Protestants 
occupying the more fertile lowland areas while Catholics 
were pushed generally toward the less productive hilltops.
In the hostile society that existed in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries there was probably a tendency for each 
community to consolidate in specific regions simply to 
insure some degree of security and self-defense. Such rural 
segregation has continued in the twentieth century, produced 
by a kind of unspoken tradition which requires that Protes­
tants do not sell land to Catholics and vice versa. The 
object of this is to maintain the solidity of each community 
and to insure that the political or electoral balance will 
not be upset. With the rapid expansion of public housing in 
the twentieth century the various local governments of 
Northern Ireland have created a situation in which the towns 
and cities are almost completely segregated. By the simple 
process of building public dwellings in specially selected 
areas, and by allocating them on the basis of religion, 
local governments have carried the residential segregation 
of the two communities almost as far as it can possibly go. 
This was done in part to maintain the political balance in 
the various constituencies, but the result has been to in­
crease the barriers to intercommunal understanding.
It is an ironic development that the ghettoization of 
the two communities should have done more perhaps than any 
other factor to bring about the collapse of the Northern
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Ireland government in 1972, for the consolidation of the 
Catholic community made it possible for the Irish Republican 
Army to carry on a successful urban guerrilla war against 
the government because of the reasonably safe sanctuaries 
which the Catholic ghettos afforded. It also made possible 
the construction of barricades by both Catholics and Protes­
tants around their particular ghettos, making the government 
of these areas by official bodies virtually impossible. The 
result was that the British government was forced to ac­
knowledge that Stormont had lost the capacity to govern; 
and in accordance with stipulations laid down in the Govern­
ment of Ireland Act of 1920 it abolished the Northern Ireland 
government and assumed direct control of the state.
It should be pointed out, however, that not all of 
the responsibility for the segregation of society and the 
lack of intercommunal understanding that flowed from this 
can be charged to the Protestants. In the early years of 
the state the Protestant leaders had proposed the establish­
ment of a primary and secondary public school system which 
would integrate the students of both communities. The 
leaders of the Catholic Church, however, bent on maintaining 
schools over which they could exercise control, and in which 
they could teach the precepts of Catholic theology, utterly 
refused to accept such integrated schools. Consequently an 
educational system emerged at the primary and secondary 
levels which was all but completely apartheid. Catholic 
teachers taught in Catholic schools; Protestant teachers in
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Protestant ones. The one institution which, perhaps more 
than any other, should have brought enlightenment to a 
segregated society was itself a victim of prejudice, fear, 
and lack of understanding. The school system, therefore, 
rather than contributing to social harmony, intensified 
communal segregation. Students of the opposing communities 
received no opportunity to discuss and understand each 
other's point of view. In the schools intercommunal debate 
was effectively stifled. If the two communities were to 
learn mutual understanding, they would do so elsewhere.
The state of communal relations in Northern Ireland 
of course reveals that Catholics and Protestants failed to 
solve their differences. If there is little opportunity for 
intercommunal contact and discussion in the schools, the 
situation in other aspects of life is not very different.
In many cultural, social, and sports activities the two 
communities are often segregated. Each engages in pursuits 
which in many cases excludes members of the other. In none 
of these areas, however, is segregation absolute, so that 
it is possible to find members of both communities among 
professional theater groups or in the arts. This is true 
also of certain sports. But in many other areas segregation 
is extensive. In amateur dramatic groups for example, there 
is seldom an intermixing of the two communities. This 
applies also to many aspects of sports. The most important 
sports activities for Catholics, as far as the numbers par­
ticipating or watching are concerned, is Gaelic football
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and hurling; yet these are games in which Protestants prac­
tically never participate or witness. In addition these 
games are often played on Sundays while Ulster Protestants 
categorically refuse either to participate in or watch 
sports events on the Sabbath. In this respect Protestant 
ethics have to a large extent been written into the laws of 
the state, for night clubs and other places of entertainment 
are severely restricted by law as to the hours they can 
remain open. These conditions, plus the fact that Catholics 
generally refuse to attend functions where the British na­
tional athem is played, aggravates communal antipathy. 
Moreover, since at most Catholic sports and cultural events, 
the national anthem of the Irish Republic is played rather 
than that of Britain, and since in addition the flag flown 
is that of the Republic of Ireland, the Protestant view that 
Catholics are not really loyal to the state receives strong 
reinforcement. While, therefore, in cultural, social, and 
sports activities there is some degree of intercommunal par­
ticipation, this is on the whole rather small. The over­
whelming impact in these areas is to intensify and extend 
the segregation of the two communities.
One of the most important sources of friction and 
dissension has stemmed from the area of employment. Except 
for the years of World War II unemployment in Northern 
Ireland has historically been extremely high. It has been 
perennially higher than that of Great Britain. In June 
1921, when the Northern Ireland Parliament
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first met, unemployment reached a height of more than 25 
per cent. It has rarely fallen below 6 per cent; and in 
1969 when the unemployment rate for the United Kingdom as a 
whole was 2.2 per cent that for Northern Ireland was 6.8 
per cent. In addition these figures reflect the unemployment 
rate for the state as a whole and do not reveal the fact 
that among the Catholic population the rate has usually been 
much higher. This has caused continual discontent and dis­
trust among the Catholic community, for many feel that these 
policies have been a deliberate attempt to keep them in a 
submissive and powerless position; or alternatively to drive 
them out of the state. The birth rate among Catholics has 
been consistently higher than that among Protestants, and 
yet the Catholic proportion of the population as a whole has 
not significantly increased. This is because the inability 
of large numbers of Catholics to find employment in Northern 
Ireland has forced them to migrate to Britain in a constant 
stream to seek jobs. Many Catholics have felt that this 
resulted from a calculated policy by the leaders of the 
Protestant community. They have long believed that their 
inability to find employment has been the result of job dis­
crimination, of a policy pursued by Protestants to force 
Catholics to emigrate and thus make possible the maintenance 
of the Protestant majority in the state. The aim, Catholics 
believe, has been to insure that Catholics would not, by 
an increase in population, be able to win control of the 
legislature. Since Protestants have had control of most
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governmental organs and of the civil service, they have been 
able to insure that most jobs went to members of their own 
community, and especially that positions of responsibility 
went to them. When Catholics were employed, they were 
generally given the less renumerative, less responsible, 
and less influential positions.
Even in the private sector of the economy the prac­
tice of discrimination was often followed, though in this 
area it was not quite as complete. Despite the fact that 
certain Protestant leaders, most notably the one-time prime
minister Lord Brookeborough, called upon the Protestant
17community to employ only Protestants, few Protestant 
enterpreneurs followed this advice rigidly. While discrim­
ination does exist in the private sector, it is perhaps more 
often the result of social patterns than of a conscious and 
calculated policy. Such discrimination is produced by such 
factors as the ghettoization of society. In Protestant 
areas businesses tend spontaneously to be staffed by the 
inhabitants of that region, while in Catholic areas employ­
ment follows a similar pattern. In addition since the at­
tainment of employment in factories and various small busi­
ness is often the result of social friendship or acquaintance 
with foremen or superintendents, the extensive communal 
segregation of society tends to insure that Protestants are 
employed in Protestant businesses and Catholics in Catholic
"^De Paor, Divided Ulster, pp. 114-15.
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ones. Thus while discrimination is widespread both in the 
civil service and in private business, in the latter it is 
often— though not by any means exclusively— caused by segre­
gated residential and communal patterns rather than by a 
conscious policy on the part of employers.
One of the most conspicuous examples of Protestant 
domination of employment has been the Royal Ulster Consta­
bulary, the regular police force of Northern Ireland. About 
90 per cent of its members have historically been Protestant, 
a fact which has led to a good deal of suspicion of the 
police by the Catholic community. Indeed Catholics are 
largely convinced that the police have been grossly one­
sided in their enforcement of the law, and that they welcome 
any opportunity to baton-charge them or harass them, while 
Protestant attacks on Catholics and the denial of their 
civil liberties are ignored. So hostile had relations be­
tween the police and the Catholic community become that a
recent commission established to investigate police behavior
18recommended a complete over-haul of the organization.
This has now been begun, and the inability of the communities 
of Northern Ireland to enforce the law impartially is re­
vealed by the fact that an Englishman has been brought in to 
administer the police force.
Even more anti-Catholic was the Ulster Special Consta­
bulary, a unit of police reserves to be called out only in
18See the Report of Advisory Committee on Police,
Cmnd. 535 (Belfast: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1969).
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emergencies. It was completely Protestant; it was recruited 
mostly from unskilled and semi-skilled laborers; and it was 
bitterly resented by the Catholic community. One of the 
first reforms which the British government imposed on North­
ern Ireland in the late 1960s was the abolition of this 
force. It should be pointed out that many Catholics tended 
to see these two police bodies as enemy groups, and were thus 
opposed to joining them. On the other hand, since Protes­
tants were convinced that most Catholics were disloyal to 
the state, they considered it extremely dangerous to entrust 
them with the enforcement of the law. Thus in this sphere 
also the distrust of the Catholic community prevented Protes­
tant officials from making a serious effort to recruit 
Catholics into these forces.
The preoccupation of Protestants with the existence 
of the state has been further intensified by the attitudes 
and objectives of southern Ireland. Since 1921 it has been 
its stated goal to seek the reunification of the country, a 
goal which involves either the abolition of the Northern 
Ireland state or the transfer of its sovereignty from 
Britain to Dublin. Apart from the fact that this has been 
the declared policy of the various Dublin governments, it 
is also the objective of the illegal physical force group, 
the Irish Republican Army. Threatened by the explicitly 
stated objectives of these two bodies and by the existence 
of a large Catholic minority within the state, a minority 
whose actions often seemed to indicate that its loyalty and
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allegiance were directed to Dublin rather than Stormont, 
Protestants became extremely militant. Any concession to 
Catholics, or any communication or cooperation with Dublin 
by Northern Ireland governments, could unleash an inflexible 
reaction among the Protestant right wing. The existence, 
vigilance, and intransigence of this force made it prac­
tically impossible for enlightened Unionist leaders to pursue 
a policy of conciliation and cooperation with Dublin. On 
the other hand the repeated statements by Dublin governments 
that their aim was the eventual annexation of Northern Ire­
land merely increased the difficulties in the path of moder­
ate and liberal Unionists. It in fact insured that any at­
tempt to establish normal relations between Stormont and 
Dublin would not succeed.
The collapse of the political career of Northern 
Ireland's most enlightened prime minister, Terence O'Neill, 
offers an excellent example of the difficulties that con­
fronted those who wished to end sectarian animosity and 
establish better and more cooperative relations between 
Dublin and Stormont. O'Neill, who was prime minister from 
1963 until 1969, made a determined effort to unite the com­
munities of Northern Ireland and to create a policy of co­
operation with Dublin. However, these objectives created 
such turmoil that he was rapidly ousted from office. Re­
lations with Dublin sank back into their traditional 
quagmire, the two communities in Northern Ireland began 
killing each other once more, and in the end the British
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had to suspend, then completely abolish, the Northern Ire­
land Constitution.
It seemed impossible therefore to achieve democratic 
reforms in Northern Ireland under the customary form of 
democratic constitution. The emphasis on communal, solidar­
ity precluded the development of reform. The two principal 
political parties were constructed on a communal basis. The 
Unionist Party represented the Protestants, and the Nation­
alist Party represented the Catholics. The predominant 
political issue was the maintenance of the state. Unionists 
were always sure of control; Catholics felt that they could 
gain little. The alternation of political parties in office 
which is ordinarily the basis of democratic politic systems 
did not apply in Northern Ireland. Because of the absence 
of electoral issues, and the segregation of society, most 
seats were not even contested. Northern Ireland was in fact 
in many ways like the American south after the Civil War. 
Since the Nationalist Party could never hope to form a gov­
ernment, or even to form an effective opposition, Northern 
Ireland was, for all practical purposes, a one-party state. 
Nicholas Mansergh's judgment of the 1930s was still appli­
cable in the 1960s: "The task," he stated, of establishing
a genuinely popular democratic system of government in the
19North has proved impossible of fulfillment."
19Nicholas Mansergh, The Government of Northern Ire­
land: A Study in Devolution (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1936), p. 137.
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The outbreak of violence which occurred in 1969, and 
is still continuing, is merely an additional chapter in the 
long history of violence that has characterized relations 
between the two communities since the seventeenth century. 
Since the founding of the Northern Ireland state this vio­
lent tradition has been kept alive by periodic eruptions.
The new state was in fact established in the midst of civil 
strife which raged from 1920 to 1923. There were further 
serious outbreaks in 1935, 1939, 1948, 1955, and 1956-1962. 
The present conflict exploded into systematic and prolonged 
violence in 1969, but it had been developing slowly since 
1966. In that year Protestant fears had increased because 
of the various celebrations that occurred throughout Ireland 
commemorating the Rising of 1916. Protestant extremists, in 
particular the Ulster Volunteer Force, began to attack 
Catholics. The Prime Minister, Terence O'Neill, immediately 
proscribed this organization under terms of the Special 
Powers Act. This statute gave the government the authority 
to suspend habeas corpus and arrest and imprison any sus­
pected person without charge or trial. The Special Powers 
Act had previously been used only against Catholics, and the 
latter had repeatedly condemned it and called for its re­
peal. It was fashioned after the old coercion acts by which 
English statesmen had ruled Ireland in the nineteenth cen­
tury. The fact that a Protestant prime minister now used 
it against an extreme Protestant and unionist group reveals 
his determination to attempt to apply the law equally to all
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sections of the community. This does not of course justify 
the existence of such a law; it does, however, prove that a 
new era was perhaps dawning in Northern Ireland.
Catholic commemoration of the 1916 Rising was not 
the only factor in the growth of Protestant fears in 1966. 
Since his advent to the premiership in 1963 Terence O'Neill 
had adopted a policy of conciliation toward the Catholic 
community. Previously, Unionist governments had proceeded 
on the assumption that the Catholic community would always 
be disloyal to the state and that consequently they must be 
excluded from all positions of power or influence. This 
assumption, and the policies based upon it, posited a per­
petual intercommunal conflict in Northern Ireland. The two 
communities could never unite because Catholics would always 
seek to subvert the state. In this respect Terence O'Neill 
proposed to pursue a revolutionary concept. He rejected 
these ideas completely. He refused to assume that the 
Catholic population would always be hostile and disloyal.
He made the basic and revolutionary assumption that Catholics 
could be persuaded to accept the state and to develop a 
loyalty and allegiance toward it. If, O'Neill argued, 
Catholics were treated equitably, if the state catered to 
all its citizens equally, if discrimination in all its forms 
were abolished, Catholics would accept the state and become 
loyal to it.2®
20Owen Dudley Edwards, The Sins of Our Fathers;
Roots of Conflict in Northern Ireland (Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1970), p. 73.
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O'Neill was aided in these policies by the new at­
titude of the Republic of Ireland. In July 1963 the Prime
Minister of the Republic, Sean Lemass, stated explicitly
21that Northern Ireland had a legitimate right to exist. 
Although in a public response to this gesture, O'Neill ex­
pressed the desire for a "full constitutional recognition" 
of this fact, he was nevertheless conciliatory and called
for cooperation between the two states on "more immediately
22relevant issues." The year 1963 therefore marked the be­
ginning of a new era in the relations between the two Irish 
governments. The next step came in January 1965 when the 
prime ministers met for the first time since the early 
1920s. It was a historic occasion in Irish history.
Terence O'Neill's awareness of right wing opposition to his 
policies was revealed in the communique issued after the 
meeting, which carefully pointed out that the discussions
23"did not touch upon constitutional or political questions."
O'Neill was convinced that the Republic of Ireland accepted
the existence of Northern Ireland and would not attempt to 
24subvert it. Sean Lemass's successor, Jack Lynch, re­
affirmed his predecessor's policy, stating that "we are not 
seeking to overthrow by violence the Stormont government or
230'Neill, Ulster at the Crossroads, p. 156.
22Ibid., p. 156.
23Ibid., p. 157.
24Ibid., p. 158.
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25parliament.” This in effect meant that the leaders of the 
Republic of Ireland sought normal and harmonious relations 
with the state to the north of them, and that while the 
reunification of Ireland remained as an ideal, it was rele­
gated to a distant future when "a sufficient number of people
in the North" would have been persuaded "by peaceful means"
2 Sto accept it. The leaders of the Republic had not abandon­
ed the quest for reunification. They had merely stated that 
such reunification could be achieved only by the free con­
sent of the majority in Northern Ireland.
The leaders of both Irish states had shown a willing­
ness to break with the policies of the past and to attempt 
to inaugurate a new era. In correlation with O'Neill's 
wishes for cooperation between the two governments, he had 
also taken the first cautious steps toward the development 
of cooperation and harmony between the two communities in 
Northern Ireland. In this, the exigencies of politics 
demanded that he proceed extremely carefully in order to 
avoid arousing among his Protestant supporters the tradition­
al fear and resistance to cooperation or concessions to the 
Catholic community. As the cautiousness and piecemeal 
nature of his reform policies reveal, O'Neill was aware of 
the rigid opposition which might develop. He stated at a
25Martin Wallace, Northern Ireland; 50 Years of 
Self-Government (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 1971),
p. 176.
26Ibid., p. 176
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later date that "any leader who wants to follow a course of
change can only go so far. For inevitably one builds up a
barrier of resentment and resistance which can make further
27progress impossible."
It was one of the ironies of the situation that the 
period in which O'Neill undertook to reconcile the two com­
munities and to grant a greater measure of justice to the 
Catholic minority was also a time when minorities in various 
countries, but most particularly in the United States, were 
demanding various rights. Spearheaded by members of the 
university and intellectual community in Northern Ireland, 
an activist civil rights movement emerged using many of the 
techniques of American civil rights groups. This movement 
refused to accept the gradualism which characterized 
O'Neill's reform policies. They demanded an immediate end 
to the various political and civil injustices which existed. 
In particular they sought the prompt institution of uni­
versal adult suffrage in all elections, plus an end to 
plural voting, the allocation of public housing on a non­
sectarian basis, new measures to solve the chronic problem 
of unemployment, and the repeal of the Special Powers Act.
In opposition to the movement for civil and political 
rights, whose leaders had hoped to make it nonsectarian, but 
which in fact became largely Catholic, there developed a 
number of determined right wing opposition groups among the
270'Neill, Ulster at the Crossroads, p. 199.
350
Protestant community. Inspired for the most part by the 
fundamentalist preacher, the Reverend Ian Paisley, these 
groups opposed any concession whatever to the Catholic com­
munity or to the cause of civil or political rights. Pre­
occupied with a concern for Protestant domination of the 
state, these people saw any adjustment of the status quo as 
a serious threat. They continually denounced the prime 
minister for his policy of reforms, his attempts to harmonize 
the two communities, and his friendly relations with the 
Republic of Ireland. They viewed any concession to the 
Catholic community as a weakening of the Protestant position. 
These extreme groups had been expressing their fears ever 
since the ecumenical movement began, and they tended to link 
this movement and the civil rights movement in Northern Ire­
land as part of a broad Catholic conspiracy which endangered 
the existence of Protestantism. Two examples of right wing 
Ulster Protestant attitudes toward the ecumenical movement 
will reveal the extent of this fear. In November 1964 the 
General Secretary of the Christian Fellowship Centre and 
Irish Emancipation Crusade denounced the proposed visit of 
the Archbishop of Canterbury to the Pope. "We desire to 
place on record," he stated,
our deep dismay and sorrow at the proposed visit to 
the Pope by his Grace the Archbishop of Canterbury.
This is indeed a grievous blow to our evangelical 
position, and a step which will inevitably draw the 
judgment of God on Church and State. We would call 
upon Christian people in all our Churches to devote 
themselves increasingly to prayer. We need delude 
ourselves no longer. The die is cast— the step has 
been taken. The most we can do now is to pray for
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courage and faith, that we might be true to the 
simplicity of the gospel in this dark hour and in
the darker days that lie before us.
We respectfully suggest that in those Churches 
and Mission Halls where evangelical truth is still 
cherished, the national anthem should be sung as a 
prayer next Sunday, with congregation and minister
kneeling in the attitude of p r a y e r . 28
In 1969 a Catholic priest was invited to attend, as an ob­
server, the annual General Assembly of the Church of Scot­
land. The Reverend Ian Paisley was extremely disturbed by 
this act. He was further distraught by the fact that the 
Queen was also scheduled to be in attendance while this 
Catholic representative was in the assembly. He therefore 
launched a vigorous protest. "Your subjects," he declared 
in a plea to the Queen, "fear the result of the proposed 
welcome to this Mass-mongering representative of the Papal 
antichrist.1,29
Caught between those who demanded the immediate re­
moval of all civil and political inequities and those who 
opposed any reform whatever, Terence O'Neill found himself 
in a political impasse. To go forward would rouse strong 
opposition from the right wing of his own Party and the 
Protestant community; to refuse reforms would elicit further 
condemnation and demonstrations from the civil rights 
forces, demonstrations which usually led to Protestant 
counter-demonstrations and to outbreaks of violence. Since
28Quoted in R. S. P. Elliot and John Hickie, Ulster;
A Case Study in Conflict Theory (New York; St. Martin's 
Press, 1971), pp. 39-40.
29
Riddell, Fire over Ulster, p. 175.
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the British government was also pressing for the enactment 
of reforms, O'Neill had little choice but to go forward. He 
tried to persuade the Protestant community that this was the 
only course acceptable to the British government, that timely 
reforms could still save the government, legislature, and 
Constitution from extinction. But many Unionists refused 
to accept this. O'Neill gradually lost support in his own 
Party and was forced to resign. Two more prime ministers 
followed him into and out of office in quick succession.
The demonstrations and violence continued. The police were 
unable to contain the situation. More and more British 
troops were poured into the province. In the end the British 
became convinced that the political system in Northern Ire­
land could not cater to the legitimate aspirations of the 
Catholic community. The forms of democracy were insufficient 
to insure justice and equity in the deeply divided and 
hostile nature oi' Northern Ireland society. Only a sincere 
willingness on the part of the inhabitants to develop a 
democratic and non-discriminatory society could have 
achieved this. Such a spirit did not exist in Northern 
Ireland. If discrimination and injustice were to be abol­
ished, and a just and equitable society created, it would 
have to be attained through some other medium. Such being 
the case the Northern Ireland Constitution could serve no 
further acceptable function. Thus in March 1972, after half 
a century of existence, it was unceremoniously abolished.
This was a severe blow to the Protestant community.
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The fact that the British government had felt it necessary 
to abolish the Northern Ireland Constitution and to assume 
direct rule of the state was a strong indictment 
of the Unionist Party which had ruled at Stormont 
for over fifty years. It is true that the Unionists had 
been confronted with a large, potentially disloyal minority, 
but their policies, until the premiership of Terence O'Neill 
in 1963, had been designed to exclude that minority from any 
influential office in politics, government service, or in 
the private sector of the economy. They antagonized rather 
than conciliated the Catholics. Their aim was to keep them 
in a subordinate and menial position, or alternatively to 
force them to migrate to Britain in search of employment. 
Practically no attempt was made to win their support and 
loyalty. No Catholics were members of the Unionist Party, 
or of the various Unionist governments, and no Catholic was 
welcome. The Orange Order, which had a large degree of con­
trol over the Unionist Party, was opposed to Catholic mem­
bership. In fact it existed largely to oppose Catholicism.
With such sectarian animosity it was impossible for 
the ordinary forms of democratic institutions to operate 
equitably in Northern Ireland. If democracy were to be 
established it would have to be imposed from outside. This 
in fact is exactly what the British government has under­
taken. It has devised a new system, a new experiment in 
government, based on the principle of power-sharing. In 
this system each party will share power in the legislature
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and the executive in accordance with the proportion of the 
population it represents. No longer will one party be able 
to control the state. The heads of the various government 
departments will be selected from the various political 
parties in such a way as to be representative of the two 
communities. Catholics will be given the administration of 
a proportionate number of departments. A Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, with a seat in the British Cabinet, 
will insure that power is shared by both communities in an 
equitable way. He will thus retain extensive powers, so 
that the new assembly and executive will have much less 
power than their predecessors. In addition a good deal of 
responsibility has now been assumed by the British govern­
ment. It alone will retain legislative authority and control 
over important areas of taxation, the suspension of habeas 
corpus, the enactment of special powers, elections, the 
franchise, and the appointment of judges and magistrates."*®
In addition the British government will retain "for the 
present" legislative control over "certain matters of law 
and order, including the criminal law, the courts, penal 
institutions, and the establishment and organization of the 
police.
The retention of these powers by the British government
2 n
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals, Cmnd.
5259, par. 560.
"^Ibid., par. 560.
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has been generally applauded by the Catholic community, but 
they have caused a bitter reaction among many Protestants. 
Thus in the assembly elections of June 30,.1973, the Protes­
tant community was decisively split for the first time since 
1921, and this split was reflected in a breakup of the 
Unionist Party. Those Protestants who oppose the new consti 
tution and the concept of power-sharing have broken away 
from the Unionist Party and formed the Loyalist Coalition.
At the recent elections they emerged as the largest party, 
electing twenty-seven members. They have vowed to "wreck"
the new constitution, though they have not yet spelled out 
32their methods. The second largest party in the new 
assembly will be the rump of the old Unionist Party, which 
elected twenty-five members. The Catholic community is 
represented largely by the Social Democratic and Labor Party 
with a total of nineteen members.
Whether the new system can survive in the face of 
such strong opposition from the right wing of the Protestant 
community remains to be seen. This group fears that its 
position within the United Kingdom may be weakened. Not 
only is it highly skeptical about the proposed Council of 
Ireland which is to be established jointly by Britain, 
Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland, it is also 
opposed to a Northern Ireland executive which includes
32Robert Fisk, "Bewildering Array of Issues and Party 
Labels in Ulster Poll Today Make Prediction of Result Rash," 
The Times, June 23, 1973, p. 2.
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members of the Catholic community. It seems in fact that 
it wants to return to something like the old system. This 
of course is impossible. Westminster is attempting to 
impose democracy and intercommunal harmony in Northern Ire­
land. Whether it can succeed without a long period of 
violence remains to be seen. The old prejudices which caused 
Lord Randolph Churchill to assert in 1886 that "Ulster will 
fight, and Ulster will be right" are apparently as strong 
today as they were then. The fears and hatreds which English 
Unionists so carefully exploited in order to prevent the 
enactment of Home Rule still survive as the legacy of a 
former age. Englishmen are now trying to conjure them out 
of existence. Whether they will be able to do so in the 
immediate future remains to be seen. The principle of 
power-sharing and the habit of Protestants and Catholics 
sitting side by side in the new Northern Ireland executive 
could lead to a degree of tolerance and mutual respect which 
has thus far been a rare commodity in Ulster history. If 
this should occur, the deep-seated sectarian and ethnic 
prejudice which permeates Northern Ireland society might 
finally have received its first important exorcistic blow.
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